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PREFACE

On May 31, 1951, new and significant changes in the field of
military justice were introduced.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice

became effective, and with it, by executive order of President Harry S,
Truman, the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951.
A unique and important feature of the new Code was the establish
ment of the United States Court of Military Appeals.

This new Court,

composed of three civilian judges, was created by Congress, as a reviewing
authority for significant cases in military justice.

Congress also re

quired the Court, in conjunction with the Judge Advocates General of the
armed forces, to survey the operations of the Code, to report on the
status of military justice, and to make pertinent recommendations.
During the past fifteen years the Court has rendered more than
two thousand opinions, and has docketed almost twenty thousand cases.
It has admitted more than twelve thousand attorneys to the bar.

Yet

this "Court of Last Resort" in the nation's largest judicial system
has received a disproportionate share of public recognition.
The purpose of this thesis is to collect pertinent information
about the operation of the United States Court of Military Appeals, and
to study the effects of its decisions safeguarding constitutional rights
in military justice.

In pursuing this objective, I have freely quoted

from the Uniform Code and the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951.
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Chapter I, Background, is largely based on Winthrop's Military
Law and the Congressional Record.

Chapter II and III, on Congressional

Legislative History and reports on The Uniform Code.

Chapter IV and V

are based on study of cases germane to the subject of constitutional
rights, and personal experience.

Chapter VI is based upon reports of

the Court and the Congressional Record.

In a number of instances the

same material is discussed in several places; this is necessary to avoid
cumbersome cross-referencing.

Tables have been compiled from official

data.
Thanks are due to the faculty of the Political Science Department
of the University of North Dakota for guidance and motivation.

My

personal interest in military justice (after more than twenty years
diversified military assignments with intermittent duty as investigator,
counsel, court member, and accuser) was sparked to unite with an academic
interest in constitutional law and judicial proceedings.
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ABSTRACT

This study was undertaken to examine the operation of the
United States Court of Military Appeals, and the effects of that Court's
decisions upon military justice in the armed services.

Of particular

interest was the Court's concern for safeguarding the constitutional
rights of military personnel.
Extensive study of cases revealed an improving trend in the
administration of military justice at the trial and investigative level
and an increasing concern at all command levels for fairness and im
partiality in military judicial proceedings.

Study of congressional

hearings on constitutional rights of military personnel confirmed that
there has been remarkable progress from the ancient condition of military
servitude to the modern position of recognition of the serviceman as an
individual citizen.
From the results of this study, it is apparent that the Uniform
Code of Military Justice provides protections for an accused serviceman,
that are equal to and in many regards superior to civilian systems of
justice.

Furthermore, the United States Court of Military Appeals,

through its painstaking dedication to protect those accused of crime,
has had a profound effect on the quality of military justice.

vii

INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is the law designed by
Congress to be uniformly applicable to the Army, the Navy, the Air
Force and the Coast Guard in time of war or peace.

It is a monumental

piece of legislation; its passage was preceded by lengthy hearings in
which the viewpoint of every interest was exhaustively considered.
To reduce to an acceptable and harmonious working basis all the
divergent views and practices of over 150 years was a magnificent
achievement.
In this thesis I shall first refer to the historical back
ground of military justice, the provisions of earlier codes, and the
operations and effects of military justice prior to the enactment of
the Uniform Code.

Then, a study of the Code's legislative history,

some comparisons with its predecessors, and its unique provisions.
Among these provisions, by far the most revolutionary, is the
United States Court of Military Appeals.
Next, I will trace the legislative history of this new Court,
its composition and function, and its impact on military justice.
The Court of Military Appeals, from the very first days of its
operation, has been the guardian of rights for all persons subject
to the Code.

In its judicial function it has applied the intent of

Congress, the language of the Code, and the Constitution itself in
safeguarding the rights of the accused; at the same time it has
recognized responsibility in adhering to the disciplinary requirements

1
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of the military.

To observe the Court in action I will refer to some

of the decisions which have contributed to the case law of the military
justice system.
Finally, there will be reference to significant changes in the
Code since its inception, and an analysis of proposed legislation for
the future.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES MILITARY JUSTICE

Pre World War II

Military law is the specific law governing the armed forces as
a separate community.
military law.

Military justice is a system of administering

Of course there are other forms of control of human

conduct under which the military power of a government acts.
forms are (1) martial law,

Such

the temporary exercise of military

authority over civilians, and (2) military government, the exercise
of military authority by one nation over another.

This thesis is

primarily concerned with military justice and the individual rights
of military personnel.
The ultimate purpose of military justice is to maintain
military discipline and thereby strengthen national security.
Command and obedience are basic elements in all military relations,
and it is discipline which effectively unites these elements in the
performance of a military mission.

From time to time, appropriate

authorities have adopted various codes, rules, regulations and
articles as instruments of military justice.
While no written military codes remain from the early times
of the Greeks or Romans, some of the principal military offenses
familiar to present military justice, such as desertion, mutiny,
cowardice and the like were recognized in their armies.

3

Many of

4
the ancient forms of punishments have come down to this day.

Such

punishments as dishonorable discharge, servile duty, hard labor and
many other penalties were known then as now.

On the other hand,

others such as decimation, beheading and maiming have fallen by the
wayside through the years.

Flogging, however, was adjudged in the

United States as recently as 1862.^
The written military laws of Europe date from the Salic code
of the fifth century.

Continental military laws reached full develop

ment by the Franks in 1532 in The "Carolina," the celebrated code of
Emperor Charles V.

Another historic example is the code of Sweden's

King Gustavus Aldolphus, promulgated by him to his army in 1521.
The first complete British military code was that of Richard
II late in the 14th century.

There subsequently evolved in 1689 the

British Articles of War, which were considerably influenced by the
code of Gustavus Adolphus.

This was brought about by the service of

many English officers in the armies of Aldolphus.

The statutory

authority for the articles was the Military Act of 1689.

2

Annually

re-enacted with many alterations and amendments, the substance of
the major provisions remained in effect through World War II.
In America, even before the Declaration of Independence, the
Continental Congress had drawn up rules for the control of the army.
Only three days before George Washington took command of the Continental
Army, the second Continental Congress had adopted the first Articles

^William Winthrop, Military Law (Washington:
2 vols., 1886), Vol. 1, p. 4.
2Ibid., p. 7.

W. H. Morrison,

5

of War, June 30, 1775.

Many of the articles were copied from the
4

Massachusetts articles of April 5, 1775.
similar codes.

Other colonies adopted

These articles were adopted, almost without change

from the contemporary English articles.

Experience in fighting

under the British flag in four Colonial wars over a period of more
than 30 years had convinced our early legislators of the soundness of
the code.

Washington served on the committee appointed, "to prepare

rules and regulations for the government of the army."
One distinctive feature in the development of our national
military law has been the enactment of timely revisions.

The code

was first revised in 1776 after recommendations of a committee of five
consisting of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, John Rutledge, James Wilson
and R. R. Livingston.

6

the British articles.

The revised code was largely the recasting of
John Adams also had considerable responsibility

in adapting the British Naval Articles of 1749, for the early American
Navy.

The United States Articles for the Government of the Navy,

enacted in 1862 and amended on several occasions, were originally and
continued to be in theory and substance, fundamentally the British
Naval Articles.^

3
Worthington C. Ford (ed.), Journals of the Continental Con
gress: 1774-1789 (34 vols.; Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Press, 1904-37), I, p. 90.
^Jinthrop, op. cit., p. 12.
^Journals of the Continental Congress, I, p. 83.
^Ibid ., p. 365.
^Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 6-169, Feb. 1953.

6
The United States Articles of War were subsequently revised
in 1786, adopted by the first Congress after the adoption of the Con
stitution in 1789, and superceded by the articles of 1806.

The next

significant revisions were in 1874 following the Civil War experience.
The 1916 revisions modernized court-martial proceedings, moderated
some penalties and in general brought military justice into closer
harmony with civil justice.
World War I had considerable impact on the administration of
military justice, because of the large civilian components involved.
After severe criticism of the powers of field commanders, the War
Department enacted General Order number 7, in January 1918, directing
that severe sentences calling for death, dismissal, or dishonorable
discharge could be executed only after such cases had been reviewed
by the office of the Judge Advocate General.
Critics, however, insisted that individual rights of military
personnel should be comparable to the right of civilians and should
be safeguarded by law.

In brief they proposed a civilian appellate

agency, similar to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
military justice.

The military leaders held that reviewing authorities

should be free from possible political influences and thoroughly know
ledgeable of the nature, cause and effect of military offenses.
military position was sustained.
1928 were minor revisions only.

The

The amended articles of 1920 and
This code remained in effect through

Q

World War II.

"Articles of War," Encyclopedia Americana, 1954 ed., Vol. II,
p. 356.

7
Post World War II

During the course of World War II approximately 11,000,000
men saw service in the United States Army, and of that number approximately 80,000 were convicted by general courts-martial.

9

Even before

the cessation of hostilities it was apparent to the War Department and
to the Congress that a detailed study of the Army system of justice
was appropriate, if not mandatory.

Accordingly, in 1944 and 1945, the

War Department sent Col. Phillip McCook, former prominent New York
jurist, to various theaters of operation to conduct such studies.
Additional reports were submitted to the War Department from other
sources.
Within a few months after the end of hostilities the matter
was brought to the attention of the American Bar Association, and on
March 25, 1946, the War Department Advisory Committee was established
by the order of the Secretary of War.

The committee, under the

chairmanship of the Honorable Arthur T. Vanderbilt, and referred to
as the Vanderbilt Committee, consisted of nine outstanding lawyers
and Federal jurists from eight States and the District of Columbia.
From March 25, 1946, until December 13, 1946, a period of almost
nine months, the members of that committee engaged in studies, in
vestigations, and hearings, and availed themselves of voluminous
statistical data of the Judge Advocate General's Department and

,

other sources.

10

9
U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess., 1950,
XCVI, p. 5795.
10Ibid., pp. 5795-96.

8
At full committee hearings in Washington, the Secretary of
War and Under Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Commander of
the Army Ground Forces, the Judge Advocate General, the Assistant
Judge Advocate General, numerous other officers, and the representatives
of five veterans' organizations were heard.

There were numerous

personal interviews, supplemented by letters, and the digesting of
321 answers to questionaires from both military and nonmilitary
personnel.

Additional widely advertised regional public hearings

were held at New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Raleigh, Atlanta,
Chicago, St. Louis, Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle.

The subsequent

report of the committee was based on these extensive inquiries.'*"'*'
During the Seventy-ninth Congress a Military Affairs Sub
committee devoted more than one year to detailed study of the Army
System of Justice.

Additional studies were conducted by special

committees of the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, American
Veterans, American Volunteer Corps, the Judge Advocate Generals'
Association, The War Veterans' Bar Association, the New York County
Lawyers' Association, and the Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity.

The

reports and recommendations of each of these groups were made available
to the Armed Services Committee and representatives of each of the
organizations appeared before the committee in public hearings in
support of their recommendations.

Other witnesses, who had particular

knowledge of the subject by virtue of their service and experience in
the recent war, were also called upon.
11 Ibid.
12

Ibid.

12

The combined efforts of

9
these organizations and individuals represented the most comprehensive
study of military justice ever conducted in the history of our country.
During the Eightieth Congress the Legal Subcommittee on Armed
Services, Representative Charles Elston, Ohio, Chairman, conducted
extensive hearings on the same subject.

That subcommittee was in

session from April 14, 1947, until July 15, 1947, and considered all
of the studies to that date.

As a result of these hearings, the sub

committee presented to the full committee, what is now known as
Title 11, Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress.

That bill, which per

tained only to the Army, was included as an amendment to the Selective
Service Act of 1948.

13

This law became the basis for the Articles of War, 1949, and
was made applicable to the Air Force

14

as well as the Army.

This code

known as the Elston Act has been stoutly defended by prominent
military authorities as superior to the later Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 1951.

15

A major feature was the right for enlisted personnel

to have more direct representation on the court.

Traditionally,

court members had always been commissioned officers; now one-third of
the membership could be enlisted.

Actually this right was exercised

in less than seven percent of courts-martial.

The general feeling

13Ibid.
■^The Air Force became a separate service in 1947, but for
several years maintained administrative and logistic relationship
with the Army.
■^Major General Reginald C. Harmon, USAF, in several public
statements in 1958, reaffirmed before the Senate Committee Hearings
on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 19621

10
was that officers were more lenient than enlisted men sitting on
courts.^
During this period, prior to the implementation of the Uniform
Code, 1951, the Armed Forces were continually subjected to press and
public censure for their administration of Military Justice.

One

widely circulated article, by Arthur John Keefe, Professor of Law,
Cornell University Law School and former President (1947) of a Naval
General Court Martial Sentence Review Board, was especially damaging.^
Professor Keefe stated:
Few of us know how completely different the military judicial
system is from the civilian. When a man is inducted into the
armed forces he leaves behind almost all of the Constitutional
safeguards which ordinarily protect him from a capricious
police, or from a hasty or biased judge or jury. His commanding
officer is chief of police, district attorney, jury, trial judge
and judge of first appeal, all in one. If he is suspected of
breaking the law he is tried in secret by men whose principal
purpose is to preserve Draconic discipline.
After the last war more than 20,000 cases were brought before
the special Navy General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board
of which I was President. In almost half of these cases we
found flagrant miscarriages of justice and recommended radical
reductions in sentences. The Army's clemency board likewise
changed many thousands of punishments.-*-^
Spurred on by such denunciations and motivated by a need for
uniformity in keeping with the reorganized defense establishment,
additional improvements in military justice became the goal of Defense
Secretary Forrestal.

The realization of that goal, The Uniform Code

of Military Justice, will be discussed in the next chapter.

■^Stanley Frank, "The G. I.'s Day in Court," Nations' Business,
Jan. 1953, p. 73.
■^Arthur John Keefe, "Drum Head Justice-A Look at our Military
Courts," Reader's Digest, Aug. 1951, pp. 39-44.

CHAPTER II

THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

Legislative History

At the conclusion of World War II, there was considerable
discussion and criticism of the justice systems of the Army and the
Navy which at that time embraced all the military services.

As a

result of this criticism both departments created several independent
boards and committees to review war-time courts-martial cases and
also to study their court-martial systems.
the bar served on these committees.

Many eminent members of

As a result of their studies,

both the War Department and the Navy Department submitted separate
bills, for introduction early in the Eightieth Congress, revising
their systems of military justice.

The House of Representatives

after lengthy hearings passed the bill, House of Representatives
2575, revising the Army courts-martial system, but no hearings
were held on a companion bill in the Senate.'*’
During the first session of the Eightieth Congress the
National Security Act of 1947 was enacted, unifying the armed services
and creating a separate Department of the Air Force.

Since the pro

posed revisions of the Army and Navy justice systems differed in

■^Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, VI (Feb. 1953), 169

11

12
many respects, and in order to avoid having a third distinct system
established by the Air Force, the then chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee suggested to the Secretary of Defense that a bill
be prepared for introduction early in the Eighty-first Congress
which would provide a uniform system of courts-martial for all the
military service.^
Toward the end of the Eightieth Congress, the bill revising
the Army courts-martial system, as passed by the House of Representa
tives, was included as an amendment to the Selective Service Act of
1948, during the debate in the Senate on the bill, and subsequently
became Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress.

This was the Elston Act

3
referred to in Chapter I.
In July of 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal appointed a
special committee to draft a Uniform Code of Military Justice, uniform
in substance and uniform in interpretation and construction, to be
equally applicable to all of the armed forces.

Professor Edmund

Morgan, Jr., of the Harvard Law School was designated chairman, the
remainder of the committee being Assistant Secretary of the Army
Gordan Gray, Under Secretary of the Navy John Kenny, and Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zukert.

Supplementing the efforts

of the main committee was a working group of approximately fifteen
persons, including officer representatives of each of the services,
and five civilian lawyers with service experience, under the chairmanship
o

Legislative History: Uniform Code of Military Justice, in
U. S. Code Congressional Service, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1949, 2222.
^U. S., Congressional Record, HR 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1950,
XCVI, 5796.

13
of Mr. Felix Larkin, assistant general counsel in the Office of the
4
Secretary of Defense.
During the seven month study, the Morgan committee and the
working group considered the revised Articles of War, the Articles
for the Government of the Navy, the Federal Code, the penal codes of
various States, and voluminous reports on military and naval justice
which have been made in recent years by various distinguished persons.
The end result of this combined effort was Senate 857, a bill to pro
vide a Uniform Code of Military Justice, and companion bill to House
of Representatives 4080, as amended and passed by the House of
Representatives.
A subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee held extensive
hearings on this bill, at which time representatives of the Morgan
Committee, veterans' associations, bar associations, Reserve Officers
associations, the Judge Advocates General of the armed services, and
other qualified witnesses appeared.
The difference of opinion of those who appeared before the
committee, or made known their views by other means, pointed for the
most part to the particular provisions of the bill discussed below.
These opinions were carefully considered by the committee and, where
desirable, changes were made.
Article 2, subdivision 1, provides the general jurisdiction
of the Uniform Code over persons in the regular omponents of the
armed services, including volunteers, inductees, and reservists
called into Federal service.

In order to leave no doubt as to the

point where an inductee will, be subject to the code, this subsection

"*Ibid.

14
is now consistent with the Selective Service Act of 1948 to provide
that jurisdiction will not be obtained over those who attempt to
avoid selection or induction.

Jurisdiction over these persons will

continue to reside in the Federal courts.
Article 2, subdivision 3, was objected to by reserve
associations on the ground that it would be used to subject reserves
to the code when they are engaged in all types of inactive duty
training.

Although the committee made no change in this subdivision,

it expressed the view that military departments should issue orders
subjecting reserves to the code only when they are engaged in inactive
duty training involving the use of dangerous or expensive equipment.
Article 3 provides a continuing jurisdiction over certain
persons who have left the service and who heretofore have been immune
from prosecution.

Under this section, •however, such persons are

subject to this code, whenever the Federal courts do not have juris
diction, and when the offense is serious enough to call for at least
five years' sentence and was committed within the statute of
limitations.
Article 15 provides for commanding officers' non-judicial
punishment and combines the practices of mast punishment in the
Navy and Coast Guard and the disciplinary punishment imposed by
commanding officers in the Army and Air Force.

This punishment

consists of withholding of privileges, restriction to specified
limits, forfeiture of limited amounts of pay, and is not imposed
pursuant to trial by court martial, but enables commanders to
impose limited punishments for disciplinary purposes.

In the pp-st,

the punishments authorized have differed in the Army, Navy, and

15
Air Force.

The Army and Air Force have never used confinement, or

confinement with bread and water, as a disciplinary punishment, while
such punishments were traditional in the Navy and Coast Guard.

This

article limits, as a disciplinary punishment imposed by commanding
officers, confinement to seven days.

It further limits confinement

with bread and water to three days, and this punishment can only be
used when the recipient is attached to or embarked on a vessel.
The composition of the three types of courts-martial is pro
vided in Articles 22, 23, and 24,

These articles continue, in general,

procedures already in effect in all services and provide for the
appointment of the members of the courts and counsel, the convening
of the courts and the referral of charges by the President,
Secretaries of Departments, and certain commanding officers.

A

number of witnesses, principally representing bar associations, urged
the amendment of these articles to provide a different method of
selection of court members.

They conceded that the commanding

officers should retain the right to refer the charges for trial,
select the trial counsel, and review the case after trial.

These

witnesses contended, however, that the authority to appoint the
court presented the opportunity to the commander to influence the
verdict of the court.

They proposed that members of a court be

selected by a staff judge advocate from a panel of eligible officers
and enlisted men made available by commanding officers.
Departmental witnesses opposed these amendments and
supported the existing method of selecting court members, on the
ground that the military has a legitimate concern with military
justice and the responsibility for operating it, and,that it is not

16
inappropriate for the President, the Secretaries of the Departments,
or selected commanding officers to appoint the members of a court.
It was their position that to have the court members selected by
judge advocates from among panels of eligibles submitted by the
commanders was.impracticable and unwieldy, would hamper the utilization
of persons on the panels on normal military antics, and could not
operate efficiently in time of war.

A number of added protections,

not found in either the Articles of War or the Articles for the
Government of the Navy, were included in this bill, such as a supreme
civilian Court of Military Appeals, boards of review removed from the
commander, and provisions that the law officer, trial and defense
counsel of a general court must be trained lawyers.

As an additional

feature, the bill included strong penalties against any authority who
attempted to influence a court.

With these safeguards, the committee

adopted the provisions recommended by the National Military Establish
ment .
Article 26 provides the authority for a law officer of a
general court-martial.
officer.

Under previous law the Navy had no law

The Army and the Air Force have had a law officer for

general courts-martial who, in addition to ruling upon points of
evidence, retires, deliberates, and votes with the court on the
findings and sentence.

Officers of equal experience on this subject

are sharply divided in their opinion as to whether the law officer
should retire with the court and vote as a member.

In view of the

fact that the law officer is empowered to make final rulings on
all interlocutory questions of law (except on a motion to dismiss
and a motion relating to the accused's sanity), and under this code

17
would instruct the court upon the presumption of innocence, burden of
proof, and elements of the offense, it was not considered desirable
that the law officer should have the voting privileges of a member of
the court.

This is consistent with the practice in civil courts

where the judge does not retire and deliberate with the jury.
Article 67 of the Uniform Code provides for a Court of
Military Appeals, which is an entirely new concept in the field of
military law.

This court, composed of three civilians, appointed by

the President and confirmed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, is the supreme authority on the law and assures uniform inter
pretation of substantive and procedural law.

The committee believed

it desirable to have the judges of the Court of Military Appeals
serve for a term of eight years rather than hold office during good
behavior.

6

Provision is made for staggering the expiration of terms

of the judges.

This Court of Military Appeals will be discussed in

chapter III.
Under provisions of Public Law 759, Eightieth Congress, a
separate Judge Advocate General's Corps was established for the
Army.
Force.

No such separate legal corps exists for the Navy or the Air
The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force opposed the

creation of a separate legal corps within their departments at this
time.

Since the legal corps in the Department of the Army had been

in operation only since February 1, 1949, and the advantages of such
a corps are speculative, it was believed desirable to postpone the

^The term of office was finally set at fifteen years at the
last conference as a compromise measure. The House wanted lifetime
appointments.

18
creation of separate legal corps within the Air Force and the Navy
until further experience is available on the operation of the corps
in the Army.

The operation of this Code will not be hampered by

lack of uniformity in this respect.

Restrictive qualifications were

included with respect to the appointment of future Judge Advocates
General of the military departments.

7

Identical bills based on the Department of Defense draft,
were introduced in both Houses of the first session Eighty-first
Congress early in 1949 (S 857, HR 2498).

After extensive hearings

the House Committee on Armed Services reported out a revised version
April 28, 1949, HR 4080 (Rep. 491).

HR 4080 passed after debate with

g
some amendments Hay 5, 1949.
The Senate Committee on Armed Services after further hearings
reported out an amended version of HR 4080 on June 10, 1949 (S. Rep.
9
486).
1950.^

This passed the Senate with additional amendments February 3,
The report of the Conference Committee (HR Rep. 1946), was

adopted by the Senate April 15, 1950 and by the House the next day.
The President signed the bill May 5, 1950.

In order to provide time

^Morgan, op. cit.
^U. S., Congressional Record, XCV, 5818-5843.
9
Letter from Louis Johnson to Senator Tydings.

Appendix A.

10U. S., Congressional Record, XCVI, 1321-1339, 1381-1398,
1458-1475.
^ Ibid., 5791, 5825-5827. The conference committee included
for the Senate: Millard E. Tydings, Estes Kefauver, Leverett
Saltenstall, and Wayne Morse. For the House: Overton Brooks, Philip
J. Philbin, Edward DeGraffenreid, Paul W. Shafer, and Charles H. Elston.
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for adjustment, the Uniform Code of Military Justice was not to take
effect until May 31, 1951.
The purpose of the Uniform Code is to provide a single
unified, consolidated and modified system of criminal
law and judicial procedure equally applicable to all of
the armed forces of the United States.^

Provisions Of The Code

The Code is uniformly applicable in all of its parts to the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Coast Guard in time of war
and peace.

It covers both the substantive and the procedural law

governing military justice and its administration in all of the armed
forces of the United States.

It supercedes the Articles of War, the

Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the Disciplinary Laws of
the Coast Guard and is the sole statutory authority for:
1.

The infliction of limited disciplinary penalties for minor

offenses without judicial action;
2.

The establishment of pre-trial procedure;

3.

The creation and constitution of three classes of courts-

martial corresponding to those formerly in existence;
4.

The eligibility of members of each of the courts and the

qualifications of its officers and counsel;
5.

The review of findings and sentence and the creation and

constitution of the reviewing tribunals; and
6.

The listing and definition of offenses, redrafted and re

phrased in modern legislative language.

^Public Law
Stat. 108 (1950) 50
1961, and has become
introduced in almost

506, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess.
(May 5, 1950). 64
U. S. C. The Code was amended in 1956, 1959, 1960,
Chapter 47, Title 10, U. S. Code., Amendments are
every session of Congress.
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The Code, while based on the Revised Articles of War and the
Articles for the Government of the Navy, is a consolidation and a
complete recodification of the former statutes.

Under it, personnel

of the armed forces, regardless of the Department in which they serve,
are subject to the same law and will be tried in accordance with the
same procedures.

The provisions of section 1 of the Code provide, for

the first time in the history of this nation, a single law for the
administration of military justice in the armed forces.
Among the provisions designed to secure uniformity are the
following:
1.

The offenses made punishable by the code are identical for

all the armed forces;
2.

The same system of courts with the same limits of juris

diction of each court is set up in all the armed forces;
3.

The procedure for general courts-martial is identical as

to institution of charges, pretrial investigation, action by the con
vening authority, review by the Board of Review, and review by the
Court of Military Appeals in all the armed forces;
4.

The rules of procedure at the trial including modes of

proof are equally applicable to all the armed forces;
5.

The Judge Advocates General of the three Departments are

required to make uniform rules of procedure for the boards of review
in each Department.
6.

The required qualifications for members of the court, law

officer, and counsel are identical for all of the armed forces;
7.

The Court of Military Appeals, which finally decides

questions of law, is the court of last resort for each of the armed
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forces; it also acts with the Judge Advocates General of the three
Departments, as an advisory body with a view to securing uniformity
in policy and in sentences, and in discovering and remedying defects
in the system and its administration.
Among the provisions designed to insure a fair trial in a
general court-martial are the following:
I

1.

A pretrial investigation at which the accused is entitled

to be present with counsel to cross-examine available witnesses against him and to present evidence in his own behalf;
2.

A prohibition against referring any charge for trial which

does not state an offense or is not shown to be supported by sufficient
evidence;
3.

A mandatory provision for a competent, legally trained

counsel at the trial for both the prosecution and the defense;
4.

A prohibition against compelling self-incrimination;

5.

A provision for equal process to accused and prosecution

for obtaining witnesses and depositions, and a provision allowing
only the accused to use depositions in a capital case;
6.

A provision giving an accused enlisted man the privilege

of having enlisted men as members of the court trying his case;
7.

A provision whereby voting on challenges, findings, and

sentences is by secret ballot of the members of the court;
8.

A provision requiring the law officer to instruct the

court on the record, concerning the elements of the offense, pre
sumption of innocence, and the burden of proof;
9.

A provision for.an automatic review of the trial record

for errors of law and of fact, by a board of review, with the right of
the accused to be represented by legally competent counsel;
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10.

A prohibition against receiving please of guilty in

capital cases;
11.

A provision for the review of the record for errors of

law by the Court of Military Appeals.

This review is automatic in

cases where the sentence is death or involves a general or flag rank
officer.

A review may be requested by petition on the part of the

accused in any sentence involving confinement of one year or more.
Among the provisions designed to insure a fair trial in
special and summary courts-martial are the following:
1.

Under former law and procedure there was great variation

in the nomenclature, composition, procedure, and powers of the inter
mediate military courts; this code completely eradicates all of those
differences and establishes complete uniformity;
2.

In special courts-martial it is not required that the

defense counsel be a lawyer unless the prosecuting counsel is; both
must be equally qualified, however; enlisted men may have enlisted
men as members of the court; if a bad-conduct discharge is imposed,
a full stenographic transcript must be made, and the case reviewed
in the same manner as a general court-martial record;
3.

Peremptory challenge of a member of a special court-

martial is provided, as in a general court-martial.

Voting is by

secret ballot; review by the judge advocate or legal officer is
required;
4.

Provision is made for permitting an accused person to

refuse trial by a summary court (trial by a designated officer) if
he prefers to be tried by a special court-martial; he then would
have the privilege of counsel and of having enlisted men on the court
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if he were an enlisted man; review by a judge advocate or legal officer
is required.
Among the provisions to prevent interference with due adminis
tration of justice are:
1.

The convening authority may not refer charges for trial

until they are found legally sufficient by the staff judge advocate
or legal officer;
2.

The staff judge advocate or legal officer is authorized

to communicate directly with the Judge Advocate General;
3.

All counsel at a general court-martial trial are required

to be lawyers, and to be certified by the Judge Advocate General as
qualified to perform their legal duties;
4.

The law officer (a competent lawyer), rules on all questions

raised at the trial, except on a motion for a directed verdict and on
the issue of the accused's sanity;
5.

The commander, who is the convening authority, must not

act on a finding or sentence of a general court-martial without first
obtaining the advice of his staff judge advocate or legal officer;
6.

The board of review, located in the office of the Judge

Advocates General and removed from the convening authority, is
composed of legally trained men and reviews the trial record for errors
of law and fact;
7.

The Court of Military Appeals is composed of civilians

and passes finally on all questions of law;
8.

When counsel appea^r before the board of review and the Court

of Military Appeals, both parties must be represented by qualified
lawyers;
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9.

Censure by a commanding officer of a court-martial or any

member or officer thereof, because of any judicial action of the court
or any member or officer is forbidden; any attempt improperly to in
fluence official action in any aspect of a trial or its review is pro
hibited .
Among command functions the Code retains are:
1.

Commanding officers refer the charges in general, special,

and summary courts-martial and convene the courts;
2.

Commanding officers appoint the members of the courts;

3.

Commanding officers appoint the law officer and counsel

for the trial;
4.

Commanding officers retain full power to set aside findings

of guilty and to modify or change the sentence, but are not permitted
to interfere with verdicts of not quilty nor to increase the severity
of the sentence imposed;
5.

The powers of commanding officers at mast and company

punishment are retained, for minor offenses which require prompt
action, and for which comparitively light punishments can be imposed.
The procedural safeguards in this type of non-judicial punishment are
considerably less than in the courts-martial, but are believed to be
,
13
reasonably adequate.

Reaction

The new Uniform Code of Military Justice was greeted with
enthusiastic acclaim by most legal authorities.
13

But some were still

This power was increased by major changes in Article 15,
UCMJ, effective Feb. 1, 1963.
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concerned that the reforms over command control had not gone far enough
.
14
"questionably supported" constitutional rights.

Others deplored the

"lack of assurances of constitutional guarantees."^

Professor Keefe

stated:
All this sounds fine. The new code is a step in the right
direction, but unfortunately a short one. The codes' Punitive
Articles are as sweeping and harsh as the old Articles of War
which John Adams copied almost verbatim from the British
military code of 1749. One new Article expressly forbids the
commanding officer who convenes a court to exert any influence
over its decision. But the commanding officer still draws the
charge, elects the judges, appoints the law officer, names the
prosecution and defense counsel, and himself reviews the results
of the hearing. Lawyers or not, the officers will continue to
avoid the "old man's" displeasure.
As for the Court of Military Appeals, it will hear automati
cally only cases involving generals, admirals and the death
penalty. The ordinary officer or enlisted man must ask for
permission to appeal. This is a complicated process and the
average soldier or sailor will have a hard time setting it in
motion. And at that, the high court will be empowered to
probe only for errors in law, not in fact.^
The well known ex-military attorney, Frederick Bernays Wiener,
in commenting on doubtful benefits said:
. . . civilian Court of Military Appeals-as to which all
concerned, in service and out, will have to hold their
breaths. Given qualified personnel with vision and breadth
of understanding, it might work.^
The Association of the Bar, City of New York reported:
In an interim report on the nations new Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which becomes effective May 31, 1951, a
committee praised establishment of a three justice civilian
Court of Military Appeals to review military court-martial*
1

^ George Washington Law Review, XX (1951), 2
•^Georgetown Law Journal, XXXVIII (May, 1950), 521.
16

"Arthur John Keefe, "Drum Head Justice-A Look at Our
Military Courts," Leaders Digest (August, 1951), 44.
17
Frederick Bernays Wiener, "The Uniform Code of Military
Justice," Army (1950).
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sentences. First appointees to this court, the report said,
would set its standard of prestige and policy and only men
outstandingly qualified should be appointed by President
Truman.
While the code represented a considerable advance in the
standard of military justice, the committee regretted that
"last ditch opposition," by high ranking officers had de
feated efforts to remove from the commanding officer of
an accused military prisoner the power to appoint the court
that would try him. However, it was pointed out that the
code would subject to court-martial any commander who
should attempt to coerce or influence a court.
A series of editorials in the press showed continued anxiety
about command control:
. . . it is a good Bill, as far as ,it goes, but it doesn't
go far enough. What it does to provide like procedures in
the various service arms is an essential part of unification
and should be supported and approved. What it does not do
is to meet fairly the challenge of the command role in the
whole court-martial set up.’*'9
Its provisions for a civilian Court of Appeals, for cross
examination at pre-trial hearings and for the presence of
enlisted men on the courts-martial will win wide applause. ^
This command control goes to the heart of military
justice. But the new civilian judges on the Court of
Military Appeals are empowered to make recommendations to
improve the code, and undoubtedly one of the provisions
they will study closely is command control. The new code,
nevertheless, is a vast improvement over the old Articles
and Disciplinary Laws of the Services.^
Despite these criticisms the general consensus was favorable.
On the day the code became effective, Overton Brooks proudly addressed
the House of Representatives:
Mr. Speaker, last year this Congress passed the bill en
titled "A Uniform Code of Military Justice: and today this
law takes effect throughout the armed services. It is a
monumental piece of legislation and is intended to correct

■*"^New York Times, Oct

18, 1950, p. 36.

19New York Times, May 6, 1949, p. 24.
^ N e w York Times, May 8, 1950, p. 22.
^ N e w York Times, May 25, 1951, p . 26
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the inequalities, inefficiencies and injustices of the old
archaic system-or lack of system I should say-prevailing in
the armed services.
The subcommittee of which I was chairman worked for 4
months almost daily, including many Saturdays, on this piece
of legislation. We reviewed every article in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice carefully, made many changes and
made rewrites of it. When this bill left us in the House,
I felt that it was as perfect as we could write such a
measure at that time. I am grateful to the members of the
subcommittee for having applied themselves most diligently
and tirelessly, without fanfare or publicity whatsoever,
to the extremely important job of guaranteeing justice to
be done within the uniformed services.
Mr. Speaker, the public has not had confidence in
justice as administered in the armed services. Rightfully
or wrongfully comparisons, to the hurt of military justice,
have been made with our civilian system of justice and in
variably military justice has come out the loser. I believe
the new Uniform Code of Military Justice will go far toward
bringing the faith, confidence and esteem in our military
courts to the level of that of civilian courts. Certainly
fair, conscientious and wholehearted support of this pro- ^
gram will go far toward eliminating the evils of the past.
The background, legislative history, provisions and initial
reactions concerning the Uniform Code of Military Justice have been
described above.
in chapter V.

The actual operation of the code will be explained

The following table
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portraying the scope of the

three types of courts-martial is included in an attempt to simplify
the language of the code itself.

The next chapter will be devoted

to those provisions of the Code which were the most revolutionary
changes, which have ever been incorporated in our military law The United States Court of Military Appeals.
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U. S .,Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951,
XCVII, 6013.
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Table I - Based on Morris 0. Edwards and Charles L. Decker,
The Serviceman and the Law, (Harrisburg: The Military Service
Publishing Company, 1951), pp. 54-59.

TABLE 1
TABLE SHOWING SCOPE OF SUMMARY, SPECIAL, AND GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL

Special

Appointing
Authority

Anyone who may convene general or
special court;
The CO of detached company, other
detachment of Army;
The CO of detached squadron or
other detachment of Air Force;
The CO or OC of any other command
when empowered by Sec. of Dept.
(Art. 24)

Anyone who may convene general
court;
The CO of a district, garrison,
fort, camp, station, Air Force
base, auxiliary airfield, or
other place where members of
Army or Air Force are on duty;
The CO of brigade, regiment,
detached battalion, or corres
ponding unit of the Army;
The CO of a wing, group, or
separate squadron of the Air
Force;
The CO of any vessel, shipyard,
base, or station; the CO of
any Marine brigade, regiment,
detached battalion, or corres
ponding unit; the CO of any
Marine barracks, wing, group,
separate squadron, station
base, auxiliary airfield, or
other place where members of
the Marine Corps are on duty;
The CO of any separate or de
tached command or group of de
tached units of any of the armed
forces placed under a single
commander for this purpose;
The CO or OC of any other command
when empowered by the Sec. of a
Dept.
(Art. 23)

General

Pres, of U. S., Sec. of a
Dept., CO of a Territorial
Dept., an Army Group, an
Army, an Army Corps, a
division, a separate bri
gade, or a corresponding
unit of the Army or Marine
Corps;
The C-in-C of a fleet, the
CO of a naval station or
larger shore activity of
the Navy beyond the con
tinental limits of the
U. S.;
The CO of an air command,
an air force, an air
division, or a separate
wing of the Air Force or
Marine Corps;
Such other CO's as may be
designated by the Sec.
of a Dept.;
Any other CO in any of the
armed forces when empow
ered by the Pres, of the
U. S.
(Art. 22)

TABLE 1— Continued

Summary

Minimum
Members

1 (An officer)

Special

3

General

5 (Plus a law officer)

Persons
Triable

Enlisted persons only who do not
object (unless they have been
permitted to elect and have re
fused non-judicial punishment
under Art. 16).

Any person subject to Code.
(Par 15 MCM)

Any person subject to Code.
(Par 14 MCM)

Offenses

Non-capital (same exception as for
special courts). (Par 16 MCM)

Non-capital, (except general
court-martial authority may
cause certain capital cases to
be tried by special courtmartial) . (Par 15 MCM)

Any offense made punishable
by the Code.
(Art. 18)

Maximum
Punish
ment

Confinement 1 mo., or hard labor
without confinement, 45 days,
or restriction, 2 mos., and
Forfeiture 2/3 of 1 month's pay.
Reduction in grade (Art. 20; Par
16b MCM)

Confinement 6 mos., and for
feiture of 2/3 pay per month
for 6 mos.
Reduction in grade.
Hard labor without confine
ment, 3 mos. (on enlisted
persons only).
Bad conduct discharge (com
plete record must be kept).
(Art. 19)

Any authorized punishment
(including death, dis
missal, dishonorable
discharge, bad conduct
discharge).
(Art. 18)

TABLE l--Continued

Summary

Super
visory
Authority

Officer exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction (or other
designated authority). (Par 91c
MCM)

Special

Officer exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction (or other
designated authority).
Judge Advocate General's office
in case of those involving bad
conduct discharges. (Par 91b
MCM)

General

Judge Advocate General's
Office
(Art. 65a)

CHAPTER III

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

Legislative History

The earliest legislative reference to a Court of Military
Appeals appears in Senate 64, a bill "To establish Military Justice,"
introduced by Senator Chamberlain in the 66th Congress, 1st Session.
This bill, in Article 52, provided for a Court of Military Appeals
consisting of three judges appointed by the President.

However, the

amended bill, as reported out of committee and enacted into law
(known as the 1920 Articles of War),-*- did not contain the provision
for a Court of Military Appeals.

On the other hand it did provide

statutory authority for the appointment of Boards of Review in the
Office of The Judge Advocate General, in Article 50%.

2

After World

War II, in March 1946, the Secretary of War appointed the War Depart
ment's Advisory Committee on Military Justice.

This committee,

commonly known as the Vanderbilt Committee, in December 1946 specifically
recommended that The Board of Review Authority be revised.
A.

The checking of command control

The final review of all general court-martial cases should
be placed in the Department of the Judge Advocate General
and every such review should be made by The Judge Advocate
General or by the Assistant Judge Advocate General for a

’
*’4 Stat. 787.
2Ibid.
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theater of operations, or by such a board or boards as shall be
designated by The Judge Advocate General or the Assistant. The
reviewing authority shall have the power to review every case
as to the weight of the evidence, to pass upon the legal
sufficiency of the record and to mitigate, or set aside, the
sentence and to order a new trial. This recommendation re
lates not only to checking command control but also importantly
to the correction of disparity between sentences.
In order to make this recommendation effective, Article of
War 50% should be amended. In its present form it is almost
unintelligible. It should be rewritten and the procedure pre
scribed should be made clear and more definite. There seems
to be no good reason why cases in which dishonorable discharge
is suspended should not be reviewed in the same way as are
cases in which it is not suspended.
As a result of this recommendation, the Elston Bill, which was
4
enacted in 1948 as amendments to the Articles of War,
Article 50%.

repealed

This bill provided for review of all courts-martial cases

involving a general officer or sentences of death, dismissal, dishonor
able, or bad-conduct discharge.

It also provided, in Article 50, for

a Judicial Council composed of three general officers of the Judge
Advocate General's Corps.

At the time of the enactment of the Elston

Bill there was considerable activity and agitation by veterans'
organizations and bar associations for Congress to take some action
to preclude "Command control" in courts-martial proceedings.
In June 1948 the Secretary of Defense appointed a committee on
a Uniform Code of Military Justice, with Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Jr.
as chairman.**

It should be noted that Professor Morgan had in 1919

testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs which was
considering Senate 64, a bill "To establish military justice."

In his

3
U. S., Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950,
XCVI, 5795-96.
462 Stat. 627.
^Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, VI (Feb. 1953), 169.
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testimony he was in favor of and recommended the passage of Article 52,
establishing a Court of Military Appeals.

At that time he had strong

feelings that such a court should be separate and apart from the
6

military.

The Morgan Committee in its recommendations for a Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which was submitted to Congress by the Department
of Defense on February 4, 1949, provided for a Judicial Council within
the National Military Establishment of not less than three members
appointed by the President from civilian life.

The Uniform Code of

Military Justice, act of May 5, 1950, as amended, and now codified in
title 10, United States Code, subsequently provided for a Court of
Military Appeals, located for administrative purposes in the Department
of Defense, and composed of three members appointed from civil life.^
During both the Senate and House hearings on the proposed Bill
there was considerable discussion as to (1) The number of persons to
be appointed to the Judicial Council (later amended to read Court of
Military Appeals), (2) Whether there should be a requirement that the
members have had military experience, and (3) other qualifications and
tenure.

Extensive hearings were held by the House of Representatives,

Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee No. 1.

The Senate committee

after studying the proposed legislation, reported the Bill to the
Senate, making the following comments pertaining to the Court of
Military Appeals:

U. S., Congress, Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on
Military Affairs, Hearings, on S. 64, Articles of War, 66th Cong. 1st
Sess., 1919, p . 1381.

108.

^Public Law 506, 81st Cong,, 2nd Sess. (May 5, 1950).
Revised to Chapter 47, 10 U. S. C. 867.

64 Stat.
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Article 67 of the Uniform Code provides for a court of
military appeals, which is an entirely new concept in the
field of military law. This court, composed of three
civilians, appointed by the President and confirmed by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, will be
the supreme authority on the law and assure uniform in
terpretation of substantive and procedural law. The
committee believed it desirable to have the judges of
the court of military appeals serve for a term of 8 years
rather than hold office during good behavior. Provision
is made for staggering the expiration of terms of the
judges.

Article 67. Review by the Court of Military Appeals.
This article is new although the concept of a final
appellate tribunal is not. Proposed AGN, Article 39 (g)
provides for a board of appeals while AW 50 (a) provides
for a judicial council. Both of these tribunals, however,
are within the Department. The Court of Military Appeals
provided for in this article is established in the National
Military Establishment for the purpose of administration
only, and will not be subject to the authority, direction,
or control of the Secretary of Defense. The terms of the
judges are fixed at 8 years. The judges are to be highly
qualified civilians and for this reason the compensation
has been made the same as that of a judge of the United
States Court of Appeals.
Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) provides for the
staggering of the terms of the judges.
Paragraph (3) provides for removal of a judge for
cause.
Grounds for removal are generally similar to those
available against a judge of the Tax Court, except that
mental or physical disability is made a ground for re
moval.
(See 26 U. S. C. 1102.)
Paragraph (4) follows the retirement provisions appli
cable to judges of courts in Territories and possessions.
(See 28 U. S. C. 373.)
Paragraph (5) provides authority on a temporary basis
to fill any vacancy caused by the illness or disability
of a judge of the Court of Military Appeals. The pro
vision is adopted so that statutory authority will exist
to keep the Court of Military Appeals at full strength
during periods when the case load is very heavy. Such
authority is desirable because of the provision in sub
division (c) requiring that the Court of Military Appeals
act uponga petition for review within 30 days of its
receipt.
8
U. S., Congress, Senate, Report no. 486, Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949, p. 6, p. 81
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Comments pertaining to the Court of Military Appeals made on
the floor of the Senate appear in the Congressional Record of February
2, 1950, and are extracted as follows:

9

MR. KEFAUVER... Following this review (by a board of Review),
there is a review for errors of law by a single Court of
Military Appeals composed of three civilians. It is
apparent that such a tribunal is necessary to insure un
iformity of interpretation and administration throughout
the armed services. Moreover, it is consistent with the
principle of civilian control of the armed forces that a
court of final appeal on the law should be composed of
civilians. The result of this pattern for an appellate
system will be that the appellate procedure will be
strengthened by a greater centralization of authority in
tribunals, rather than in individuals as at present.
This appellate system also has the virtue of being less
complex than the present systems and should result in
greater protection for an accused. In general, it is
patterned after the appellate system of the Federal
courts, with the court of military appeals closely follow
ing the procedures of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
While some differences of opinion were expressed by the
witnesses on the merits of the court of military appeals,
the preponderance of opinion was favorable. Several in
dividuals and some of the reserve associations criticized
the court as too civilian in nature and as accomplishing
an unnecessary amount of unification. There was also a
difference of opinion between the Services themselves,
with the Department of the Army registering a dissent to
this type of court. On the other hand, the Navy, the Air
Force, Professor Morgan, the bar associations, the AMVETS,
the American Veterans Committee and a number of other
witnesses strongly favor such a supreme civilian court of
military law. The position of the proponents of this court
is that it is necessary if the substantive and procedural
law of the uniform code-which applies to all persons in
the Service-is to be uniformly interpreted. In addition,
they see a need for a final authority on the law and feel
that the present system-whereby the Secretaries of the
Departments of the President are called upon to decide
questions of law-is completely inadequate. In addition,
they believe that a court of this character, with the
prestige of a United States Court of Appeals will do great
deal to insure public confidence in the fairness of mili
tary justice. The House committee and our committee feel
9
U. S., Congress, House, Report no. 1946 Conference UCMJ,
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 4.
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that a court of this character will result in major im
provements in the trial of courts-martial.
As originally drafted, the judges of this court were
to be appointed by the President, after confirmation by
the Senate for life. Our committee carefully considered
this provision and felt that, since the court represents
a new concept in military law, it was advisable to pro
vide the appointment of the judges for a term of years,
rather than for life. Accordingly, our committee amended
the provision relating to tenure and has made them similar
to the tax court of the United States and some of the
Territorial courts.
MR. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator whether his
committee has made a study of the business which would
come before the Court of Military Appeals which is estab
lished by the bill, as provided at page 161.
MR. KEFAUVER. Yes; the committee has considered that
problem and has made some study of it.
MR. KEM. In the course of a normal year in time of
peace, how many cases would the court have to consider?
MR. KEFAUVER. Considering the number of courtsmartial, the witnesses who testified before our committee,
the Morgan committee, and the House committee, including
those representing the three armed services, as I under
stand, were of the opinion that this court would be
sufficient to handle cases which would come before it.
MR. KEM. I had no doubt that it would be sufficient;
but my question was predicated on whether the court would
have enough to do to keep its members busy, whether the
bill would give the court jurisdiction sufficiently
broad to keep three men busy throughout the year, in time
of peace.
MR. KEFAUVER. I may say that was one of the questions
which arose and which caused the Senate committee to re
commend that the terms of the three judges be not for life,
but for a certain number of years, the idea being that
after a certain amount of experience we would know fairly
well whether there should be additional judges or fewer
judges.
But the general feeling was that there would be suf
ficient work, or perhaps a little more than sufficient,
for them to do, to keep them very busy; that probably
2,000 or 3,000 cases a year would come to them.
MR. KEM. Of course there is no way to estimate the
number of writs of certiorari which would be granted.
MR. KEFAUVER....Mr. President, one very worthwhile
section of the proposed code is that which requires the
Court of Military Appeals to make to the Congress an
annual report in which it will state the number of cases
it has tried, the disposition of the cases and its re
commendations for improvement of the system. At the
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present time Congress does not receive annual recommenda
tions or reports about military justice. u
MR. MORSE„ The purpose of House Bill 4080 which is
now before the Senate is, of course, to create a Uniform
code of Military Justice for all the services. While
there is a common agreement upon the need for uniformity
in the administration of the judicial system of the
armed forces, there is considerable divergence of opinion
concerning the propriety of bringing to military justice
certain concepts of civilian justice, and an even greater
difference of opinion as to the advisability of creating
a court of appeals for the Military Establishment, the
members of which shall be appointed from civilian life.
I refer, of course, to article 67 of the pending bill
which creates a Court of Military Appeals consisting of
three judges appointed from civilian life by the President,
by and with the consent of the Senate, located for admin
istrative purposes in the National Military Establishment.
This court is a direct outgrowth of the Judicial Council
constituted by section 226 of the Elston Act, Public Law
759, in the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the
Army....
MR. MORSE. Two objections have been interposed to the
enactment of article 67. The first is that it places
appellate power of cases tried by military courts in a
civilian body, the members of which are not familiar with
problems peculiar to the maintenance of dicipline in the
armed services. The powers of review of the proposed
court of military appeals are limited to matters of law.
It would seem therefore, that the court would not be re
quired to pass upon questions which involve technical
military knowledge.... ^
The report of the Senate and House Conference contained the
following comments pertaining to the Court of Military Appeals:
2.
In section 1, article 67, the House had provided
for the Establishment of a Court of Military Appeals, con
sisting of three judges appointed from civilian life by
the President, by and with the consent and advice of the
Senate, for life tenure. The House further provided that
such judges were to receive the same compensation, allow
ances, perquisites, and retirement benefits as judges of
the United States court of appeals. The Senate amended
this provision by reducing the tenure of the judges from1
2
0

10Ibid., p .

1391.

11Ibid., p .

1469.

12 Ibid ., p . 1470.
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life to a term of 8 years, providing that the first appointees
should have staggered appointments with one expiring on March
1, 1953, a second on March 1, 1955, and a third on March 1,
1957, after which all successive appointments would be for a
term of 8 years. While the Senate amendment left the salaries
of these judges at $17,500 a year, it discarded the retire
ment benefits accorded judges of the United States court of
appeals and substituted the same retirement benefits as
those provided for judges of Territorial courts.
The conference agreement provides that the judges of the
Court of Military Appeals shall be appointed for a term
of 15 years, respectively, the first of which will expire
on May 1, 1956, the second on May 1, 1961, and the third
on May 1, 1966, with the terms of office of all successors
to be for a full 15 year term.
The conference agreement also terminated the retirement
provisions provided by the Senate amendment and substituted
therefor contributory civil-service retirement. It will be
noted that, as a result of the conference agreement, the
bill makes no reference to retirement privileges. However,
it is a well settled principle of law that employees of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the govern
ment for whom no other retirement system is provided will,
as a matter of law, come within the provisions of contri
butory civil-service retirement. It is the intent of the
conferees that this be the type of retirement for the
judges of the Court of Military Appeals.
The House recedes and agrees to the Senate amendment with
an amendment.13
Although there have been technical amendments to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, the composition of the Court or the qualifi
cations of its members has not been changed since the court was
established.

By the act of March 2, 1955 the salary of each judge

was increased from $17,500 to $25,500 a ye a r . ^

The act also pro

vided for the payment of travel expenses and reasonable maintenance
expenses, not to exceed fifteen dollars a day, when outside the
District of Columbia on official business.

S., Congress, House, Report no. 1946 Conference UCMJ,
81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, p. 4.
14 69 Stat. 10.
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Functioning

The United States Court of Military Appeals (hereafter called
the Court or USCMA) is a civilian tribunal.

It is entirely independent

of the military in the review of courts-martial cases under its juris
diction, but is the highest appellate body in the military judicial
system.

It may be aptly called the supreme court of military justice.

It has been nicknamed, "The GI Supreme Court" or "The Military Court of
Last Resort".

Its decisions establish precedents which are binding

upon the services.

It is a legislative rather than a constitutional

court because it was established by Congress under authority implied
from constitutional provisions other than Article I II.^

For adminis

trative purposes, which extend to such matters as acquisition of
supplies and security clearance of the court's staff, it is located in
the Department of Defense.

16

The Court itself is physically situated

in its own courthouse on 5th and E Streets, N. W. , Washington, D. C.
The three judges of the Court must be appointed from civilian
life.

They may, however, hold a reserve commission in any of the

Armed Forces.

Appointment is by the President, by and with the advice

and consent of the Senate.

They may be removed by the President for

neglect of duty, malfeasance, or upon the ground of mental or physical
disability.

In case of temporary disability, the President may

designate a U. S. Court of Appeals judge to fill the office during the

■^Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 30.
^Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 67.
cited as UCMJ 67.

Henceforth
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period of disability

7

The judges serve staggered terms of fifteen

years at salaries of $25,500 a year.

18

The present fixed term of

office will probably be changed to life tenure which would make tenure
as well as salary equivalent to the U. S. Court of Appeals.

19

A bill,

H. R. 3179, incorporating these features and provisions for retirement
privileges and survivor benefits, was passed by the House of Representatives July 9, 1963,

20

the membership to five.

There has been some consideration for increasing

21

The Court has a staff of approximately forty

civilian employees, and has an annual budget of approximately $500,000.
The original members of the Court, who were appointed by
President Harry S. Truman, were Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn, formerly
Governor of Rhode Island and state Superior Court Judge, Judge George
W. Latimer, formerly a justice of the Supreme Court of Utah, and Judge
Paul W. Brosnan, Dean of Tulane University Law School.

Brosnan, who

died in office, in December 1955, was succeeded by Judge Homer Ferguson,
appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Ferguson was formerly

Judge of the Circuit Court of Michigan, U. S. Senator from Michigan,
and Ambassador to the Philippine Government.

Latimer, whose term

expired in May 1961, was succeeded by Judge Paul J. Kilday, appointed
by President John F. Kennedy; Kilday had been a Congressman from Texas1
0
2
9
*
7

17UCMJ 67 (a) (4).
^Public Law 9, 84th Congress, March 2, 1955.
Stat. 10. The original salary was $17,500.

Sec. (i), 69

19
Benjamin Feld, A Manual for Court-Martial Practice and Appeal,
(New York: Oceana Publications, 1957), p. 91.
20

Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals,
1963, p. 50. Henceforth cited as USCMA.
^Feld, op. cit., p. 126.
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in the U. S. House of Representatives since 1938.

Chief Judge Quinn

was reappointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in May 1966.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Court is
empowered to prescribe its own rules of procedure.
prescribed by rule three and Article 67 of UCMJ.
the record of trial in the following cases:

Jurisdiction is
The Court reviews

22

(a) General or flag officers; death sentences. All
cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of
review, affects a general or flag officer, or extends
to death;
(b) Certified by The Judge Advocate General. All
cases reviewed by a board of review which The Judge
Advocate General forwards by Certificate for Review
to the Court; and,
(c) Petitioned by the accused. All cases reviewed by
a board of review in which, upon petition of the accused
and on good cause shown, the Court has granted a review,
except those reviewed under Article 69.
As explanation of the rule, cases are reviewed on three bases:
(1) mandatory or automatic review such as (a) above,

(2) Certificate

of Review; only the government can appeal as a right to the USCMA;
the service may forward a Board of Review case to the Court for
further review upon specific issues, and (3) Petition for Grant of
Review; the most frequent basis of review is on grant of the accused's
petition "on good cause shown."
Since its establishment, the Court, as of June 30, 1966, had
docketed 19,839 cases.

Of these, 18,364 were by petition, 438 by

certificate, and only 37 mandatory.

A tabulation of these statistics

can be found in Table 2 and Table 3 in this chapter.

23

The cases in

clude review of almost every conceivable type of criminal action.

22USCMA Rule 3.
^Annual Report USCMA, 1962-1966.

It2
*
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is now docketing approximately 800 to 1000 cases per year.
The Court will act only with respect to the findings and
sentence as approved by the convening or reviewing authority, and as
affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law, by a board of review.
Court has power to act only in regard to matters of law.

The

In those

cases which the Judge Advocate General forwards to the Court by certifi
cate for review, action need be taken only with respect to the issues
raised by him.

In a case reviewed upon petition of the accused, action

need be taken only with respect to issues specified by the Court in its
grant of review.

The Court may, and frequently does, review other

matters of law which materially affect the rights of the parties.

24

Of the thirty-seven mandatory review cases there have been two
flag or general officer cases (one Army and one Navy), and thirty-five
25
death sentence cases (thirty Army, two Navy, three Air Force) .

Follow

ing affirmance by a board of review, a mandatory case is forwarded auto
matically to the Court by The Judge Advocate General and may be accom
panied by any assignment of errors or petition of the accused.
The Court has docketed a total of 427 certificates for review
as follows:

Army, 147; Navy, 208; Air Force, 77; Coast Guard, 6.

26

A certificate for review may be filed as a matter of right by the Judge
Advocate General of the service or by the General Counsel of the De
partment of the Treasury (Coast Guard), in any case reviewed by a board
of review.

Such filing is not limited by whether the decision of the*
6
5
2

2^Feld, op, cit.
25Table 2.
26

Table 2.
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board of review is for or against the accused, or whether the Court
could otherwise review the case on petition for grant of review.
Normally, when such a case is forwarded to the Court for review, it
is because there is a question concerning the law of the case as
applied by the board or an issue concerning the sufficiency of evidence.
The UCMJ is silent as to the time limit for filing the certificate of
review; under the rules of the Court it must be filed within thirty days
after receipt by The Judge Advocate General of the decision of the
board of review.

28

The most common group of cases reviewed by the Court consists
of those in which it exercises its discretion and grants an accused's
petition for review on a showing of good cause.

The accused has thirty

days from the time he is notified of the decision of the board of review, to petition the Court for a grant of review.

29

The Court has

docketed a total of 19,364 petitions for grant of review as follows:
Army, 10,498; Navy, 4,442; Air Force, 4,375; Coast Guard, 49.38
Petition has been granted for 2,042 cases; cases granted are about 100
in a typical year; cases denied are about 800.

31

Under the current practice of the Court, the concurrence of
two judges is required for either granting or denying a petition for
review.

Denial of a petition amounts to affirmance of the decision of2
1
0
3
9
8
7

27Military Justice, (Extension Course Institute, Air University,
1962), V, 25.
28USCMA Rule 25.
29USCMA Rule 26.
30Tables 2 and 5.
31 Tables 4-5.
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the board of review, for it serves to terminate the appellate review
of the case.

The granting of a petition for review does not mean

that the case is reversed; it simply means that the Court will take
cognizance of the case and render an opinion. 32
As stated, the Court has power to act only in regard to matters
of law; unlike the board of review, the Court has no authority to
weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine
controverted questions of fact.

The Court does, however, have the

power to review the evidence to determine whether, as a matter of law,
it supports the findings of guilty.

33

Although there are prescribed forms for petition for Grant of
Review, the Court has never insisted on rigid adherence.

Thus it has

held, that a letter by the accused can properly be considered a
petition (United States v.Marshall, 4 USCMA 607, 16 CMR 181).

A tele

gram can also constitute a petition (United States v. Korzeniewski,
7 USCMA 314, 22 CMR 104).

A petition is forwarded through The Judge
q/

Advocate General of the service of the accused.
While the USCMA has been described as "the Supreme Court" for
the military justice system, its function of review is different from
that of the U. S. Supreme Court.

Unlike the Supreme Court, the USCMA's

principal function is to correct prejudicial errors in the proceedings
below.

"Good cause" therefore, consists of specific errors, not the

broader issues which influence the grant of certiori by the Supreme*
3

33Feld, op. cit.
33Ibid.
34USCMA Rule 17.

45
Court.
action.

Not every error of law is grounds for reversal or even corrective
Errors which do not affect a substantial right of the accused

are disregarded.

Error may have been waived by failure to make timely

objection or by a guilty plea, or by the accused's admission of guilt
in his own testimony.

On the other hand, certain errors which affect

fundamental elements of the court-martial procedure provide a ground
for review notwithstanding a failure to raise objection at the trial.
Errors considered are:

35

(1) sufficiency of evidence, which as

a matter of law can support a finding of guilty, (2) errors in admission
of evidence, and (3) instruction by the law officer.
classified into three classes:

Errors are further

36

Errors which deprive the accused of substantial proce
dural rights and privileges (these errors will justify
reversal of a conviction regardless of compelling evi
dence of guilt) .
Errors which prejudice the accused in some material
regard (such errors require corrective action only to
the extent necessary to cure the harm).
Errors which do not present a fair risk of harm to
the accused (these may be disregarded).
In considering a petition for grant of review, if the first
judge to review the record grants the petition his action is sufficient
to bring up the case for review.

On the other hand, if he denies the

petition it is sent to a second judge.

Two denials will normally end

the

appeal, however the third judge may still request a grant if he

has

a special interest.

A denial of petition is announced by the Clerk

of the Court and no reasons are ordinarily given.
If petition forGrant of Review has been granted, the
ask

for final briefs to be filed and consider motions.

35Feld, op. cit.
36Military Justice, V, 25.

Court may

A.fter all
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briefs have been filed the Clerk of the Court sets a date for the
hearing, giving at least ten day's notice.
Hearings are normally held two weeks in every month from
September or October to late June or early July.

At least two judges

must be present and a judge not present at the hearing cannot partici
pate in the decision except by consent of counsel for both sides.
appellant is entitled to open and close the argument.

Argument is

normally limited to forty-five minutes for each side.

Questions by

The

the judges are appropriate.
From fifteen to twenty-five cases are heard during a normal
two-week period.

Cases are assigned to each judge by rotation at a

conference held at the end of each day of hearing.

Each judge then

is directly responsible for five to eight decisions for the Court, and
must also review the decisions of the other judges.

He may concur out

right, concur in part, dissent in part or dissent to the whole of a
decision.

Usually each judge has one of the commissioners of the Court

and a law clerk to assist him.

Differences among the judges may be the

subject of additional conferences to settle points of dispute. 37
The Court generally issues a written opinion in every case
heard, setting forth the reasons for its decision; this is in sharp
contrast to other courts of appeal.

38

The concurrence of two judges

is required for the rendition of a final decision.

The opinion bears

the name of the author judge and an indication as to the concurrence or

~^Ibid.

38U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 193.
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dissent of the other justices.

It is not uncommon for judges to write

separate opinions which concur in the same conclusion but for different
reasons than those stated in the main opinion.

Likewise, a dissenting

opinion which states the legal reasons for the nonconcurrence of one
of the judges is often appended.
known as per curiam.
dicated.
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Another type of opinion is that

In this type of opinion no author judge is in

A per curiam decision is used in a case that falls squarely

within the reasoning of a previous decision of the Court.4^
As of June 30, 1966 the Court had rendered 2,294 opinions; of
these 2,275 were published.

In forty-nine percent of the published

opinions, decisions of boards of review were modified or reversed.4^
The published opinions of the Court are available in many large public
libraries and in most bar association and law school libraries.

The

official reports of the Court are known as the Court of Military Appeals
Reports (USCMA).

The opinions of the Court may also be found in the

Court-Martial Reports (CMR). One or more sets of the CMR's are main
tained in each staff judge advocate office.

In addition the most

recent opinions of the Court are released weekly in unbound mineograph
/ r
\
form. Printed pamphlets of opinions appear every two weeks.
Errors are corrected by the Court in several ways.

If there is

insufficient evidence in the record to support the findings of guilty,
the Court will dismiss the charges.

In a case involving prejudicial*
0
4

•^Military Justice, V, 25.
40Mil itary Justice, V, 26.
4lTable 5, 6.
/O
^Statement of Staff Judge Advocate, Grand Forks Air Force
Base, N. D.
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error, the Court will set aside findings of guilty and usually will
order a rehearing of the case.

The Court occasionally dismisses the

charges, however, if it appears that the interests of justice will
best be served by such action.

When the error affects some, but not

all, findings of guilty, only those affected are set aside.

The un

affected findings are affirmed.
A rehearing may be ordered of offenses as to which the findings
have been set aside.

In a multiple charge case, however, the Court may

return the record of trial to the Judge Advocate General for reference
to a board of review with directions that the board order a rehearing
or that it order dismissal of the findings of guilty that have been set
aside and that it reassess the sentence on the basis of the affirmed
findings.

The Court may affirm the sentence on the basis of the

affirmed findings of guilty if the offense set aside is relatively
minor in relation to the remaining charges.
Where the findings are unassailable but error affects the
sentence, other corrective action is appropriate.

If the entire

sentence as adjuged by the court-martial is affected, a rehearing on
the sentence only may be ordered; or the case may be referred to the
Judge Advocate General for submission to a board of review for
consideration of the sentence.

re

When some but not all of the findings

of guilty are set aside and dismissed, the case may be returned to
The Judge Advocate General for redetermination of the sentence on the
affirmed findings; however, if the affirmed findings are minor in re
lation to those which are dismissed, the Court will order a rehearing
on the sentence.

Rehearings are always before a court-martial whose

49
,o
members have not acted previously in the case.
Errors committed during the post-trial proceedings, as for
example, the inadequacy of a staff judge advocate review, will result
in a case being returned for corrective action to the review level at
which the error occurred.

If the particular reviewing authority is

unable to correct the error with impartiality and freedom from the in
fluence of the previous erroneous action, the case will be referred to
another competent reviewing authority.

Thus, if the error occurred at

a general court-martial reviewing level, the case might be sent to a
neighboring general court-martial reviewing authority for the prepara
tion of a new review, if appropriate.
It has been said that creation of the Court was the most revolutionary change wrought by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

44

"The decision of the Court of Military Appeals is final, and there is
no further review by a United States Circuit Court of Appeals.

45

Numerous decisions of the Court have laid down far-reaching principles
and have overturned many practices and procedures long used in the
military system of law.

The Court has invalidated, expressly or im

pliedly, many portions of the Manual for Courts-Martial and has held
that its use by members of the court-martial is an error which denies
the accused a fair trial.

46

Specific opinions concerned with Con

stitutional rights of the accused will be reviewed in chapters IV and V.*
6
4

^^Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, p. 160.
^ U . S., Congress, House, Report 491, UCMJ, H. R. 4080, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.
^~*Shaw v.United States, 209 F 2nd 811 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
46
HOUnited States v. Boswell, 8 USCMA 145, 23 CMR, 369 (1957).
United States v. Rinehart, 8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).

TABLE 2
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
CASES DOCKETED
15 years
Total as of
June 30,'66

Total as of
June 30,'60

FY 1961

FY 1962

FY 1963

FY 1964

FY 1965

FY 1966

PETITIONS
Army
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total

8,099
2,745
3,196
39
14,079

371
330
252
1
954

431
323
193
1
948

353
268
204
2
827

371
302
176
2
851

471
245
204
1
921

402
229
150
3
784

10,498
4,442
4,375
49
19,364

CERTIFICATES
Army
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Tocal

111
174
43
6
334

11
7
6
0
24

7
6
4
0
17

6
5
9
0
20

3
6
8
0
17

4
5
5
0
14

5
5
2
0
12

147
208
77
6
438

MANDATORY
Army
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total

31
3
2
0
36

0
0
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

31
3
3
0
371

14,449

979

965

847

868

935

796

19,839z

Total
Cases Docketed

^2 Flag Officer cases; 1 Army and 1 Navy,
2

19,521 cases actually assigned docketed numbers. Overage due to multiple actions of the same cases.

On

o

TABLE 3
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS - CASES TRIED BY SERVICES, REVIEWED BY BOARDS OF REVIEW, AND DOCKETED
FY 1962
COURT MARTIAL
CASES
Army
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total
CASES REVIEWED BY
BOARDS OF REVIEW
Army
Navy'
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total
CASES DOCKETED
WITH U.S. COURT
OF MILITARY APPEALS
Army
Navy
Air Force
Coast Guard
Total

FY 1963

FY 1964

FY 1965

FY 1966

72,025
45,529
15,429
835
133,818

60,607
39,033
12,850
593
113,083

43,118
25,041
7,551
347
76,057

43,456
24,565
4,821
327
73,169

38,613
26,936
3,315
310
69,174

1,418
3,212
934
27
5,591

1,465
3,208
762
27
5,462

1,491
2,727
761
13
4,992

1,261
2,376
604
9
4,250

1,092
2,411
437
14
3,954

438
329
197
1
965

359
273
213
2
847

374
308
184
2
868

475
250
209
1
935

407
234
152
3
796

TABLE 4
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS COURT ACTION

PETITIONS
Granted
Denied
Denied by Memorandum Opinion
Dismissed
Withdrawn
Disposed of by order setting aside
findings and sentence
Disposed of on Motion to Dismiss;
With Opinion
Without Opinion
Remanded to Board of Review
Court action due
(30days)
Awaiting Replies
CERTIFICATES
Opinions rendered
Opinions pending-*Withdrawn
Remanded
Set for hearing-*Ready for hearing^Awaiting briefs’
*Disposed of by Order
MANDATORY
Opinions rendered
Opinions pending
Remanded
Awaiting briefs

Total as of
June 30,'60

FY
61

FY
62

FY
63

FY
64

FY
65

FY
66

Total as of
June 30,'66

1,442
12,212
2
9
299

114
842
0
1
8

101
799
0
2
14

88
765
0
0
6

99
758
0
2
5

86
823
0
1
6

112
672
0
0
6

2,042
16,871
2
15
344

3

0

0

0

0

0

2

5

7
36
115
77
19

1
2
23
57
25

0
1
5
88
25

0
1
6
57
25

0
0
4
38
25

0
0
10
47
20

0
0
5
42
18

8
40
168
42
18

311
10
6
1
0
1
6
0

37
2
0
0
0
1
1
0

16
3
1
1
0
0
0
0

18
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

19
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

12
2
0
0
0
0
2
0

14
2
0
0
0
0
0
0

427
2
i

35
1
1
0

1
0
0
1

1
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

37
0
1
0

lks of June 30, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966.

2
0
0
0
1

Ln
NO

TABLE 5
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS OPINIONS RENDERED

Petitions
Motion to dismiss
Motion to stay proceedings
Per curriam grants
Certificates
Certificates and petitions
Mandatory
Remanded
Petitions for a new trial
Petitions for reconsideration of:
Denial order
Opinion
Petition for new trial
Motion to reopen
Petitions in the nature of writ of
error cerram nobis

Total

1

Total as of
June 30,'60

FY
61

FY
62

FY
63

FY
64

FY
65

FY
66

Total as of
June 30,'66

1,228
10
1
22
272
37
35
2
1

91
1
0
4
34
3
1
0
0

95
0
0
1
15
1
1
0
1

89
0
0
2
17
1
0
0
0

84
0
0
1
15
4
0
0
0

83
0
0
6
11
1
0
0
0

98
0
0
4
11
2
0
0
0

1,768
11
1
40
375
49
37
2
2

0
0
1
1

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

3
0
0
0

2
1
0
0

5
1
1
1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

2,610

134

114

109

104

104

119

2,294

2,294 cases were disposed of by 2,275 published opinions. 120 opinions were rendered in cases involving 67
Army officers, 29 Air Force officers, 16 Navy officers, 5 Marine Corps officers, 2 Coast Guard officers, and
1 West Point cadet. In addition, 19 opinions were rendered in cases involving 20 civilians. The remainder
concerned enlisted personnel.

TABLE 6
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS COMPLETED CASES

Petitions denied
Petitions dismissed
Petitions withdrawn
Certificates withdrawn
Certificates disposed of by order
Opinions rendered
Disposed of in motion to dismiss:
With opinion
Without opinion
Disposed of by order setting aside
findings and sentence
Writ of error coram nobis by order
Motion for bail denied
Remanded for board of review

Total
Pending completion as of June 30
Opinions pending
Set for hearing
Ready for hearing
Petitions granted-awaiting briefs
Petitions-court action due 30 days
Petitions-awaiting replies
Certificates-awaiting briefs
Mandatory-awaiting briefs

Total

Total as of
June 30,'60

FY
61

FY
62

FY
63

FY
64

FY
65

FY
66

Total as of
June 30,'66

12,212
9
299
6
0
1,603

842
1
8
0
0
133

799
2
14
1
0
114

765
0
6
0
1
109

758
2
5
0
0
104

823
1
6
0
0
104

672
0
6
0
0
119

16,871
15
344
7
1
2,286

7
36

1
2

0
1

0
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

8
40

3
0
0
115

0
0
0
23

0
0
0
6

0
0
0
6

0
1
0
4

0
1
0
10

2
0
1
5

5
2
1
169

14,290

1,010

937

888

874

945

805

19,749

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

38
1
0
9
77
19
6
0

16
0
1
17
57
25
1
1

19
0
0
14
88
25
0
0

15
0
0
9
57
21
2
0

20
0
1
10
38
25
1
0

10
0
1
9
47
20
2
0

17
0
0
7
42
18
0
0

150

118

146

104

95

89

84

CHAPTER IV

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Scope of Military Justice

Before examining the constitutional rights of military personnel,
we should first consider why this is important.

Fallen and Pepper, in

a very comprehensive study of the scope of military justice,'*' pointed
out that this is really the largest judicial system in our nation.

In

comparing the military with other judicial systems the study pointed
out that in 1945, there were approximately 730,000 trials by courtsmartial; during the same period there were about 37,500 criminals tried
in all the Federal courts--a ratio of twenty to one.

In our most

populous state, New York, there were 207,000 cases for the same period-more than a three to one ratio.

All figures excluded minor offenses.

....We conclude that the Armed Forces at peak mobilization
in World War II not only handled one third of the nation's
crime potential, but also that their courts handled one third
of all criminal cases tried in the nation, with the remaining
two thirds being divided between 49 civilian systems.2
The same study, estimating the peacetime situation of 280,000
cases per year in the military, compared to New York's 267,000 went on
to say.
Thus, even without a large-scale war, it would appear
that the military system of justice handles a greater*
2

^Delmar Karlen and Louis H. Pepper "The Scope of Military
Justice." Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science.
Sept.-Oct. 1952 Vol. 43, No. 3.
2Ibid.
55
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volume of criminal business than that of the nation's largest
civilian system.
....The conclusion seems justified that military justice
is the largest single system of criminal justice in the
nation, not only in time of war, but also in time of peace;
now, and as far ahead as we can see.34
If we realize that the armed service is predominantly composed
of the sex and age group in which the incidence of crime is the highest,
and that the serviceman is liable for military offenses as well as
civilian offenses, we can appreciate the scope of military justice.
Actually military offenses, which are entirely beyond the jurisdiction
of civilian authority, account for approximately two thirds of all persons imprisoned by courts-martial sentences.

4

Further, if we consider that today most of our servicemen are
draftees, and those not actually drafted were impelled to volunteer
because of direct and indirect influence of the draft, we can appreciate
a new peacetime situation.

Now we are actually concerned about civilians

temporarily in uniform, not the hard-core small regular force of the past
Today, in dramatic contrast to pre-World War II conditions, our
armed services number approximately three million; every resident male is
a potential member of the peacetime military; active and reserve obliga
tion encompasses over ten percent of a normal lifespan.

When the

authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity for affecting
the lives of our citizenry the wisdom of being concerned about the rights
of the military citizen should be apparent.3

3Ibid.
4
Ibid., citing MacCormick and Evjen, "Statistical Study of
24,000 Military Prisoners," Federal Probation, No. 2, pp. 6-8.
~*Earl Warren, "The Bill of Rights and the Military." The James
Madison Lecture for 1962, delivered at the School of Law, New York Univ
ersity, Feb. 1, 1962. N.Y.U. Quarterly, 1962.
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Note the statistical tables at the end of this chapter which
confirm the magnitude and scope of the military justice system.
These data indicate that the study referred to above, which was com
pleted in 1952, is not completely valid today.

The reduced number of

cases is a direct result of a recent change permitting greater use of
non-judicial punishment, and also reflects an improvement in discipline
under UCMJ.

Fundamental Rights

The United States Supreme Court and the Court of Military Appeals
both believe that military personnel are protected by "fundamental con
stitutional rights."^

Recently Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in a

lecture at the School of Law, New York University:
....The Supreme Court indicated in Burns v. Wilson that
court-martial proceedings could be challenged through
habeas corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those
proceedings had denied the defendant fundamental rights.
The various opinions of the members of the Court in
Burns are not, perhaps, as clear on this point as they
might be. Nevertheless, I believe they do constitute
recognition of the proposition that our citizens in
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply be
cause they have doffed their civilian clothes.^
The United States Court of Military Appeals unequivocally
stated in United States v. Jacoby, ".... the protections of the Bill of
Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication

g
inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."

Chief

Judge Robert E. Quinn, USCMA, has stated:

^Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 844 (1953).
States v, Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960).

United

^Warren, loc, cit.
8
'
United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960).

58
I firmly believe that accused persons in the military
services are entitled to the rights and privileges secured
to all under the Constitution of the United States, unless
excluded directly or by necessary implication by the pro
visions of the Constitution itself.^
I believe we hold among the most important judicial appoint
ments in the country with the exception of the Supreme Court.
Our jurisdiction is world-wide and with 3,000,000 men in the
armed forces, we go into almost every home. The function of
this court is to safeguard the rights of individuals which
too often are ignored or violated by military organizations.
As the public becomes more familiar with our work, I believe
that draftees and their families will be more reconciled to
military service made necessary by world conditions.
At the time of the enactment into law of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, President Harry S. Truman remarked, "Under the pro
visions of this new and modern code, the democratic ideal of equality
before the law is further advanced."^
Testifying at the Senate Hearings on Constitutional Rights,
General Alan B. Todd, U. S. Army Assistant Judge Advocate General,
stated:
Congress has sought to insure that the provisions and
protections granted by the Constitution extend to those
individuals serving our Nation as members of the armed
services. The Department of the Army and the Judge
Advocate General believe that the intent of Congress
that the protections of the Constitution of the United
States extend to the members of the Military Establish
ment has become a reality. We welcome the opportunity
to discuss the constitutional safeguards extending to
each of us in the military services.^ *
2
1

^United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220, 11 CMR 220 (1953).
letter Quinn to Ervin

See

■^Stanley Frank, "The G I 's Day in Court." Nations Business.
Jan. 1953, p. 36.
^ New York Times, May 7, 1950, pp. 82, 83.
12

U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, p. 99.
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At the same hearings, General A. M. Kuhfeld, U. S. Air Force
Judge Advocate General, said:
....I think there should be definite provisions for
reviews that insure that the individual and all of his
rights are protected. I can say this: I do not think
that there is any question about his rights being pro
tected under the present code. I was engaged 4 years as
State's attorney, for years as Assistant Attorney General,
and would say without any fear of successful contradiction
that I know of no State or no system of the administration
of justice in which the accused or the defendant has more
protection than he has under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice
Testifying at the same hearings, the Honorable Paul B. Fay, Jr.,
Under Secretary of the Navy stated:
Relative to the matter of protecting and safeguarding
constitutional rights in legal and administrative pro
cedures, I feel that the rights of Navy men and Marines
are adequately safeguarded under the provisions of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice.... The uniform code in
sures the protection of individual rights from the time
of having committed an offense until final review of
his case by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals is completed.
The General Counsel of the Department of the Treasury, Fred B.
Smith, demonstrated his concern for constitutional rights by this
statement in the 1966 annual report pursuant to UCMJ:
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Miranda y, Arizona, 348 U. S. 436, 86 S.
C t . 1662, enunciating concrete guidelines for the inter
rogation of persons suspected of crime. On June 15,
district legal officers of the Coast Guard were advised
that in view of the Miranda decision, whenever an Arti
cle 31 warning was given, the suspect so warned was also
to be informed that he had a right to consult a lawyer
before being questioned, and to be told specifically:
"You have the right to have the lawyer or the counsel
designated for you present with you during the inter-1
3

13Ibid., p. 155.
^ I b i d . , p. 51.
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rogation." The Coast Guard was thus the first armed
force to embrace the Miranda rules.^
The views of the members of our legislative branch are better
known.

Some have been cited in chapters 11 and 111; note Appendix.

In his introduction to the 1962 Senate Hearings on Constitutional Rights
the Chairman, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., reviewed the objectives of
Congress as follows:
The hearings that preceded enactment of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice indicate that Congress had in
mind a number of fundamental rights which it wished to
protect for the serviceman....In an effort to provide
for minimal standards of "due process" in major cases,
Congress created the post of law officer,...The establish
ment of direct civilian review of court-martial convict
ions, an inovation in American military justice, furnished
the serviceman a remedy for invasion of many important con
stitutional rights.... etc.
The recognition of individual rights of military personnel is
a relatively recent concept.

The relationship of the Constitution

and more specifically the Bill of Rights has rapidly assumed increasing
importance because of changing domestic and world conditions.
Traditionally, military organizations have been composed of in
dividuals who gave up their citizen rights.
"Servitude."

They were in a kind of

Blackstone referred to soldiers as occupying a "State of

Servitude in the midst of a nation of Freemen", and added that the
soldier's position was "The only State of Servitude" in England.

In

the early years of our own Republic our armed forces consisted of
small bands of volunteers.

The individual serviceman was not highly

regarded and there was little worry about loss of rights on his part.

•^Annual Report, USCMA, 1966, p. 65.
16

Hearings, CRMP, Note 12 SUPRA, p. 4.
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Strict discipline was the rule and was considered necessary for military
success.

There is strong evidence that the framers of the Bill of Rights

did not consider that its provisions applied to any but civil trials. ^
It is interesting to note that even the United States Court of
Military Appeals, whose members frequently espouse constitutional rights
of servicemen, in an early case concluded that such rights do not stem
from constitutional guarantees, but rather are based solely upon Federal
Legislation.

18

In United States v. Clay Judge Latimer stated:

We look to the acts of Congress to determine whether it has
declared that there are fundamental rights inherent in the
trial of military offenses which must be accorded to an
accused before it can be said he has been fairly convicted.
There are certain standards in the military accusatorial
system which have been specifically set by Congress and
which we must demand be observed in the trials of military
offenses.
Some of them are more important than others, but all of
sufficient importance to be a significant part of military
law. We conceive these rights to mold into a pattern
similar to that developed in federal civilian cases. For
lack of a more descriptive phrase, we label the pattern as
"military due process" and then point up the minimum stand
ards which are the framework for this concept and which must
be met before the accused can be legally convicted. The
UCMJ contemplates that he be given a fair trial and it
commands us to see that the proceedings in the courts
below reach that standard.
Generally speaking, due process means a course of legal
proceedings according to those rules and principles
which have been established in our system of jurisprudences
for the enforcement and protection of private rights. For
our purposes, and in keeping with the principles of mili
tary justice developed over the years, we do not bottom
these rights and privileges on the Constitution. We base
them on the laws as enacted by Congress. But, this does
not mean that we cannot give the same legal effect to the

^General Hull was tried by court-martial and sentenced to
death. At the trial he asked to have his lawyer speak for him and was
refused. Since this was a case involving a General officer and death
sentence it came before the President, James Madison, the draftsman of
The Bill of Rights. He approved the proceedings.
(from Frederick
Bernays Wiener, "Courts-Martial and The Bill of Rights," 72 Harv Law
Rev. 266 (1958), pp. 294-304).
18United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
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rights granted by Congress to military personnel as do civilian
courts to those granted to civilians by the Constitution or
by other federal statutes.
As we have stated in previous opinions, we believe Congress
intended, insofar as reasonably possible, to place military
justice on the same plane as civilian justice, and to free
those accused by the military forces from certain vices which
infested the old system. Believing this, we are required to
announce principles consistent therewith.
A cursory inspection of the UCMJ, discloses that Congress
granted to an accused the following rights which parallel
those afforded to defendents in civilian courts: To be
informed of the charges against him: to cross-examine
witnesses for the government; to challenge members of the
court for cause or peremptorily; to have a specified
number of members compose general and special courtsmartial; to be represented by counsel; not to be com
pelled to incriminate himself; to have involuntary con
fessions excluded from consideration; to have the court
instructed on the elements of the offenses, the pre
sumption of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be
found guilty of an offense only when a designated number
of members concur with findings to this effect; to be
sentenced only when a certain number of members vote in
the affirmative; and to have an appellate review.
....We impose upon military courts the duty of jealously
safeguarding those rights which Congress has decreed are
an integral part of military due process.^
The Court of Military Appeals later insisted that except for
the right to presentment by grand jury and to trial by petit jury,
an individual in the military service has every right and privilege
guaranteed to any citizen by the Constitution.

Also in United States

v. Jacoby, The Court of Military Appeals ruled, "The protections of the
Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to members of our armed forces."
Richard L. Tedrow, Chief Commissioner, USCMA, has stated:
There is no question but that all three members of the
present Bench (Quinn, Ferguson, Kilday) hold that those*
1
2

2QUnited States v. Burney, 6 USCMA 776, 21 CMR 9 (1956)
21United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 429, 29 CMR 244 (1960).

2
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in the military are entitled to all constitutional
rights unless they are excluded directly or by im
plication. In the early days Brosnan had various
doubts about this in finding necessary exceptions
on occasion; Latimer took the position that a civilian
constitutional right must first be granted by the Con
gress to those in the military.22*
5
2
A sharp division has always existed between the military courtmartial system and the United States judicial systems.

The United States

Supreme Court has maintained a hands-off attitude toward review of
military justice.
diction only.

23

The Court's interest has been concerned with juris

The Supreme Court ruled in Dynes v. Hoover, that the

court-martial system is not a part of the judicial system of the United
States.

Considering provisions of the Constitution the Court stated:

These provisions show that Congress has the power to
provide for the trial and punishment of military and
naval offenses in the manner then and now practiced by
civilized nations; and that power to do so is given with
out any connection between it and the Third Article of
the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United
States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent
of each other.^
Since courts-martial are not included among the "inferior courts"
of Article 3 and are not a part of the Federal Judicial system, there is
no direct appeal channel to the Federal Appellate courts.

During the

civil war the system of military trials was challenged in the Supreme
Court.

The Court dismissed the case, stating that it was without juris-

diction to review the proceedings of a military tribunal.

22 Richard L. Tedrow, Digest:

25

Annotated and Digested Opinions,
U, S. Court of Military Appeals (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company,
1966), p . 658.
2%arren, loc. cit.
2\>ynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U. S.) 65 (1857).
25E x Parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 243 (1864).
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For court-martial matters to come before the Federal courts,
persons held or tried by the military must petition the Federal courts
for writ of habeus corpus.

By so petitioning, a person detained by or

because of military authority raises the issue of whether the military
has the power to detain and try him.
diction.

This is the basic issue of juris

The petition may be made to the appropriate Federal District

Court and may reach the Supreme Court by way of appeal.

In an early

example, which has been considered as one of the great landmark decisions
in the cause of civil supremacy, Ex Parte Milligan, the court ruled that
the military had no jurisdiction over a civilian, even in time of war,
if civil courts were operating.

The Court was particularly concerned

about the Constitutional rights of the civilian.

26

In Grafton v. United

States the Court ruled:
Courts-martial are lawful tribunals, with authority
to determine finally any case over which they have
jurisdiction, and their proceedings, when confirmed as
provided, are not open to review by the civil tribunals,
except for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction} it
had exceeded its powers in the sentence pronounced.
Later Supreme Court jurisdictional cases, even after the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, have declared that military courts
have no jurisdiction over civilians, citing the lack of constitutional
guarantees.

28

These rulings have declared unconstitutional certain

provisions of the UCMJ granting jurisdiction over civilians.

(Article

3(a) and Article 2(11).2
*
6

26Ex Parte Milligan. 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. ed. 281 (1866).
2^Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S. 333 (1907).
^ United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11; 76 Sup.
Ct. 1 (1955).
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But now with the decision in Burns v. Wilson, the Supreme Court
has shown that; "Court-martial proceedings could be challenged through
habeus corpus actions brought in civil courts, if those proceedings
had denied the defendant fundamental rights." 29
In another case, although not directly involving a court-martial
proceeding, the Supreme Court showed a special interest in the civilian
serviceman's basic rights.

In this case the court considered a provision

of our law that acted retroactively to denationalize a citizen convicted
of wartime desertion by a court-martial.

Under this provision, over

7000 men who had served in the Army alone, in World War II, were rendered
stateless.

It was the decision of the Court that by this act, Congress

had exceeded its constitutional powers by depriving citizens of their
birthright.

Four members of the Court, including the chief justice,

expressed the view that this law, effectively denying the person's
rights to have rights, was a cruel and unusual punishment.

The need

for military discipline was considered an inadequate foundation for
. .
30
expatriation.
The executive branch of our government has also been reluctant
to recognize the constitutional basis for the serviceman's rights.

As

late as 1911, it was generally denied that the personal guarantees found
in the constitution applied to men in uniform.

31

We even find under

UCMJ that some court-martial officers believe that persons in the
military do not have constitutional rights.

The Court of Military

Appeals reversed one conviction where the court-martial president stated*
1
0
3

^Warren, loc. cit.
30Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86.
31

James Snedeker, Military Justice Under The Uniform Code (Boston:
Little Brown and Co. 1953), p. 445 N. 1 citing, JAG, Navy, June 29, 1911.
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his belief that servicemen have no constitutional rights except as
given in the Code.

32

Also in a most recent answer to a contention by

the Navy's Judge Advocate General that, "military law is in nowise
affected by constitutional limitations", the Court said, "the time is
long since past when this Court will lend an attentive ear to the argu
ment that members of the armed forces are by reason of their status,
ipso facto deprived of all protections of the Bill of Rights."

OO

Even the United States Air Force, whose military justice experience has been almost entirely under the UCMJJ

has, at least in

some cases, disregarded some of the basic rights.

An editorial in the

Washington Post was especially critical.
The case of Captain Joseph P. Kauffman, now before
the United States Court of Military Appeals, has ex
posed some thoroughly abhorrent conduct on the part
of the United States Air Force. Captain Kauffman was
convicted, of conspiracy to commit espionage--and was
certainly guilty of conduct that was extremely foolish
if not actually disloyal. But the Air Force, by its
own admission, was guilty of conduct that violated the
law--and violated fundamental standard of fairness and
decency as well.
The Air Force admitted that, in its investigation of
the Kauffman case, its agents illegally broke into the
officer's off-base home four times and searched it with
out a warrant. These agents also tapped his telephone
and listened in on conversations between him and his
attorney. This reckless disregard of the law and of a
defendant's rights recalls the recent case of Airman
Gerald M. Anderson from whom a confession was extorted
after 40 hours of grilling by Air Force investigators
less than a year ago in Idaho. What manner of Gestapo
is the Air Force operating?*
3

^ United States v. Deain, 5 USCMA 44, 17 CMR 44 (1954) .
33Time, May 5, 1967 Vol. 89 No. 18 p. 50.
34

The Air Force operated initially under the Army Articles of
War until the UCMJ became effective in May 1951 (Act of June 25, 1948;
c. 648, 62 Stat. 1014).
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It is beside the point that the conduct of the Air
Force was no doubt prompted by zeal and by concern for
the national security. The Air Force was established
as a defender of American values and what is proudly
called an American way of life. It cannot protect those
values and that way of life by disregarding them.33
The Anderson case referred to caused considerable notoriety for
the Air Force and its Office of Special Investigations.

In this case,

Anderson confessed to a double murder after intensive interrogating.
Seven months later he was exonorated while in theElsinore County, Idaho,
jail awaiting trial.

Another man confessed and convinced authorities of

Anderson ,s innocence. 36
Of Course one would expect the military to be more concerned with
overall discipline than with the rights of the accused.

The armed forces

have always considered military justice, or more specifically the courtmartial, as an instrument to enforce discipline.
Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Govern
ment, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by
Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to
aid him in properly commanding the Army and Navy and
enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his
orders or those of his authorized military representa
tives ."
This followed the British concept, "It must never be lost sight of that
the only legitimate object of military tribunals is to aid the Crown to
maintain the discipline and government of the Army."

38

33Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1963 (U. S. v. Kauffman, 14 USCMA
283, 34 CMR 63).
O£

aJames R. Phelan, "Innocent's Grim Ordeal," Saturday Evening
Post, Feb. 2, 1963.
37
William Winthrop, Military Law (Washington:
2 vo1s, 1886), Vol, I, p. 52.
38
Vol. 6) .

W. H. Morrison,

Ibid., p. 53 (citing Clodes, "Military Forces of the Crown,"
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Professor Morgan, in discussing the background of the Uniform
Code, emphasized the problem of satisfying Secretary Forrestal's directive
to frame a code that would provide full protection of the rights of
persons subject to the code without undue interference with appropriate
military functions.

"This meant complete repudiation of a system of

military justice conceived only as an instrumentality of command."

39

Whether we consider that the serviceman's rights are constitu
tional or statutory, or were given by the founding fathers or subsequent
lawmakers, or were recognized by old or new judicial decisions, the fact
remains he now has protections equal to and in some cases greater than
his civilian counterpart.
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Since our military justice system is based

on constitutional authority let us examine those rights or guarantees
based on the Constitution.

The Uniform Code mentions some of them but

is silent on others, and nowhere enumerates the guarantees applicable.

Comparisons of Justice

All of the guarantees enumerated in the Constitution do not
apply in courts-martial.

Some are specifically excepted, and some are

by their history inapplicable in whole or part.

The prohibition of3
*
9

39

Edmund M. Morgan, "The Background of the Uniform Code of Mili
tary Justice," Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 6-169, Feb. 1953.
^®Carrol C. Moreland, Equal Justice Under Law: The American Legal
System (New York: Oceana Publications Inc., 1957) p. 55. William C.
Hamilton, Jr., "Military Law: Drumhead Justice is Dead," American Bar
Association Journal Vol. 43 Sept. 1957, p. 797. See statement by A.
Kenneth Pye, Assoc. Dean and Prof, of Law,. Georgetown University Law
Center. Senate Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel,
1962, p. 567; and Testimony p. 787. Also see Michigan Law Review, Vol.
63-1, Nov. 64. "...Courts-martial, unlike their civilian counterparts,
are paternalistic and designed to deal with the internal affairs of the
military when summary command discipline is appropriate. The maximum
limits on punishment, the stringent rules against self-incrimination, and
the elaborate system of automatic and discretionary review found in mili
tary courts offer greater protection to a defendant before a court-martial
than he would receive in civilian courts.
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prosecution for a capital or otherwise infamous crime except upon
presentment or indictment of a grand jury is specifically excepted
from operation in cases arising in the land or naval f o r c e s . T h e
right to a jury trial is excepted by implication; that right is inter
preted as applicable to those whom the right of grand jury action is
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

42

The right to a trial in the state

where the crime was committed, and the protection against excessive bail
have never been held applicable to courts-martial procedure; they were
not so applicable at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and
it is upon the background of the conditions existing at that time that
the language of the Constitution is interpreted.

/Q

The prohibition of

warrants issued upon other than probably cause, supported by oath, and
being specific as to place, persons, and things

44

does not apply to

courts-martial for the same historical reason; but the failure to make
any provision in the armed forces for the issuance of search warrants
does not operate to give to military authorities unlimited power to
45
make searches and seizures.

The guarantee against unreasonable searches

and seizures applies to persons in the armed forces, but greater latitude
is allowed, due to the exigencies of military service, in the determination of what may be unreasonable.

46

u. S., Constitution Amend. V.
'Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. ed. 281 (1866) .
[Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1, 63 Sup. Ct. 1 (1942) .

u. S., Constitution Amend. IV.
45

Best v. United States, 184 F. 2nd 131, (C. C. A. 1st. 1950).4
6

46Gillars v. United States, 182 F. 2nd 962, (APP. D. C. (1950).
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Although many scholars have shied away from comparing military
and civilian justice because of basic differences, a number of seemingly
valid comparisons can be made.

Some of the fundamental guarantees which

apply to an accused in military justice are the following:
1.

47

Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation (U. S. Const. Amend, VI).
2.

Right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense

(U. S. Const. Amend. VI).
3.

Right to a speedy trial (U. S. Const. Amend. VI).

4.

Right to a public trial (U. S. Const. Amend. VI).

5.

Right to be confronted with the witnesses against him

(U. S. Const, Amend. VI).
6.

Right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

in his favor (U. S, Const. Amend. VI).
7.

Protection against compulsory self-incrimination (U. S.

Const. Amend. V).
8.

Protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

(U. S. Const. Amend. IV).
9.
10.

Due process of law (U. S. Const. Amend. V).
Prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments and excessive

fines (U. S. Const. Amend. VIII).
11.

Protection against double jeopardy (U. S. Const. Amend. V).

12.

Other rights retained by the people and not delegated to the

Federal Government (U. S. Const. Amend. IX).
The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation agains.t. him entitles him to insist that the charges
47

Snedeker, op. cit. p. 447.
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and specifications apprize him, in advance of trial, of the offense
charged, with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense
and subsequently protect himself against another prosecution for the
48
same offense.

Under the UCMJ,

an accused must be immediately informed

of the specific wrong of which he is accused, if placed under arrest;
he must be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable
after they have been formally drawn; he must be advised of such charges
when a pretrial investigation is ordered; and he must be served with a
copy of the charges prior to trial.

The UCMJ is still subject to some

criticism because of the vagueness of the General Article 134.

This

Article, although an improvement over the former AW 96 and AGN 22,
"Conduct to the prejudice of good order and discipline", is criticized
because a potential offender cannot be sure of the nature of the offense.
Of course when actually being informed of the nature of the charge
specific language is used.

In general the basic right is upheld.

The right to have assistance of counsel for the accused's
defense is recognized as essential to any fair trial of a case prosecuted
by the Federal Government.

49

Assistance of counsel means not only the

right to have counsel, but to have qualified counsel, and the right to
an opportunity for such counsel to examine the facts and the law and to
have reasonable time to prepare a defense.
court-martial,

50

This right applies to

and was denied in part under the old system.

Under*
9
4

^ U C M J 10, 30 (b), 31(b), 35. UCMJ 30 presupposes the existence
and application of the Constitutional Right.
49

The Supreme Court Miranda decision has made the right to counsel
applicable to State Justice, even in pre-trial procedure. This decision
has also resulted in some adjustments in military procedure.
5QJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 58 Sup. Ct. 1019 (1938).
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UCMJ, the accused has the right to counsel at the pretrial investigation,
51
during the trial, and before appellate review agencies.
be provided for him.

Counsel will

The USCOMA has ruled that the right to obtain his

own counsel even applies in the police investigation of a suspect as
52
part of military due process.

The UCMJ provides that defense counsel

for a general court-martial must be a fully qualified lawyer certified
by the Judge Advocate General as competent to perform as defense counsel.

53

In a special court-martial he need not have legal qualifications unless
the tiral counsel (prosecutor) is so qualified.

54

The accused has the

right to choose his military counsel; he will be provided if reasonably
available.

In any case the accused can obtain the services of civilian

counsel at his own expense."’"’

In general the basic right is fully pro

tected .
The right to a speedy trial must be considered as relative and
must be dependent upon the circumstances of a particular case.
able delay is acceptable.

Reason

Unjustified delays, however, if they deprive

the accused of support of witnesses or prejudice his defense are violations
of the right.

Under UCMJ, the right to a speedy trial is protected by5
4
*
2

51 UCMJ 32(b), 38(b), 70(c), (d) .
52

United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 130, 23 CMR 354 (1957) .
This seems to be a forerunner of the Miranda rule.
53
UCMJ 27(b).
54
UCMJ 27(c). In practice, the Air Force now provides counsel
in special courts-martial if the offense is serious enough for a possible
bad conduct discharge as punishment. The Army always refers such cases
to general court-martial where counsel is provided.
55

UCMJ 38(b). "Reasonably available" depends on military priority.

56
Beavers v. Haybert, 198 U. S. 77, 25 Sup. C t . 573 (1905).
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the provision that immediate steps be taken to try the accused or to
dismiss the charges."^

There is also a requirement that general court-

martial charges must be forwarded to the officer exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction within eight days after arrest.
33 contains the provision "if practicable."

58

Article

This condition has been

the subject of some criticism by the U. S. Court of Military Appeals,
which in one particular case stated:
While, under the particular circumstances of this case,
we find neither a denial of due process nor prejudice
to the substantial rights of the accused, we emphasize
the duty and responsibility of every officer to comply
with the mandates of the Uniform Code. In the past, we
fear, Article 33 has been observed more often in the
breach than in following its clear terms. In order to
avoid future controversies in this area, we suggest
that the attention of all concerned with the processing
of court-martial matters be forcibly drawn to its un
ambiguous command.59
While there is punitive action provided against offenders^ for violating
Article 33, there is no Code remedy provided for the accused.

In general

the right is upheld and most military cases are completed more quickly
. ...
61
than civilian cases.
The right to a public trial is a right to have the court sit
"with open doors" during the presentation of evidence.

It originated

because of aversion to Star Chamber practice, and was imprinted on the
minds of our country's founders by fears arising from memory of the*
0
6
8
5

“*^UCMJ 10. The constitutional right was discussed in the
hearings on the Code. House Hearings UCMJ, 829, 906, 911, 983, 1012.
58

UCMJ 33.

-^United States v. McKenzie, 14 USCMA 261, 34 CMR 141 (1964).
60UCMJ 98.
iMorris 0. Edwards and Charles L. Decker, The Serviceman and
The Law (Harrisburg:

The Military Service Publishing Co., 1961) p. 93.
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Spanish Inquisition.

62

The scope of the right has been subject to dis

agreement, but according to the Supreme Court, the purpose is to allow
the public to see that the accused received fair treatment and to act
as an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial powers.

63

The accepted practice is to exclude young persons when public decency
may be offended.

Under the Uniform Code the same general rules apply.

The right to a public trial is not specifically mentioned in UCMJ, but
in the House hearings on the Code, it was discussed and agreed that the
right applied.

64

The U. S. Court of Military Appeals has indicated

that except in security matters, the right to a public trial is the
same in the military as in civilian courts.

65

There is a provision in

the Code to extend the Statute of Limitations if trials must be deferred
during wartime.
The right of confrontation is a common law right which has always
had some exceptions.

Typical exceptions are dying declarations and

former sworn testimony of a witness now deceased.
preserved and continued the common law right.

67

The Sixth Amendment

This right assures an

accused that only those witnesses who personally appear at his trial
and are subject to his cross examination can testify against him.
Under UCMJ this right is only partially upheld.

The Code provides that

the prosecution may, upon notice to the accused, take depositions of*
5
6
62

In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 68 Sup. C t . 499 (1948)

63t,
.,
Ibid.
64House Hearings UCMJ, 743, 983, 1044.
65United States v. Brown, 7 USCMA 251, 22 CMR 41 (1957).

66
67

UCMJ 43(e).

See also MCM 53(e).

Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S. 47, 19 Sup. Ct. 878 (1899)

75
witnesses who are unable or refuse to testify in person.
tions may be read in evidence.

68

Such deposi-

The U. S. Court of Military Appeals,

however, has ruled that valid depositions require the presence of accused
or defense counsel at the taking, and that written interrogatories are
insufficient protection for the rights of the accused.

Of course the

69
accused can waive this right.

This ruling is considered an exception

ally strong pronouncement for the accused's constitutional rights.
Statutory authority for depositions based on military necessity date
back to AW 25 and AGN 68.

The unconstitutional aspects have been

argued many times in the past.^

With the USCMA ruling, the right is

substantially upheld in military justice.
The right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the
accused's favor is not an absolute right; it should not be denied,
however, unless the demand for witnesses is unreasonable.

It was not

a common law right and the constitutional guarantee does not compel
the prosecution to secure the attendance of defense witnesses.^
Examples of unreasonableness might be the immaterial nature of the ex
pected testimony, or the accumulation of extra corroborative witnesses.
In Federal criminal cases it is the duty of the Judge to issue subpoenas
and to send for defense witnesses within jurisdiction of the court.

This

72
may be at government expense if the accused is unable to bear the cost.6
1
7
*
8

68UCMJ 49.
^ United States v. Jacoby, 11 USCMA 428, 29 CMR 244 (1960) .
^Antieau, "Courts-martial and the Constitution," 33 Marq. L.
Rev. 25 (1949) .
71Keller v. State, 123 Ind. 110, 23 N. E. 1138, 18 AM. St.
7^United States v. Kenneally, 26 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 15, 522,
(N. D. 166, 1870) .

76
Under UCMJ the right to have compulsory process to obtain defense
witnesses is authorized,

"The trial counsel, defense counsel and the

court-martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and
other evidence in accordance with such regulations as the President may
73
prescribe,"

There has been some anxiety concerning the "equal

opportunity" condition.

"The issuances of subpoenas for distant

witnesses has sometimes been dependent upon the state of the budget,
not upon the materiality of the testimony

„74

The United States Court

of Military Appeals has had relatively few issues of compulsory process,
but has been careful to protect the right of the accused.
The right against compulsory self-incrimination is one of the
most publicized in our society.

The basic rule is aimed at physical or

moral compulsion to extort communications which would expose to criminal
prosecution the person from whom they are extorted.

76

It is not limited

to oral testimony, but protects against the use of legal process to
compel production in evidence of written communications, such as books
and papers, of an incriminating character.^ It applies to a witness as
well as to the accused.

The accused cannot be compelled to testify at

78
his own trial; if he becomes a witness it must be at his own request.*
7

73UCMJ 46.
7^Snedeker, op. cit. p. 453.
75United States v. Thorton, 8 USCMA 446, 24 CMR 256 (1958).
United States v. Hawkins, 6 USCMA 135, 19 CMR 261 (1955). United States
v. Daniels, 11 USCMA 52, 28 CMR 276 (1960).
76

Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2 (1910).

77 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
78

u. S., Constitution Amend. V . "....nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself...."

77
The right extends to joint trials in that one accused may not be com
pelled to testify against the other.

Of course voluntary confessions,

statements, etc, are not self-incrimination if introduced into evidence.
The requirements for accused persons to undergo intoxication tests,
display parts of the body, assume a specific stance, etc. are not con
sidered compulsory self-incrimination in Federal Courts.
this right is more than adequately protected.

7 9

Under UCMJ

This constitutional

right was covered in the old AW 24 and AGN 42, but the Code goes even
further.

The UCMJ prohibits anyone subject to the Code from interrogating

or taking any statements from an accused, before informing him of the
nature of the accusation, and advising him of his right to refuse to
make any statement.

Compulsion of any sort is prohibited and may itself

be punishable by the Code.

Although the right is legally established,

the superior-subordinate relationship in a military society has some
,
80
tendency to be a form of compulsion.

Winthrop, one of the most revered

authorities on military law, long ago recommended that, in view of the
authority and influence of superior rank, confessions made by military
subordinates held in confinement should be held incompetent.

81

The

United States Court of Military Appeals negated certain provisions of
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, by rulings on the
privilege against self-incrimination.
the privilege is violated:
79

UCMJ 31.

The USCMA decisions said that

by requiring an accused to make a sample

House Hearings UCMJ, 988.

80

See Professor Arthur Keefe's description of the Navy's "Sugar
Cane Rape Cases" in Hawaii in 35 Cornell L. Q. 164 (1949). See also
notes 35 and 36 Supra.
oi
Winthrop, op. cit., p. 329.
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of his handwriting;

by requiring an accused to utter words for the

purpose of voice identification;

83

and by compelling a person to furnish

a urine specimen for the purpose of using an analysis of it, as evidence
against him.

84

These decisions have made it clear that Article 31,

UCMJ, is much broader than the Fifth Amendment and affords greater pro
tection to the military accused.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures

85

is

dependent upon the reasonableness of a search or seizure made without
a search warrant, considering all the circumstances.

The boundaries

of the right of privacy are not necessarily those of reasonableness,
and the opportunity to secure a search warrant in advance is but one
factor, not a conclusive test.

A search may be reasonable if made as
O£

an incident to a lawful arrest.

Also the Supreme Court has held

that, a search without a warrant may be conducted on "probable cause"
if an offense is in progress.

The Rabinowitz v. United States and

other recent decisions demonstrate that easy generalizations in this
field are extremely dangerous; it is difficult to formulate a precise
rule which can be applied to every case.

The law of search and seizure

^ United States v, Rosato, 3 USCMA 143, 11 CMR 143 (1953) .
United States v. Eggers, 3 USCMA 191, 11 CMR 191 (1953).
^United States v. Greer, 3 USCMA 576, 13 CMR 132 (1953).
84United States v. Jordan. 7 USCMA 542, 22 CMR 242 (1957).
85

In general, the Fourth Amendment forbids police officers to
search persons, houses, papers and effects without a warrant issued by
a proper judicial officer.
88A search may be made without a warrant as an incident to a
lawful arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 359 U. S. 56, 70 Sup. Ct.
430 (1950).

79
is uncertain and extremely complex.

For example, even though probable

cause for arrest of a person may justify the arrest, a subsequent search
may be made unreasonable because of the method used.

88

Related to the

basic right of the Fourth Amendment is the right of privacy in the use
of communications media.

This is supported by section 605, Federal

Communications Act of 1934,

89

which provided that, "no person not being

authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of such intercepted communication to any person."

The basic

use of wiretaps and other communications interception techniques is a
90
controversial legal issue.

In the military, under UCMJ, the protection

against unreasonable searches and seizures applies fully to the private
homes and property of persons subject to military law when they are
located outside the limits of areas under military control.

91

The pro

tection applies also to quarters and property inside areas under
military control, but the reasonableness test might well be different;
consider, for example, the responsibility of the commanding officer for
safety, order, and discipline in such areas.

"The mere fact that the

issuance of search warrants by the armed forces is not provided for,

8^Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1959), p. 546.

88

Forcible use of a stomach pump without consent was held un
reasonable. United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S. D. Calif., 1949).
8948 Stat. 1103; 47 U. S. C. 605.
98W. S. Fairfield and Charles Clift, "The Wiretappers," The
Reporter, Dec. 23, 1952, p. 9; Jan. 6, 1953, pp. 9-20.
9^House Hearings UCMJ, 1062.
9^Best v. United States, 184 F. 2nd. 131 (CCA 1st. 1950).
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however, does not confer upon such forces the power to make unreasonable
searches and seizures."

93

Evidence is inadmissible against an accused

if it was obtained as a result of an unlawful search or in violation of
the Federal Communications Act of 1934.

Additionally, all evidence

obtained through information supplied by such illegally obtained evidence
is likewise inadmissible.

94

In general, the Federal rules are applicable

and the right is well protected.

"The general principles governing

search and seizures are simple, but not always easy to apply.
each case must depend upon its own facts."

95

Essentially

USCMA decisions will be

discussed in the following chapter.
The right to Due Process of Law has been another highly publicized
and controversial doctrine in constitutional law.

The major controversy

has been concerned with its application to States, as a clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment.

96

The basic right,

....nor be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law....,"
of Federal and therefore Military Justice.

97

is the concern

Due process is generally a

procedural right and is the recognition and respect of substantial rights
other than the specific fundamental rights listed in the Constitution
and Amendments.

These rights have generally been deemed essential to

a fair trial in American Justice.
93

When any of these rights are denied

Ibid.

94
MCM 152, Also see Major Fenton J. Mee, USMC, "Search and
Seizure," Navy JAG Journal, Mar., 1948, p. 2.
95

United States v. Wilcher, 4 USCMA 215, 15 CMR 215.

96
Walton H. Hamilton, "The Path of Due Process of Law," The
Constitution Reconsidered (Conyers Read, ed.) (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1938), p. 167.
97

U. S., Constitution Amendment, V.
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and the denial is a substantial prejudice against an accused, there has
98
been a denial of due process.

In military justice, the right to due

process is not well covered under UCMJ.

There has developed, however,

a "military due process" pattern for fair treatment.

This pattern is

based on the laws enacted by Congress and generally parallel civilian
justice.

The United States Court of Military Appeals has assumed the

role of enforcing this concept.

"We impose upon military courts the

duty of jealously safeguarding those rights which Congress has decreed
are an integral part of military due process."

99

The Supreme Court

moreover in Burns v. Wilson stated:
....For the constitutional guarantee of due process is
meaningful enough, and sufficiently adaptable, to protect
soldiers-as well as civilians-from the crude injustices
of a trial so conducted that it becomes bent on fixing
guilt by dispensing with rudimentary fairness rather than
by finding truth through adherence to those basic
guarantees which have long been recognized and honored
by the military courts as well as the civil courts.
There are of course, many military due process rights and protections
for the accused, in the Code and the Manual for Courts-Martial, but
they are not defined as such.

As cited by USCMA these are:^^

1.

To be informed of the charges against him.

2.

To cross-examine witnesses for the Government.

3.

To challenge members of the court for cause or per

emptorily.
4.

(UCMJ 10, 30).
(MCM 149).

(UCMJ 41).
To have a specified number of members compose General and

Special court-martial (UCMJ 29).
98

Snedeker, op. cit., p. 456 citing House Hearings UCMJ 1013.

" United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
100Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 73 Sup. C t . 1045 (1953).
’
'‘^United States v. Clay, Supra, pertains to 1-10 only.
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5.

To be represented by counsel (UCMJ 27).

6.

Not to be compelled to incriminate himself (UCMJ 31).

7.

To have involuntary confessions excluded from consideration

(UCMJ 31) .
8.

To have the court instructed on the elements of the offenses,

the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof (UCMJ 51).
9.

To be found guilty of an offense only when a designated

number of members concur with findings to this effect (UCMJ 52).
10.

To be sentenced only when a certain number of members vote

in the affirmative (UCMJ 52).
11.

The pre-trial investigation (UCMJ 32).

102

In summary, the concept of military due process serves as a substitute
to the civilian constitutional right to due process of law.
The protection against cruel and unusual punishments and ex
cessive fines was directed principally at the brutality of early
English law.

Some of the cruel and degrading punishments presumedly

considered were:

beheading and quartering, dragging through the streets,

disembowelling alive, burning at the stake, mutilation by cutting off
hands and ears, and the use of many barbarous forms of torture.

103

Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death,
or are inhuman or barbarous.

104

Flogging, keel-hauling, and confinement

in irons were not unusual in the armed services at the time of adoption
102
10

United States v. Allen, 5 USCMA 626, 18 CMR 250, (1955).
3

David Fellman, "Cruel and Unusual Punishments," Journal of
Politics , Feb. 1957, p. 35.
^Sjeems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 30 Sup. C t . 544
(1910) .
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of the Bill of Rights; they were, however, prohibited by law by 1861.
Confinement on a bread and water diet was upheld as not cruel and unusual punishment when inflicted by a civilian court in 1907.

106

is still an authorized punishment in the United States Navy.

This

In the

military today, UCMJ prohibits punishment by flogging, branding,
marking or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual punish
ment.

The Code also prohibits the use of irons, except for the purpose

of safe custody.

107

The Code still authorizes confinement on bread and

water, but limits its imposition to not more than three consecutive days
as a non-judicial punishment against enlisted offenders attached to or
embarked in a vessel.

108

Since it is not a prohibited punishment, a

navy court-martial could adjudge up to thirty days confinement on bread
and water; the three consecutive day restriction for bread and water
still applies.

Loss of pay within the limits prescribed by the President

or provided for as a fine by statute is not excessive.

The right is

adequately protected.
The protection against double jeopardy as stated in the Fifth
Amendment, "....for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life and limb," has been liberally construed to preclude a second
prosecution for the same offense regardless of punishment.

1059 Stat. 515 (1850).

109

12 Stat. 317 (1861).

106

Spencer v. State, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N. W. 462, 122 Am. St.
Rep. 989 (1907).
107UCMJ 55.
1 no

UCMJ 15(b) (2) (A).
Chap. V, Note 94.
109

Revision effective Feb. 1, 1963, but see

.
Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall.

163 (U. S. 1874).
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Although a controversial subject for many years, jeopardy is considered
to begin at the time of arraignment.11^

Since state and federal courts

derive their authority from a different sovereign source, an accused can
be prosecuted by both without being in double jeopardy.

Many states

have, however, extended protection against trial in state courts after
trial for the same offense under federal authority.

Although the

question has not been definitely decided, the Supreme Court indicated
that the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment apply to
courts-martial.

111

In the military, under UCMJ, Article 44 provides

that no person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for
the same offense.

The major distinction, which carries over from the

old Article of War 40, provides that a trial is not terminated, if
found guilty, until review of the case has been fully completed.

112

Since a court-martial is a federal court an accused may not be tried
for the same offense in another federal court.
tried by both a state court and a court-martial.

He may, however, be
In practice, the

armed services do not prosecute by a court-martial if there has been
a conviction in a civil court.

There are circumstances of course which

may prompt the military to prosecute.

113

The right against double

jeopardy is inferior to the civilian constitutional right.

H^Ibid., Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 24 Sup. C t .
797 (1904).
U 1 Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 69 Sup. C t . 834 (1949).

112

UCMJ 44(b). Rehearings are provided to prevent "an obviously
guilty man" from escaping punishment "on a technicality." Hearings
UCMJ 1180. An exception is lack of sufficient evidence, UCMJ 63.
113

See statement by Brigadier General Alan B. Todd, Appendix C.
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The other rights "retained by the people" statement of the
Ninth Amendment is designed to dispel any theory that the enumerated
rights in the Constitution form a complete list.

It preserves to the

people those safeguards which are inherent in Anglo-Saxon justice.

The

concept that a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty is such
a right.

This right is expressly covered by UCMJ which provides that

the presumption of innocence be brought to the attention of a courtmartial before a vote is taken as to guilt or innocence.

114

The Code

also provides for the burden of proof.
Those rights enumerated and discussed above are also not a
complete and closed list.

Note Table 9 at the end of this chapter

which makes a comparison of civilian and military rights.

116

Beyond

these rights of the accused, are other constitutional and natural
rights which are not directly related to criminal justice.

For example

the right to marry enters into a military justice case, when a conviction
of failure to obey a lawful order was set aside; the order requiring a
six months' waiting period was not lawful, as it was an unreasonable
restraint of personal f r e e d o m . T h e guardian role of the United
States Court of Military Appeals in specific cases will be discussed
in the next chapter.
114
UCMJ 51(c) (1) and (2).
115UCMJ 51(c ) (4).
116

Edwards and Decker, op. cit.

Table 9.

^^Earl Snyder, Every Serviceman's Lawyer (Harrisburg: The
Stackpole Company, 1960), p. 28. Similarly, unlawful restraints of
freedom of speech have been corrected by UCMA.

TABLE 7
NUMBERS OF COURTS-MARTIAL BY TYPE FOR FISCAL YEARS SHOWN - U. S. ARMY

General

Special

Summary

All Courts-Martial

FY
Convicted

1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943

7,155
10,348
14,184
5,944
6,660
5,577
3,839
4,379
5,170
5,196
4,983
5,465
4,638
4,701
3,656
2,783
1,580
1,481
1,316
1,643
2,062
2,579
1,959
1,776
3,187
3,225
13,836

Total

7,737
12,357
16,547
6,769
7,905
6,468
4,310
4,671
5,475
5,493
5,239
5,743
4,861
4,909
4,052
2,954
1,681
1,590
1,407
1,742
2,223
2,699
2,046
1,851
3,388
3,725
14,782

Convicted

3,604
13,294
21,307
5,116
6,717
7,863
6,550
6,022
6,948
5,751
4,804
5,760
5,410
5,301
5,461
4,719

,

Total

Convicted

3,942
14,734
24,452
5,838
7,410
8,545
7,139
6,536
7,517
6,428
5,491
6,176
5,744
5,650
5,805
4,983
4,138

75,509
202,173
197,585
54,198
39,004
20,639
16,194
13,091
13,656
13,129
10,540
12,470
12,417
12,554
12,763
12,115

Total

79,097
211,913
209,445
59,961
40,778
21,362
16,812
13,556
14,129
13,566
11,798
12,906
12,750
12,906
13,072
12,331
10,350

Convicted

Acquit
ted

Total

86,268
225,815
233,076
65,308
52,381
34,079
26,583
23,492
25,774
24,076
20,327
23,695
22,465
22,556
21,880
19,617

4,508
13,183
17,368
7,260
3,712
2,296
1,678
1,271
1,347
1,411
2,201
1,130
890
909
1,049
651

90,776
239,004
250,444
72,568
56,093
36,375
28,261
24,763
27,121
25,487
22,528
24,825
23,355
28,465
22,929
20,268
16,169

15,984
36,141
103,798
315,097

439
994
4,264
8,052

'
4,208
9,473
36,650
113,386

4,016
4,431
9,926
38,418
117,697

10,000
23,481
63,923
187,875

9,596
10',141
23,821
65,919
190,670

15,658
16'428
37,135
108,062
323,149

TABLE 7— Continued

General
FY

Convicted

1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966

Special

All Courts-Martial

Summary

Average
Strength

7,507,000
8,131,000
4,816,000
1,417,000
585,000
657,000
632,000
1,090,000
1,597,000
1,536,000
1,477,000
1,311,000
1,083,000
1,004,000
939,000
889,000
921,760
923,828
1,053,706
1,015,142
' 1,015,287
1,016,832
1,096,803

21,547
24,102
32,657
9,382
8,928
5,130
4,736
4,819
7,376
10,444
9,642
9,359
7,404
5,308
3,560
2,251
1,959
1,768
1,762
1,762
1,763
1,463
1,386

Total

22,815
25,671
35,977
9,977
9,561
5,532
5,090
5,206
8,037
11,168
10,149
9,884
7,750
5,586
3,767
2,376
2,060
1,899
1,876
1,843
1,865
1,553
1,476

Convicted

168,675
48,027

25,484
50,335
62,079
50,995
43,030
34,203
32,594
26,424
19,075
19,279
22,108
25,254
25,147
23,102
23,757
22,169

Total

204,123
175,591
50,402
44,130
36,971
25,119
30*359
27*404
53,483
65,547
54,144
45,852
36,451
34,761
28,125
20,287
20,424
23,471
26,607
26,448
24,327
24,813
23,121

Convicted

272,163
98,707

88,564
97,266
76,922
60,615
48,857
49,907
43,368
34,875
33,414
36,499
41,694
30,939
16,055
16,106
13,169

Total

292,172
279*146
101,625
97,104
81*794
52*597
68*128
79*226
90*950
100,888
79,498
62,613
50,702
51,978
45,156
35,224
34,682
38,049
43,542
32,316
16,926
17,090
14,016

Convicted

Acjujt-

464,940
179,391

15,468
8,613

146,275
169,789
137,559
113,004
90,464
87,809
73,352
56,201
54,652
60,575
68,710
57,848
40,920
41,326
36,724

6,195
7,807
6,232
5,345
4,439
4,516
3,695
2,686
2,514
3,044
3,315
2,759
2,198
2,130
1,889

Total

519,110
480*408
188,004
151,211
128*326
83*246
103*577
111*836
152*470
177,596
143,791
118,349
94,903
92,325
77,048
58,887
57,166
63,419
72,025
60,607
43,118
43,456
38,613
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TABLE 8
TOTAL COURTS-MARTIAL BY SERVICE FOR FISCAL YEARS 1962-1966

CourtMartial

General

Military
Service

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

Army

1,876

1,843

1,865

1,553

1,476

Navy

495

420

440

339

355

A. Force

483

492

421

406

258

C. Guard

4

6

3

1

3

2,858

2,761

2,730

2,309

2,092

Army

26,607

26,448

24,327

24,813

23,121

Navy

15,782

15,724

13,816

13,174

14,647

A. Force

3,257

2,809

2,707

2,287

1,825

C . Guard

148

139

89

95

95

All

45,794

45,120

40,939

40,369

39,688

Army

43,542

32,316

16,926

17,090

14,016

Navy

29,252

22,756

10,785

11,052

11,934

A. Force

11,689

9,549

4,423

2,128

1,232

C . Guard

683

448

255

231

212

All

85,166

65,069

32,389

30,501

27,394

Army

72,025

60,607

43,118

43,456

38,613

Navy

45,529

39,033

25,041

24,565

26,936

A. Force

15,429

12,850

7,551

4,821

3,315

C . Guard

835

347

327

310

76,057

73,169

69,174

All

Special

Summary

Total

All

133,818

593
113,083

t

TABLE 9
TABLE SHOWING COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
SAFEGUARDS OF ACCUSED PERSONS

Rights of Civilians

(1)

Court must have jurisdiction
a. over person
b. to try offense
c. to award punishment

Rights of Servicemen

(1)

Same
a. same
b . same
c . same

(2)

Same (Article 51c)

Habeas Corpus (liberty of person)
(Article 1, Section 9)4
*
8
7
6
5

(3)

Essentially same (MCM 8,214)

(4)

No. ex post facto law (Article 1,
Sec. 9)

(4)

Essentially same (MCM 8)

(5)

Grand jury indictment (V Amend)

(5)

Impartial investigation (includes
right to counsel)
(Article 322 and b)

(6)

Against double jeopardy (V Amend)

(6)

Essentially same (Article 44)

(7)

Against self-incrimination (V Amend)

(7)

Essentially same (Article 31)

(8)

"Due process" - includes other enumerated
rights (V Amend)

(8)

"Due process" includes trial in
accordance with law, regulation,
customs of the service not in
consistent therewith (Article 42)

(2)

(3)

Presumption of innocence (reasonable doubt
resolved in favor of accused)
■(common law)

CO
VO

TABLE 9--Continued

Rights of Servicemen

Rights of Civilians

(9)

Opportunity to be heard (V & XIV Amend)
a. Testify (Title 18, U. S. C. Sec.
3481)
b.

(9)

Remain silent

Essentially same
a. To testify as witness (includes
right to testify for limited
purpose)
b. Option to remain silent (MCM
Article 31)

(10)

Essentially same (MCM 11c, 53a)

(11) ■Speedy and public trial (VI Amend)

(11)

Essentially same (Article 30b,
Article 98; MCM 30h)
(court may
be closed to public in special
cases MCM 53e)1
6
5
4
3
2

(12)

Jury, impartially selected (includes
right to challenge)
(VI Amend; common
law)

(12)

Court members, impartially selec
ted; 1/3 enlisted if accused re
quests (Article 25); challenges
for cause and one peremptory
challenge (Article 41)

(13)

Be informed of charge (notice)

(13)

Essentially same (Article 35)

(14)

Confront hostile witnesses
(VI Amend)

(14)

Same (MCM 117, 149b; Article 49)

(15)

Compulsory process to obtain favorable
witnesses (VI Amend)

(15)

Same (Article 46; MCM 115a)

(16)

Assistance of counsel

(16)

Essentially same (Article 27; MCM
6, 44, 46)

(10)

Be present during trial (V & XIV Amend)

(VI Amend)

(Cross examine)

(VI Amend)

TABLE 9— Continued

Rights of Civilians

Rights of Servicemen

(17)

No excessive bail (VIII Amend)

(17)

Not applicable (but there is cor
responding prohibition against con
finement for minor offenses)
(Arti
cle 56; MCM 18b, 127c)

(18)

No excessive fines (VIII Amend)

(18)

Essentially same (MCM 126h (3)

(19)

No cruel or unusual punishment (VIII
Amend)

(19)

Same (Article 55; MCM 125)

(20)

Right to appeal in certain cases
(Statutory)

(20)

Three automatic reviews in serious
cases plus right to petition for
appeal thereafter - right to free
counsel at each step (Articles 6573; MCM 98-105)

CHAPTER V

DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF MILITARY APPEALS

Typical Procedure

In this chapter I will refer to specific decisions of the United
States Court of Military Appeals, how those decisions protect the rights
of those subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and the impact
of those decisions on the military justice system.

There were many

significant improvements in the Uniform Code of Military Justice over
the old systems, but the most significant was the creation of the Court
itself.

In an annual report to the Congress, the Court stated:

In June 1951, when the Court, the first civilian judicial
body in this Nation's history to sit in final review upon
military courts-martial, was constituted, it was immediately
faced with an enormous task. Those accustomed to the pro
visions of the Articles of War and the Articles for the
Government of the Navy found its terms revolutionary.
Lawyers for the accused and the Government-a law officer
who did not deliberate with the court-instructions on the
law in open court-verbatim records of trial in all serious
cases-a meaningful system of appellate review had, for the
first time, been provided for all branches of our Armed
Forces by a Congress and Executive determined to uproot
the last vestige of evil which flowed from practices
under antecedent legislation. But, in the manner of most
Codes, these provisions of law supplied only the skeleton
of military due process. Their interpretation, pursuant
to the intent of Congress was left to this Court, composed
of civilian judges in accordance with the well-tried
American tradition of ultimate civilian control over the
military, and thoughtfully balanced by devolution upon
the Executive of the right to prescribe rules of evidence
and procedure as well as limitations upon maximum punish
ment .
At the outset, the Court was met with hostility on the
part of many Armed Forces officers, accentuated by the
92
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fact it began its role as a supreme judicial body in the
midst of war. Nevertheless, from the beginning, it in
sisted that rights granted by the Constitution and the
Congress not be sacrificed in the face of preconceived
and untested notions of guilt and fashioned on the frame
work of the Code, a sound system of military justice,
designed fairly to arrive at a proper verdict and sentence,
and proven to be workable both in time of war and peace.^
Before examining specific actions of the USCMA it would be wise
to review the working of military justice before a case reaches that
level.

To make this review more meaningful we will make comparisons

with the civil judicial system, and point out some similarities and
distinctions, particularly those related to the rights of an accused.
Anyone subject to the code may initiate sworn charges against
an individual subject to military jurisdiction.

It is customary,

however, that a person subject to the code report the facts to the
accused's commander who may then prefer charges.

2

The commander must

make a preliminary inquiry in order to make intelligent disposition of
the case.

If he decides that charges should be preferred, he then

takes appropriate action.

This step corresponds to action of the dis-

trict or county attorney in issuing a warrant for arrest.

3

If the accused's commander determines that the alleged offense
4
is of a serious nature,

he forwards the charges with his report of

Annual Report of the United States Court of Military Appeals,
1965, p. 11. The war referred to in the quote was the Korean conflict.
^Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, par. 29b.
Henceforth cited as MCM, 1951.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4. Henceforth cited
as FRCP. Note that preliminary inquiry is not required as in military
law. A sworn complaint is sufficient for issuance of warrant of arrest.
^MCM, 1951, 32. Less serious offenses may be disposed of by
non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. See chapter VI for a
discussion of this Article.
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investigation to the next higher commander who reviews the case and
decides what action to take.

This intermediate commander relies upon

the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, an experienced lawyer, and his
own experience and judgement.

He may decide to refer the case to a

summary or special court-martial at this level of command, or to refer
it with his recommendations to a higher commander exercising general
court-martial jurisdiction.

His decision will depend, to a great extent,

upon the seriousness of the charges.
Let us assume that the intermediate commander recommends trial
by general court-martial.

The charges and allied documents (including

sworn statements of witnesses, summary of evidence, documentary exhibits,
and recommendations), go to the Staff Judge Advocate of the commander
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction.

This senior legal

officer thoroughly reviews the case and advises his commander of the
action to take.

The commander at this level is usually a general or

flag officer.
If the allegations are of such serious nature that the senior
commander feels that reference to trial by general court-martial should
be considered, an officer is appointed to formally investigate the
charges.^

As a result of this investigation the commander may decide

to convene a general court-martial.

Charges cannot be referred for

trial however, unless the Staff Judge Advocate can certify that the

^MCM, 1951, 33.
of courts-martial.

See table chapter II for comparison of scope

^lCM, 1951, 32, 33.
^Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 32. Henceforth
cited as UCMJ. This Article 32 investigation may already have been
ordered and conducted under lower authority.
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specification states an offense and the evidence is legally sufficient
to make out a prima facie case as to each element.

g

The comparable

civilian procedure is issuance of a warrant of arrest, commissioner's
9
hearing and grand jury action.

The pretrial investigation is com

parable to the preliminary hearing and the grand jury action.^
It is interesting to note that in the military procedure at
the pretrial investigation, an accused is entitled to military counsel
at no expense to himself, to present his own witnesses and to crossexamine government witnesses.
procedure for the Navy.

11

This pretrial investigation is a new

Compare the right of the civilian defendent

under Rule 6, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes
only the presence of attorneys for the Government, witness under exam
ination, interpreter if needed, and stenographer, in grand jury sessions.
The investigating officer makes his report in which he can
recommend dismissal, trial by a lower court, or referral to trial by
general court-martial.

Let us assume that the investigating officer

recommends trial by general court-martial.

The case is then referred

to a court composed almost entirely of senior officers (or one-third
enlisted men if the accused so requests) serving in a capacity com
parable to a jury.

The court is supervised by a law officer, an

experienced lawyer who is certified as competent to perform such duties*
0
1
9

^CM, 1951, 35.
9FRCP, Rules 5, 6.

10

United States v. Lee, 1 USCMA 212, 2 CMR 118 (1952)

^ T h e Article 32 investigating officer is usually a field
grade (major or above) officer. When workload permits a legal officer
is sometimes directed to this duty. This author has conducted such an
investigation.
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by the Judge Advocate General of the service; this position is com
parable to that of a federal district judge.
authority of the trial.

12

He is the directing

A further matter of interest is the fact

that counsel, in all cases an attorney who is certified as competent
to perform the duties of defense counsel by the Judge Advocate General
of the service, is furnished the accused free of charge.
Trial procedure in a military court-martial
that in a Federal District Court.

13

is similar to

Furthermore, the United States Court

of Military Appeals has stated that if fair trial requires it, the Court
will adopt procedure contrary to civil practice or former military rule.
The United States Supreme Court ruled, "any ambiguity in a provision of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice must be resolved in favor of the
accused.

All the safeguards of federal trial procedure apply.

The

punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense shall not
exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense.

16

The manual for courts-martial including the table of maximum punishment
is prescribed by executive order.^
To continue the comparison, let us assume that the accused is
convicted and sentenced to a punitive discharge and confinement in1
6
*
4
3
2

12United States v. B lankenship, 7 USCMA 328, 22 CMR 118 (1956).
United States v. Berry, 1 USCMA 235, 2 CMR 141 (1952).
13
UMCJ, 36(a); MCM, 1951.

Appendix 8 contains trial procedure

guide.
14
United States v. Hemp, 1 USCMA 280, 3 CMR 14 (1952).
^ Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 569, 77 Sup. Ct. 1027 (1957).
16UCMJ, 56.
Initially executive order 10214. President Harry S. Truman,
Feb. 8, 1951. There have been numerous revisions of the manual by
executive order. UCMJ is public law and can only be revised by full
legislative action.

14
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excess of one year.

He is furnished a verbatim record free of charge

and appellate steps then begin.

A lawyer in the office of the Staff

Judge Advocate thoroughly reviews the case for error, sufficiency of
evidence, and with a view toward clemency action.

The record of trial,

the written review, and the recommendations of the reviewing officer
then go to the commander who convened the court.

He can approve, dis

approve or modify the sentence, in addition to exercising the power to
grant clemency.

This constitutes the first appellate step.

18

If the sentence as approved includes a punitive discharge or
confinement for one year or more, the record goes forward to a board
of review.

19

This board of review is composed of three experienced

senior military attorneys, at the highest Department level.

The Board

thoroughly reviews the case without petition from the accused, it has
the power to weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses
and determine controverted questions of fact, a power unique in
appellate procedure.

During this second appellate step, the accused

is entitled to the services of experienced appellate attorneys who are
authorized to present briefs and oral arguments, precisely as in the
Federal Court of Appeals.
If this conviction is sustained by the board of review, notice
of such action is served upon the accused.

Within thirty days he may

indicate his intention to petition the United States Court of Military
Appeals for a review of his case.

20

This notice can take the form of

a letter dropped in a mailbox, a letter placed in official military1
0
2
9
8

18MCM, 1951, 84-93.
19MCM, 1951, 100.
20UCMJ, 67(c ).

/
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channels, a statement to his counsel, or completion of a form given him
at the time of service of the action of the board of review.

At the

time he takes action to transmit his desire to appeal, his right to
petition the court accrues, and he is again entitled to appellate
counsel at government expense.

This is his third appellate step.

Contrast his appellate rights with the appellate rights of a civilian
defendent.

Contrast also the mentioned thirty-day period with the

period allowed a civilian defendent under Rule 37(a) (2), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which requires that an appeal be perfected within
ten days from the final order.

Consider also the appellate steps in

civilian courts where a defendent is allowed normally one appellate
review upon the law of the case, and at considerable expense to himself
for attorney fees, transcripts, filing fees and the like.

21

When these appellate steps have been finished, the military
procedure is not yet complete.

After final action by the board of

review or the United States Court of Military Appeals as the case may
be, the record is examined in the Office of the Judge Advocate General
for possible clemency action.

The accused must also be considered for

clemency within six months after confinement and each year thereafter
during his confinement.

Contrast these several opportunities for

clemency afforded a military accused with the one opportunity afforded
a civilian defendent by reference of his case to a busy probation
officer in a Federal District Court.
A further point that may be of considerable interest is the
fact that this military appellate procedure is not limited to those2
1

21
William C. Hamilton, "Military Law: Drumhead Justice is
Dead," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. XLIII, pp. 797-800.
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accused individuals who plead not guilty at trial level and require
the government to prove its case.

The same rights and appellate steps

are afforded an accused who pleads guilty and offers no evidence in
his behalf.22
The procedure in the United States Court of Military Appeals
was described in Chapter III.

In discussing the goals of UCMJ and

USCMA, the Court has said that it has been its desire to establish for
the military a body of law under which all who serve in the military
can rely on receiving a fair and impartial trial if they are charged
with a crime subject to military jurisdiction.

This does not mean

that the Court considers itself the be-all and end-all of the military
justice system.

Rather, it is the belief of the Court and its members,

that a good military justice system begins as soon as it is known that
a crime has been committed.

Thus, the system must be impregnated with

honesty, fairness, and impartiality throughout the whole procedure;
commencing with the investigation, the charges, the appointing of the
members of the court-martial as well as the counsel who will appear
before such members; the proceedings before the court-martial, the
staff judge advocate's or legal officer's review, the convening
authority's action; the proceedings before the Boards of Review, and
ultimately by the review of the United States Court of Military Appeals.
Each step is an important cog in the military justice machine.

It is

the aim of the Court to achieve at every level that excellence in

22MCM, 1951, 84a. "General. After every trial by courtmartial, etc." The code provides for an automatic review in all casesfirst by the convening authority and then by the Judge Advocate General.
The three appellate steps in the assumed case were a result of the
serious sentence.
(dishonorable discharge and confinement for one year).
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operation, which is not only desirable but also necessary to the
administration of military justice.

23

USCMA In Action:

Jurisdiction

In this attempt to show how the Court accomplishes the mission
of guardian of military justice let us examine some cases and decisions.
Before any trial can begin the Court must have legal jurisdiction.
Uniform Code is very specific.

The Court of Military Appeals monitors

jurisdiction in the exercise of its normal appellate function.
so four questions are considered:
stituted?

(2)

The

In doing

(1) was the court-martial duly con

did it have jurisdiction of the person tried?

it have jurisdiction of the offense charged?

(4)

(3)

did

was the sentence

imposed within the prescribed maximum limit?
In discussing the first question, "was the court-martial duly
constituted?"

one should realize that courts-martial unlike ordinary

civil courts, do not possess any high degree of permanance.

They come

into existence by direct written orders of the convening authority,

24

usually a senior commander; in the case of a general court-martial he
is normally a general or flag officer.

Large commands often have

several general and special courts appointed at one time.

Due to the

nature of the military occupation, court members are often unavailable;
this requires frequent amendments and the creation of new courts.

The

Uniform Code requires members of general and special courts-martial, all
23

The United States Court of Military Appeals, pamphlet 0-774-858
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 5.
24
UCMJ, 22, 23, 24. These Articles respectively specify who may
convene a General, Special and Summary court-martial. Also see Table 1.
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counsel, the law officer and the reporter to take an oath in each
case "in the presence of the accused to perform their duties faithfully."
USCMA has said:
General courts-martial, being tribunals of special and
limited jurisdiction, must be convened strictly in accordance
with statutory requirements. . . . members of a courtmartial must have been lawfully appointed thereto in order
that they may enjoy status as members.26
The eligibility of all members is carefully evaluated.

In one case a

security watch officer on the night of the offense in question made an
investigation and later sat as a member of the special court that tried
the accused.

The USCMA. found "a probability of specific prejudice"

against the accused, and ruled that the prejudice was not waived by
failure to challenge even though the accused had pleaded guilty.

27

There must also be careful scrutiny of the eligibility of the law
officer, trial and defense counsel, and the status of the convening
authority.

28

The following is an interesting case concerning con

vening authority.
An airman at Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D. C.,
burglarized the house of General Edwards, and four days later made a
similar attempt at the house of General Lee, the Base Commander.

25UCMJ, 42(a).
2^United States v. Padilla and Jacobs, 1 USCMA 601, 5 CMR
31 (1952).
27United States v. Bound, 1 USCMA 224, 2 CMR 130 (1952).
28MCM, 1951, par. 5, 6, 7. Eligibility even concerns the
Reporter. An accuser, whether actual or nominal, is disqualified from
acting as Reporter or interpreter in court-martial proceedings in which
he is the accuser nor can the accuser take depositions. United States
v. Moeller, 8 USCMA 275, 24 CMR 85 (1957). United States v. Martinez,
11 USCMA 224, 29 CMR 40 (1960). United States v. Payne, 12 USCMA 455,
31 CMR 41 (1961).

25
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General Lee was interviewed as part of an investigation.
involving General Lee's house was dropped.

The charge

The accused was tried, for

the offense at General Edwards' house, by a court convened, after the
event, by General Lee as Base Commander.

The accused was convicted and

sentenced to a dishonorable discharge and five years confinement.

In

his review as convening authority, General Lee reduced the confinement
to two years.

The Court of Military Appeals held that General Lee was

disqualified to act as convening and reviewing authority.

The Court

ruled:
.... reasonable persons would impute to General Lee at
the time he appointed the court a personal feeling or
interest in the matter . . .
While General Lee reduced the sentence, who can say
what, if any, additional remission might have been
made by one who had no interest in the matter.
.... we find substantial rights of the accused were
OQ
materially prejudiced . . .
In another case involving the convening authority, two Navy
hospital men (enlisted), were charged personally by their commander,
a Navy captain, for a regulation violation.

The captain forwarded the

charges to his superior, the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East.

This

latter officer then referred the case to the Officer Commanding the
Naval Base at Pusan, Korea.

This Base Commanding Officer, whose rank

was commander convened a special court-martial for the trial.

Of

course in the Navy the rank of commander is inferior to captain.

This,

the Court of Military Appeals ruled, was contrary to the intent of the
Code,

30

in that only a "superior" could be a "competent convening

authority."
29

The court held:

"The provisions with which we deal require

United States v. Gordon, 1 USCMA 255, 2 CMR 161 (1952).

30UCMJ, 23(b).
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a superior to convene the court; and these provisions having been
violated, the tribunal designated was not authorized by law to try these
accused and render a judgement against them."

31

This was clearly a

case of the court's concern for enforcing a procedure that had been
adopted to lessen command control.
In civil life the court is taken much for granted.

Rarely is a

judicial appointment or election questioned, and rarely are judicial
acts declared void because the court was not duly constituted.

In

contrast we have seen some of the problems in this regard in the
military justice system.

So too with personal jurisdiction.

question is much more likely to occur in the military sphere.
exceptions

32

The
Rare

emphasize the general rule in civil life, that, exemption

from criminal jurisdiction cannot be predicated upon the status of the
accused.

Under civil law the locus of the offense is all important;

the status of the accused is not.
quite the reverse is true.

Under military law, in contrast,

Unlimited geographic jurisdiction of the

court-martial has been traditional and supported by U. S. Supreme Court
. . .
33
decision.

The Uniform Code expresses this inrefutable view with appro-

priate conciseness:

"This code shall be applicable in all places."

34

31
United States v. LaGrange and Clay, 1 USCMA 342, 3 CMR 76 (1952)
32

Such exceptions are Ambassadors and other diplomats, and in
fants under seven.
33

Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wallace (U. S.), 2 (1867). Chief Justice
Chase said, "and wherever our Army or Navy go beyond our territorial
limits neither can go beyond the authority of the President or the
Legislation of Congress."
34
UCMJ, 5. An exception is the third clause of Article 134, The
General Article, "crimes and offenses not capital." For example, a
person subject to military law cannot be prosecuted under this clause
for having committed a crime or offense, not capital, when the act
occurred in occupied foreign territory, merely because the act would
have been an offense against the law of the District of Columbia if it
had been committed there. MCM, 1951.
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This simplicity of place is in sharp contrast to the elaborate specific
provisions of the code with respect to what persons, in what status,
,
.
’
.
.
35
at what time are subject to military jurisdiction.
In discussing the next question, "Did the court-martial have
jurisdiction of the person tried?"

we enter one of the most contro

versial issues of The Uniform Code.

The United States Supreme Court

invalidated those provisions applying to the jurisdiction over civilians.

36

This created a jurisdictional gap for which legislation has been proposed
several times.

37

This problem will be discussed in the next chapter.

With respect to military personnel, USCMA has had relatively few cases
to decide.
It should be remembered that military personnel, in general,
continue to be subject to civil court jurisdiction for offenses against
ordinary criminal law.

Courts-martial have exclusive jurisdiction

over purely military offenses.

38

But a person subject to the code is,

as a rule, subject to the law applicable to persons generally.

We

have seen in the discussion of protection against double jeopardy,

39

that aside from policy consideration, military personnel may be tried
before a court-martial and a civil court for the same offense, provided

35UCMJ, 2 and 3.
36UCMJ, 2(11), Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 77 Sup. Ct. 1222 (1957).
Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U. S. 234, 80 Sup. Ct. 297 (1960). Gresham v.
Hagan, 361 U. S. 278, 80 Sup. C t . 310 (I960). McElroy V. Guargliardo,
361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305 (1960). Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11,
76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955).
37

S. 761, 89th Congress 1st Sess.

38

Examples of purely military offenses are: absence without
leave, desertion, disrespect toward officers, willful disobedience.
39

Chapter IV.

Supra. Also statement by General Todd, Appendix.
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the courts derive their jurisdiction from different sovereigns.

Our

concern now is, simply, does the court-martial have jurisdiction of the
person, and need not be complicated by determining whether the jurisdiction
is exclusive or concurrent.
If we now limit this discussion to military personnel we also
narrow our concern for what persons.

It is obvious that military

personnel would be subject to the code, and we can summarize the
categories of military personnel to include:
duty with any of the Armed Forces, (2)
service academies, (3)

(1)

personnel on active

cadets attending any of the

reserve personnel voluntarily accepting inactive

duty training, when the orders specify they are subject to the code,
and (4) prisoners of war.
The requirements for discipline demand that all such persons in
the above list be subject to court-martial jurisdiction.

The questions

usually under consideration are what status, and what time.

A military

person cannot be tried by court-martial for a criminal offense committed
by him before he acquired military status, even though the offense is
contrary to military law.

This demands a precise rule for determining

the instant a person ceases to be a civilian and acquires military
status.

As a result of numerous draft-dodging incidents subsequent to

the Selective Service Act of 1940,

40

the U. S. Supreme Court supplied

the precise rule.
41
The case was Billings v. Truesdale,
Billings, a teacher at
the University of Texas, who claimed to be a conscientious objector,4
*
0

4054 Stat. 894 (1940).
^ Billings v. Truesdale, 321 U. S. 542, (1944).

106
was ordered by both his draft board and appeal board to report for in
duction at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

He did so and the next morning

was found physically and mentally qualified, whereupon he refused to
take the oath of induction and refused to submit to fingerprinting.
For this latter refusal, he was tried and convicted by court-martial
for wilful disobedience of a lawful order.

The Supreme Court, on

habeas corpus attack, granted certiorari and held the court-martial
was without jurisdiction; since Billings had not taken the oath of in
duction, he had not been "actually inducted" into the Army.

It pointed

out that Billings was subject to criminal prosecution in the federal
district court, for a violation of the Selective Training and Service
Act in refusing to be inducted.

This was wholly consistent with a

Supreme Court statement of 1890, "that the taking of the oath of
allegiance is the pivotal fact which changes the status from that of
civilian to that of soldier.
The Court of Military Appeals has applied the oath test in
finding that a court-martial was without jurisdiction to convict an
accused of desertion.

43

In another desertion case it extended the rule

in affirming jurisdiction, by holding that the taking of the oath of
allegiance was not necessary.

In this case the accused, a Mexican

citizen, without objection reported for induction and remained in a
military status for ten days before deserting.

44

Additionally, the

Court has held that a person below the minimum age of enlistment is,
under the law, incompetent to acquire military status, and any such*
3
4
^ In Re Grimley, 137 U. S. 147, (1890). Actual delivery of
discharge terminates military jurisdiction, U. S. v. Scott, 11 USCMA 646
29 CMR 462.
43United States v. Ornelas, 2 USCMA 96, 6 CMR 96 (1952).
^ United States v. Rodriguez, 2 USCMA 101, 6 CMR 101 (1952).
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enlistment is considered void.4-’ Furthermore, there is no jurisdiction
to try such underage enlistees for desertion, an offense presupposing
military status.

46

The court held that such enlistment is void even

if the individual stayed in service beyond the age of lawful enlistment.4^
Court-martial jurisdiction over cadets and midshipmen has been
a settled matter for many years.

For a period of time, however, mid

shipmen (then referred to as cadets) were held to be in a class by them
selves and not subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.

The Attorney

General in 1877 wrote such an opinion, basing his reasoning upon lack
of statutes on the subject applicable to the Navy as distinguished from
the Army.

48

This untenable situation was corrected, however, in 1895.

49

A cadet case decided by the United States Court of Military Appeals in
1958 discussed jurisdiction from a historical point of view, but the
emphasis was upon a related but different problem, that of determining
the kind of punitive separation a court could adjudge in such a case.
The opinion referred to cadets as "inchoate" officers and decreed that
dismissal was the only legal punitive separation for them.^^
The reservist who voluntarily accepts written orders for in
active duty training submits to the jurisdiction of courts-martial if
his orders specify that he is subject to the Code.

He is in a poor

position to contest jurisdiction to which he has submitted.

In short,4
9
8
7
6
5

45United States v. Blanton, 7 USCMA 664, 23 CMR 128 (1957).
46United States v. Taylor, 8 USCMA 24, 23 CMR 248 (1957).
47

United States v. Overton, 9 USCMA 684, 26 CMR 464 (1958) .

4815 OP. Atty. Gen. 634 (U. S.).
4928 Stat. 838 (1895), 34 U. S. C. 1061.
5°United States v. Ellman, 9 USCMA 549, 26 CMR 329 (1958).
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when the provisions of UCMJ

are complied with, the reservist becomes

in every sense of the word a member of the "land and naval forces"
52
within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
53
of War, August 12, 1949,

recognizes that the detaining power should

and does have jurisdiction over prisoners of war in its custody.

To

be more specific, the Convention prescribes that unless the detaining
power has jurisdiction to try its own Armed Forces in civil courts for
the particular crime involved, the prisoner of war must be tried by a
military court.
jurisdiction.

This, of course, is a recognition of court-martial
Our Armed Forces were instructed during the Korean con

flict to abide by the principles of the Geneva Convention, though the
United States did not formally subscribe to the Convention until 1955.
Questionable categories of persons are retired regulars on pay
status and retired reservists in service hospitals.

There are few

cases contesting jurisdiction in these two categories.

A case involving

a retired regular naval officer was viewed by the United States Court of
Military Appeals in 1958.

The jurisdictional question was decided

54
against him.

A retired regular is not only subject to duty if recalled

but has the continuing obligation that attaches because of his pay
status and because of the rights and privileges due his rank.

In short

he is considered still in the service and is subject to dual pay pro
hibition applicable to Federal employment.

A reservist, however, is5
1

51UCMJ, 2 (3).
-^United States, Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8.
"^Geneva Convention, ch. 3, Arts. 82 and 84 (pow), 1949.
“^ United States v. Hooper, 9 USCMA 637, 26 CMR 417 (1958).
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looked upon in an entirely different light.
as a civilian in uniform.

He is often referred to

Thus when he is no longer on active duty or

no longer subject to inactive duty training as previously discussed,
he is, generally speaking, not subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
The Code provides for jurisdiction in the case of retired reservists,
however, when they seek and obtain the services of our Armed Forces
hospitals.

The Uniform Code of Military Justice is a public law, and

knowledge of its contents may be presumed.

Thus the hospitalized

reservist may be said to have voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction.
In a sense he has returned to duty when hospitalized, for he has again
become part of a community made up almost entirely of military personnel.
Since discipline must be maintained in military hospitals as in other
military organizations and agencies, the exercise of courts-martial
jurisdiction in this instance is reasonable.
Another questionable area of jurisdiction is that over discharged
servicemen.

UCMJ, Article 3(a) provides that, subject to the statute of

limitations, a person charged with committing, during his term of
service, an offense against the Code punishable by confinement at hard
labor for five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried
in any United States, State, or Territorial court, or the District of
Columbia, is not relieved from amenability to trial by court-martial by
reason of the termination of such term of service.
jurisdiction was not seriously contested until 1955.

This area of
The question is

now settled that, after normal discharge and serverance of all military
connection, jurisdiction over ex-servicemen does not exist.

The

”*“*UCMJ is not the first statutory provision for this jurisdiction.
Former statutes relating to Army and Navy hospitals were: 34 Stat. 255
(1906), and 35 Stat. 748 (1909).
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unconstitutionality of article 3(a) as applied to certain cases can
best be discussed by reference to the leading cases arising both prior
and subsequent to enactment of the Code.
The following case is of historical interest, having occurred
prior to enactment of the Code.

The accused, a member of the Navy, was

captured during World War II by the Japanese.

He was liberated in 1945

and returned to duty with the Navy in January 1946.
year his enlistment expired.

In March of the same

He was returned to the United States and

was honorably discharged but re-enlisted the following day.

About one

year later he was tried by court-martial for offenses including mal
treatment of fellow prisoners while a prisoner of the Japanese.

Upon

conviction he was sentenced to dishonorable discharge and a period of
confinement.

Military appellate agencies upheld his conviction, but in

a habeas corpus proceeding in a Federal District Court he was ordered
released.

This judgement was reversed upon the first appeal, but upon

appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was in favor of the accused.
After pointing out that jurisdiction ceased upon his discharge and
that under no theory would the Navy have considered bringing him to
trial except that the accused chose to re-enlist in the Navy, the Court
stated "Jurisdiction to punish rarely, if ever, rests upon such illogical
and fortuitous contingencies."

The Court in its short opinion observed

that there was no congressional authorization for such jurisdiction
and quickly concluded that jurisdiction once dead is not revived by
subsequent re-enlistment.^

Of interest also is the District Court's

reasoning in the same case that each contract of enlistment is a5
6
56 United States ex rel Hirschberg v. Cooke, 336 U. S. 210 (1949).
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separate entity and that subsequent enlistment, since it did not make
reference to the prior contract, could not preserve jurisdiction
obtained under it but lost it by its expiration. ^

This case established

the "Hirschberg" rule.
Another striking application of this jurisdictional gap is the
case of former Sergeant Lo Dolce
mitted to go free.

58

in which a confessed killer was per

The murder and robbery were committed in Northern

Italy in 1944 when that area was occupied by Germany as a hostile
belligerent and after Italy had entered into an armistice with the
United States.

The accused, then on active duty as an American army

sergeant, killed his commanding officer, an American major, and threw
the body into a mountain lake.

The offenses were not discovered until

long after Lo Dolce had returned to the United States, been discharged
and reverted to civilian status.
by court-martial.

No attempt was made to try Lo Dolce

The effort made by Italy to extradite was rejected

by the federal district court upon dual grounds.

First, that since

at the time of the crimes Italy had capitulated, and American forces
were present as friendly visiting forces, the rule of Schooner Exchange
59
v. M'Faddon

vested jurisdiction of the offense in the military

authorities of the United States, and not Italy.
following the rule of Coleman v, Tennessee, ^

Second, that,

even if a state of

belligerency still existed between Italy and the United States,

^ United States ex rel Hirschberg v. Macanaphy, 73 F. Supp. 990
(D. C. E. D. N. Y . , 1947) .
58

In Re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455 (W. D. N. Y., 1952).

59 Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch (U. S.), 116 (1812)
60Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U. S. 509 (1878).
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jurisdiction over its own forces vested exclusively in the United States
as a hostile occupant.

Since the exercise of this jurisdiction by the

United States was impossible due to Lo Dolce's fortutious change of
status from soldier to civilian, and because murder committed in Italy
normally is not punishable by any American civil court, federal or
state, complete immunity resulted for this confessed homocidist.^

This

_
.
.
.
,
.
.
62
fantastic situation has arisen many times.
Article 3(a) of the Uniform Code was designed to remedy this
glaring jurisdictional hiatus.
went into effect.

The following case arose after the Code

Toth, the accused (an ex-serviceman legally discharged

from the Air Force and living as a civilian), was apprehended and re
turned to his former base in Korea, the scene of his alleged crimes of
murder and conspiracy to murder, to stand trial by court-martial.
sister instituted habeas corpus proceedings to obtain his release.

His
The

Government's theory of jurisdiction was, of course, Article 3(a) of the
Code.

A United States District Court ordered his release, and the case

thereafter went before the Supreme Court on appeal.
affirmed the decision of the District Court.

The Supreme Court

"The powers granted

Congress 'to make rules' to regulate 'the land and naval forces' would
seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually
members or part of the Armed Forces. . . Any expansion of court-martial*
2
6

^ L o Dolce and a co-accused, Icardi, were tried in absentia for
this offense by the Italian Government. On November 6, 1953 they were
found guilty of murder by a trial court at Novara, Italy. Lo Dolce was
sentenced to seventeen years confinement; Icardi to life imprisonment.
New York Times, November 8, 1953, p. 2E.
62
William B. Aycock and Samuel W. Wurfel, Military Law Under
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (Chapel Hill: The University of
North Carolina Press, 1955), pp. 43-44.
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jurisdiction like that in the 1950 act necessarily encroaches on the
jurisdiction of Federal courts set up under Article 3 of the Con
stitution where persons on trial are surrounded by more constitutional
safeguards than in military tribunals."

63

In the following closely related case, the accused allegedly
committed offenses contemplated under Article 3(a) while a prisoner of
war in Korea.

His term of enlistment expired while he was a prisoner.

After his release he was returned to the United States where he requested
re-enlistment.
day.

He was therefore discharged but re-enlisted the following

Charges were preferred following his re-enlistment.

The United

States Court of Military Appeals distinguished this case from Hirshberg,
stating that by enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
Article 3(a), Congress intended to provide for continuance of jurisdiction
in cases such as this and that as applied to a discharged serviceman
who has re-enlisted, this statutory provision is constitutional.

As

applied to persons in accused's position, it held that the cited
Article may be sustained under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 14, of the
Constitution, empowering Congress to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces.

The concurring opinion

declared the Toth case to be applicable only to ex-servicemen who have
severed all connection with the military.

64

Since status and time are so closely related, the applicable
ruling for termination of military status is the time of presentation
C O

United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955).
^ United States v. Gallagher, 7 USCMA 506, 22 CMR 296 (1957) .
Jurisdiction also extends to service personnel who having been relieved
from active duty and transferred to a reserve component for completion
of their military service deligation, have been voluntarily recalled
to active duty. United States v. Wheeler, 10 USCMA 646, 28 CMR 212 (1959) .
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of discharge.

Within the time span of oath to discharge numerous other

problems of status have arisen and will probably continue to arise.
accused may not terminate jurisdiction by his own wrongful act.

An

For

example, the contention of an accused that his three-year term of en
listment having expired while he was in disertion negated jurisdiction,
was disallowed.

Similarly, where an accused after arraignment, voluntarily

absents himself from his trial the court-martial retains jurisdiction to
complete the trial, findings and sentence.

This doctrine has received

the approval of the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, even in a capital
case.

The Court made this observation:

Of necessity military personnel are highly mobile, and
on occasion are scattered to the four winds within a
matter of hours. In oversea theaters, and particularly
in combat areas, witnesses, both military and civilian,
are exposed to uncommon hazards which make their assembly
for trial difficult always and too often impossible.
Certainly the degree of prosecution hardship sharply
increases as the time of trial is delayed. The capital
offense escapee may thus gain great advantage, which
will vary directly with the length of time he is able
to prolong his absence. This is, of course, true in
all areas of law enforcement, but it is greatly in
tensified in that of military judicial administration.
We discern no reason for impending (sic)-perhaps even
defeating the prosecution of those who choose not to
be present for trial, regardless of the offense with
which they are charged. This would, we believe, be
distinctly in derogation of the just claims of the
military society, an interest often disregarded in
febrile evaluation of the rights of frequently un
deserving individuals."
"....In the civilian community there is no rigid
rule demanding that a convicted man be sentenced only
by the judge who presided over his trial. However,
There is no provision in military criminal law pro
cedure for the imposition of any sort of sentence
save by the court which tried and convicted the
accused. As a practical necessity, the court which
convicts a man in absentia must have the power to
sentence him as well, otherwise the conviction will
have gone for naught. It will always be difficult,
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and usually impossible, ever to reassemble a courtmartial-and the longer the delay, the greater the
difficulty and threat of impossibility."8^
Consideration of the variety of cases under the question of
jurisdiction of the person tried is further complicated by concurrent
or discretionary jurisdiction.

The determination of jurisdictional

responsibility in cases arising in countries visited by military personnel
is frequently subject to agreement.

The members of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization have entered into such an agreement.

There is

also an agreement between the Departments of Justice and Defense,

67

as

well as informal arrangements at local level in civilian communities.
Since arrangements of this type concern the offense as well as the
person let us proceed to the next question.
The question of jurisdiction of the offense is answered in
simplest terms by recognizing that a court-martial's jurisdiction is
confined to those offenses expressly denounced by Congress in the
punitive Articles.

Congress has also specified in UCMJ, Article 18:

"General courts-martial shall also have jurisdiction to try any person
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal. . ."

69

This latter jurisdiction, by natural derivation of the law of war must
extend to offenses as well.*
8
6

^ United States v. Houghtaling, 2 USCMA 230, 8 CMR 30 (1953).
88Status of Forces Agreement, NATO, Art. VII par. 80, 1953.
67
Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of Justice
and Defense relating to the investigations and prosecution of crimes over
which the two Departments have concurrent jurisdiction, July 19, 1955.
68UCMJ, 77-134.
8^This does not apply to Special or Summary courts-martial.
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Let us limit this discussion of offenses to those denounced
in the punitive Articles of the Code.

We must remember that certain

offenses can be committed only by certain categories of persons.

For

example, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman^ pertains only
to a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman.

The offense of in

subordinate conduct in Article 91 pertains only to enlisted persons;
contempt toward government officials, of Article 88, pertains to
officers.

But with few exceptions the punitive Articles apply to anyone

subject to the Code.
In general, the concern of the Court of Military Appeals is
whether the offense charged is one denounced by the Code and is it
properly identified.

The general rule as to the sufficiency of the

wording of a specification is that it must fairly inform the accused
of the offense of which he stands charged, and must be sufficiently
definite to prevent the accused from being tried again for the same
offense, but it need not be framed in technical language nor with the
exactitude of a common law indictment.^’*' The Court has aptly observed,
"Sight must not be lost in the fact that the prosecution of crimemilitary or civilian-is not a fox hunt, and that rather different
ground rules should obtain."

72

On the other hand, the Court is especially wary when the right
of the accused is involved in jurisdiction of offense.

Of course

general courts-martial have jurisdiction over all offenses made punish
able by the Code, from the most serious capital offenses, such as7
2
1
0

70UCMJ, 133.
71United States v. Marker, 1 USCMA 393, 3 CMR 127 (1952).
72

United States v. Aldridge, 2 USCMA 330, 8 CMR 130 (1953).

117
murder, to the most minor, such as failure to report for a routine
duty.

Special and summary courts-martial have specific limitations.

73

The following case illustrates the Court's concern.
During the Korean conflict the accused was tried and convicted
by Navy special court-martial for sleeping on post, which in time of
war is a capital offense.

The case had been referred to trial by an

officer having special court-martial jurisdiction.

There had been

no action on the part of any officer exercising general court-martial
jurisdiction or of the Secretary of the Navy which would vest jurisdiction
for such cases in special courts-martial.

USCMA held:

The Korean con

flict constituted a state of war within the meaning of the Code.

Though

not mandatory, capital punishment is authorized for the offense.

While

special courts-martial may exercise jurisdiction over nonmandatory
capital cases, it is necessary that all the prescribed requirements
be met.

Since the court was convened by an officer whose authority

extended only to special court-martial and he had not been authorized
to refer a case of this nature to such court, jurisdiction was lacking
and the proceedings were void.^
The question of the offense itself frequently enters into the
area of constitutional rights of the accused.

The case regarding

restriction against marriage was mentioned in the general discussion
of constitutional rights above.73*
5 An example of violation of an order,
7
which infringed on the accused's right of freedom of speech, was

73See Table 1.
7^United States v. Bancroft, 3 USCMA 3, 11 CMR 3 (1953).
75 Chapter IV, p. 117, Supra.
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7f)
United States v. Voorhees,
In this case the Court held that the right
of a military superior to impose silence on a subordinate is not absolute.
In part, the principal opinion by Chief Judge Quinn is as follows:
Plainly AR 360-5 imposes restrictions on the free ex
pression of ideas by Army personnel. The question then
is whether those limitations set out in the regulation
constitute an illegal departure from the Constitutional
prohibition on legislation 'abridging the freedom of
speech,' which is contained in the First Amendment.
"The right to free speech is not an indiscriminate
right. Instead, it is qualified by the requirements
of reasonableness in relation to time, place, and cir
cumstance. Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47, 63 L
ed 470, 39 S Ct 247. Thus, there is no doubt that re
straints which reasonably protect the national interest
do not violate the Constitutional right of free speech.
See Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494, 95 L ed 1137,
71 S Ct 857. With these principles for our frame of
reference, we proceed to inquire into the legality of
the regulation.77
78
In United States v. Wysong,
the Court held that an order by
a commanding officer to a subordinate to refrain from talking to other
persons under any and all circumstances for an indefinite period of
time was an illegal and unenforceable restraint on the subordinate's
freedom of speech.

79
And in United States v. Milldebrandt,
the Court

held a commander could not compel a member of the command to disclose
information of his financial actions during leave when such actions
were not related to military duty or discipline.

In a separate con

curring opinion Chief Judge Quinn said:
Persons in the military service are neither puppets
nor robots, They are not subject to the willy-nilly push
or pull of a capricious superior, at least as far as trial
and punishment by court-martial is concerned. In that

^ United States v. Voorhees, 4 USCMA 509, 16 CMR 85 (1954).
77t, . ,
Ibid.
78United States v. Wysong, 9 USCMA 249, 26 CMR 29 (1958).
79

United States v. Milldebrandt, 8 USCMA 635, 25 CMR 139 (1958).
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area they are human beings endowed with legal and
personal rights which are not subject to military order.
Congress left no room for doubt about that. It did not
say that the violation of any order was punishable by
court-martial, but only that the violation of a lawful
order was.
The Court has been especially alert to offenses against Article
134, the General Article.

It has stated that this article is limited

to recognized military offenses and those crimes not specifically
delineated by the other punitive articles.

The Court has reversed

cases where it appeard that Article 134 was being used as a catchall
to supply a basis for punishment where some essential element of an
offense covered by some other article of the code was missing either
in the pleading or proof.

In this regard, it has stated, "We cannot

grant to the services unlimited authority to eliminate vital elements
from common law crimes and offenses expressly defined by Congress and
permit the remaining elements to be punished as an offense under
O 1

Article 134."

The possible constitutional violation of this article

continues to be the subject of considerable criticism due to the
vagueness of some of the. offenses alleged.

82

As the question of jurisdiction of person is related to offense,
so too is offense, as well as person, related to punishment.
because of the authority within the Code
certain offenses in time of war.

83

This is

to increase the penalty for

For example, during the Korean conflict

Executive Order no. 10247 suspended the Table of Maximum Punishments
for certain offenses in the Far East area in 1951.

^ Ibid.

The normal limitations

The case referred to UCMJ, 92.

Ol
United States v. Norris, 2 USCMA 236, 8 CMR 36 (1953).
82

Senate Hearings 1962, CRMP op. cit. p. 785.

83
UCMJ, 85, 90, 101, 106, 113.
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were restored in 1955.8^

By making certain offenses capital, the

jurisdiction of the summary court-martial is thereby negated.

As we

8 5
have seen in the case above, ' special courts-martial must be given
particular authorization.
Therefore, with respect to the question of the sentence being
within the prescribed maximum limit, the Court of Military Appeals must
consider time, place, persons, and other special circumstances, in
order to judge the jurisdiction of the court-martial.

The prescribed

maximum punishments are specifically listed in the manual;

86

courts-

martial must be briefed as to their own authority before determining
sentence; Congress has directed the convening authority to approve,
". . .such part or amount of the sentence as he finds correct in law
and fact;"

87

and the board of review must affirm, ". . .such part or

amount of the sentence as it finds correct in law are fact."

88

With

all of the above it is unlikely that the Court would have much exercise
in this regard.

There have been some interesting decisions none-the-less.

89
In United States v. Whitman,
the record of trial in a special
court-martial case was in part a narrative summary and in part a
verbatim record.

The Court said:

"The punitive discharge . . . cannot

stand without the support of a verbatim record.

This portion of the

^Executive order no. 10628, Aug. 1955.
85

United States v. Bancroft, supra., n. 74.

86MCM, 1951, 127.
87UCMJ, 64.
88UCMJ, 66(c ).
89United States v. Whitman, 3 USCMA 179, 11 CMR 179 (1953).
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sentence is, therefore, illegal."
In the period of transition between the old Articles of War and
the new Uniform Code, this case came to the attention of the Court:
Lieutenant Colonel Downard was charged under Article of War 95

91

with

conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, which involved assaulting
and cursing his wife in the vicinity of the Fort Monroe Officers' Club.
The acts involved occurred prior to May 31, 1951, the effective date of
UCMJ, but the case was tried thereafter.

The mandatory penalty upon

conviction prescribed by Article of War 95 was dismissal, whereas the
successor Article 133
martial may direct.

prescribed that punishment shall be as a courtThe law officer instructed that dismissal was

mandatory and the court imposed that sentence.

The Court of Military

Appeals reversed, held this instruction constituted prejudicial error,
and stated that a proper instruction would have been that the court
might assess punishment at its discretion, not in excess of dismissal.
It pointed out that anything in excess of dismissal would constitute
an ex post facto application of the new Code, but that the accused was
entitled to the benefit of the possibility of a lesser sentence under
93
it.

Jurisdiction was not directly involved since under proper in

struction the court could have imposed dismissal.
The Court has also invalidated certain provisions of the Manual
as a result of its ruling and concern for a constitutional right,
90

UCMJ, 19. A bad conduct discharge shall not be adjudged un
less a complete record of the proceedings and testimony before the court
has been made.
^Articles of War, 1920; 41 Stat. 806 (1920).
92
* UCMJ, 133.
93
United States v. Downard, 1 USCMA 346, 3 CMR 80 (1952) .
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Article 55 of the Code, in part, provides that "cruel or unusual punish
ment, shall not be adjudged by any court-martial . . . "

However,

Article 15(a) (2) (F) thereof expressly permits, "if imposed upon a
person attached to or embarked in a vessel, confinement on bread and
water or diminished rations for a period not to exceed three consecutive
days."

The Manual purported to prohibit Army and Air Force courts from

imposing bread and water punishment but to authorize Navy and Coast
Guard courts to adjudge confinement on bread and water for up to exceed
thirty days,

94

in keeping with unbroken Navy practice.

In the case of

Marine Private Wappler, shore-based at Camp Pendleton, California, a
special court in an absence without leave and missing movement case, as
part of its sentence included a bad conduct discharge and thirty-days
confinement on bread and water with a full ration every third day.

This

set the stage for one of the more spectacular decisions rendered by the
Court of Military Appeals.

It held confinement on bread and water was

cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by Article 55 and that
accordingly that part of the sentence "was illegal and void."

It

further held that since confinement on bread and water was included in
the Table of Equivalent Punishments it could in no event be imposed as
part of a sentence which also included a punitive discharge.

The Court

stated:
Although we do not believe that the proscription
against punishments of this nature contained in the Con
stitution's Eighth Amendment-if applicable-would bar the
punishment adjudged here, it is to be noted that the
Amendment does not necessarily define the limits of
'cruel and unusual' as used by Congress in Article 55.

^^MCM, 1951, 126a, Medical certificate, that serious injury to
health would not result, was required; a full ration could not be de
prived for more than three consecutive days.
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Use of the phrase by Congress, therefore, raises a
problem of legislative rather than constitutional con
struction. Certainly Congress intended to confer as
much protection as that afforded by the Eighth Amend
ment . . . we believe it intended to grant protection
covering even wider limits. Accordingly, we think
Article 55 quite broad enough to bar confinement on
bread and water, except to the extend permitted by
Article 15. ^
This last decision must have come as a shock to the Navy.
Something that was accepted punishment for 175 years suddently became
"cruel and unusual."

We must remember, however, in the study of this

and other decisions in this discussion, that the Court is primarily
concerned about those areas that create a substantial prejudice
against the accused.

The court itself has stated in substance:

It is true that courts-martial are special tribunals
of a limited jurisdiction, and strict compliance with
the creative statute is required.
. . . However, we have repeatedly held that not every
violation of a statutory provision with respect to courtmartial proceedings constitutes a jurisdictional defect.
. . .On the contrary we have said that proceedings are
rendered void only by a failure to comply with those pro
visions which constitute "indispensable prerequisites"
to the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. . .^6
We have seen in earlier discussion

97

that the United States

Supreme Court has extended its traditional interest in military courtsmartial beyond jurisdiction into the area of Due Process.
be fitting therefore to follow the same road.

98

It should

As one military lawyer

commented:
While the decisions since Burns do not support de
finitive analysis, they are at least consistent with

95United States v. Wappler, 2 USCMA 393, 9 CMR 23 (1953).
96
United States v. Vanderpool, 4 USCMA 561, 16 CMR 135 (1954).
97

Chapter IV, supra.

98
?°Burns v. Wilson, 346-U. S. 137, 346 U. S. 844 (1953).
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the conclusions that:
(1) The administration of mili
tary justice since Burns, either at the trial or appellate
level, has been more in line with the constitutional re
quirements of due process than in the decade proceding
Burns.
The Supreme Court, in an earlier case upholding the action taken by
military authorities stated; "to those in the military or naval service
of the United States the military law is due process."

100

Let us now

turn to the "G I Supreme Court" and due process.

USCMA In Action:

Military Due Process

Certain rulings and opinions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals have been referred to above in chapter IV.

Because

Military Due Process is such an inclusive grouping of categories of
rights, there are a number of additional cases worthy of discussion.
On the other hand, because of the vast number of cases and the scope
of interest, only a cursory examination can be within the purview of
this thesis.
Describing Military Due Process in a legal periodical, Chief
Judge Quinn stated:
It can be said, therefore, that Military Due Process
begins with the basic rights and privileges defined in
the Federal Constitution. It does not stop there. The
letter and background of the Uniform Code add their
weighty demands to the requirements for a fair trial.
Military Due Process is, thus, not synonomous with
Federal Civilian Due Process. It is basically that
and something more and something different. How much

^Captain Rudolph G. Kraft, Jr., "Collateral Review of Courtsmartial by Civilian Courts," JAG Bulletin, USAF, Vol. V, no. 2, 1963,
p. 21.
^^Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U. S. 296, 31 Sup. C t . 230 (1911).
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more and how much different is indefinable in general
terms for all possible situations.^01
In keeping with the Clay

102

case in which the Court first

aspoused Military Due Process, we can include almost every action in a
judicial proceeding.

In that case in addition to mentioning all of

the safeguards granted by Congress to a military accused, Judge Clay
said, "Due Process, means a course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been established in our system
of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights."

103

The Court of Military Appeals, preempting the Supreme Court
Miranda

104

decision, held that an accused could not be deprived of the

right to consult a lawyer when he is held for interogation by law en
forcement a g e n t s . T h e

accused is not entitled to appointed military

counsel prior to the Article 32 investigation, but he has the right to
retain civilian counsel at any time he is a suspect.

He also is entitled

to consult generally with the Staff Judge Advocate, in the role of im
partial advisor for the command.

This has become an especially signifi

cant pronouncement for the military, because the Court dismissed the
charges for deprivation of counsel.
". . . I t seems to us to be a relatively simple matter
to advise an uninformed and unknowing accused that while
he has no right to appointed military counsel, he does

^"'■Robert E. Quinn, "The United States Court of Military Appeals
and Military Due Process," St. John's Law Review, XXXV (1961), 225.
102United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951).
103Ibid.
104Miranda y. Arizona, 348 U. S. 436, 86 Sup. C t . 1662 (1953).
105United States v. Gunnels, 8 USCMA 150, 23 CMR 354 (1957).
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have a right to have his counsel present with him during
an interogration by a law enforcement agent."106
The SJA erroneous refusal to provide proper information to accused was
held to preclude any use of a statement subsequently obtained from him.
The Court has stated it considers the pretrial, Article 32, in
vestigation as a fundamental part of Military Due P r o c e s s . I t

has

further stated that the investigation constitutes a "discovery proceeding,"
and as such the accused is entitled to "qualified" legal representation.

108

Prior to the enactment of The Uniform Code it was the commonly accepted
view that counsel at the pretrial investigation did not have to be a
lawyer.

This view prevailed during the first several years of operation

under the Code.
Consider this case, which involved an Air Force sergeant with
almost 19 years of military service who, had declined to exercise his
right to counsel at the Article 32 investigation.

During the course of

the investigation the accused made an incriminating statement which was
subsequently received into evidence at the trial.

During the trial the

defense counsel objected to the evidence because the accused was deprived
of qualified counsel at the investigation.
The Court of Military Appeals, in reversing the conviction 2 to
1, held that if an accused desires counsel and selects neither civilian
nor particular military counsel, the convening authority must appoint a
lawyer qualified in the sense of Article 27(b) of the Code.

"It would

107United States v. Allen, 5 USCMA 626, 18 CMR 250 (1955).
108United States v. Tomaszewski, 8 USCMA 266, 24 CMR 76 (1957).
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defeat that purpose if a person unskilled in the requirements of proof,
or knowledge of legal defenses represents the accused."

109

The holding in the Tomaszewski case was the signal for numerous
appellate decisions based upon alleged failure to provide certified
counsel at the Article 32 investigation.
The Court's concern for the right to counsel was further
emphasized by the pronouncement concerning qualifications of counsel
selected and provided by the accused at a general court-martial.
Even at his own insistence and with full advice as to
his right to be represented by qualified counsel, an
accused cannot be permitted to elect to be represented
by a nonlawyer before a general court-martial. It is
imperative that only qualified lawyers be permitted to
practice before a general court-martial. Accordingly,
it is directed that the practice of permitting non
lawyers to represent persons on trial before a general
court-martial be completely discontinued. However, this
is not to be construed in any manner as prohibiting an
accused from conducting his own defense should he desire
to do so without the assistance of counsel. Nor does
it in any manner infringe upon his right to consult with
a nonlawyer, or even have a nonlawyer present at trial
and seated at the counsel table
The Court also insisted that the accused must be advised of his right
to counsel during appellate procedure and denounced an Army policy of
discouraging representation at boards of review.
The right to counsel is so closely guarded because it is up to
the counsel, in discharging his official duties, to be concerned about
all of the rights of the accused.

The Court has reversed cases where

in its judgement, the defense counsel did not adequately protect the
109 Ibid.

110

United States v. Kraskouskas, 9 USCMA 607, 26 CMR 387 (1958).

111 United States v. Darrlng, 9 USCMA 651, 26 CMR 431 (1958).
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rights of the accused.
We have seen some references to USCMA rulings in the discussion
in chapter IV above on self-incrimination, search and seizure, and other
rights.

Most of the categories are included in the Court's summation

of Military Due Process.

113

Search and seizure is not, but since federal

rules apply in general, the right is adequately provided for.
has not ignored this area.

The Court

The illustrations in the following discussion

describes the Court's point of view.
It is well established that where property is owned or controlled
by the United States, the commanding officer having jurisdiction of the
place concerned has authority to search or to authorize others to do so
for him.

Likewise, in foreign countries or occupied territories, the

commander having jurisdiction over the person concerned may search or
authorize search of that person's off-base quarters.
The power of a military commander in this field has long been
recognized, and numerous decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals uphold it.

114

He has great responsibilities with regard

to property entrusted to him, as well as responsibilities of command
and discipline.

Additionally, someone must be readily available to

exercise this extraordinary power.

There being no one comparable to

the civilian magistrate in the military community, it must devolve upon
someone who can exercise it in a dispassionate manner.
the best choice.
11

The commander is

However, the commander, too, is bound by the requirement

2

United States v. McMahan, 6 USCMA 709, 21 CMR 31 (1956).
United States v. McFarlane, 8 USCMA 96, 23 CMR 320 (1957) .
113
114

Chapter IV.

United States v. Florence, 1 USCMA 620, 5 CMR 48 (1952).
United States v. Doyle. 1 USCMA 545, 4 CMR 137 (1952).’
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that probable cause must exist for belief that an offense had been
committed by the person searched for possession of the criminal goods
sought.

Mere suspicion, without factual basis, will not support this

requirement.

He may delegate his authority with discretion.

Consider this case.

The accused and nine other soldiers, while

on pass, were transported by an Army truck.

Six or seven of the ten

were suspected narcotics users and one of them was reputed to have been
previously "caught" with narcotics but never tried for the offense.
Still another was known to have borrowed money before leaving on his
pass.

Upon return of the truck to the unit area, the commander ordered

the apprehension and search of all ten soldiers based upon the foregoing
information.

This was done and two bottles of heroin were found on the

accused's person.

The Court of Military Appeals held that, search and

seizure was illegal and its product was inadmissible in advance.

Reason

able or probable cause was lacking for both the apprehension and the
search.

The commander acted on mere suspicion in ordering a wholesale

search of a group which included "suspects" and those regarded as
innocent.

The search was general and exploratory in nature and "wholly

lacking in reasonable cause."^^
In the following case a search was made by the provost marshal
of a Marine Corps Supply Center.

The commanding general of the center

had, by general order, delegated search authority to certain personnel,
including the head of the administrative branch of the center.

The

provost marshal conducted the search after permission from the head of
the administrative branch.

The Court held that the search was properly

. . . 116
authorized.

115United States v. Brown, 10 USCMA 428, 28 CMR (1959).
116

United States v. Weaver, 9 USCMA 13, 25 CMR 275 (1958).
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Often searches are conducted by persons, who assume that they
have authority to act and who do so in good faith, without receiving
specific approval of one with unquestionable authority.
have produced a volume of legal controversy.

Such instances

Cases in this category

have been upheld on appeal where it could be determined that under the
particular circumstances of the case the person either had sufficient
authority or the need for immediate action made the search reasonable.
The Constitution protects only against unreasonable searches.
If immediate action is required to prevent destruction or removal of
criminal goods, it is reasonable that such action be taken.

On the

other hand, it takes only a short time, ordinarily, for law enforcement
officers to arm themselves with appropriate authority.

The peculiar

circumstances of the case (each case is decided on its own facts) will
determine reasonableness.

Thus when six law enforcement officers

expecting to seize a storage of narcotics had staked out the accused's
shack for 24 hours without result and rushed in to search without
warrant when he was subsequently apprehended approaching it, the United
States Court of Military Appeals felt the search was unreasonable.
There were sufficient officers present that one could have gone for the
warrant while others restrained the accused and waited.

117

The Court of Military Appeals defined the nature of a serviceman's
"home", the place in which he had a right to be free from the uninvited
and unauthorized intrusion of others.
A dwelling house is not a mere physical structure of a
particular kind; it is a place in which human beings live.
It may be a hotel room, an apartment, an entire building,
as in the case of a single family residence, or a tent.

117United States v. Alaniz, 9 USCMA 533, 26 CMR 313 (1958).
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State v. Holbrook 98 Or. 43, 188 Pac. 947. Cf. United
States v. Love, 4 USCMA 260, 15 CMR 260. Generally a
military person's place of abode is the place where he
bunks and keeps his few private possessions. His home is
the particular place where the necessities of the service
force him to live. This may be a barracks, a tent, or
even a foxhole. Whatever the name of his place of abode,
it is his sanctuary against unlawful intrusion; it is his
castle. And he is there entitled to stand his ground
against a trespasser to the same extent that a civilian
is entitled to stand fast in his civilian home. No reason
in law, logic or military necessity justifies depriving
the men and women in the armed forces of a fundamental
right to which they would be entitled as civilians. Con
sequently, when the accused retired to his own tent, he
retreated as far as the law demands. The law officer
erred in failing to make that clear to the members of the
court.
The trial procedure in courts-martial has been carefully monitored.
This encompasses a complete review of all rights up to the appellate
level.

We have seen how many of the decisions discussed up to this

point are based on discovery by the Court in reviewing the record of
the trial.

Here is a case on illegal testimony; this appears in a

service newspaper:
WASHINGTON - The Court of Military Appeals has just
reversed the conviction of an airman second class be
cause his wife was illegally compelled to testify against
him.
In his unanimous (3-0) opinion, Chief Judge Robert F.
Quinn came out strongly in favor of preserving a marriage
rather than ending it because of occasional "bouts" be
tween spouses. The airman was accused of "cuffing" his
wife.
Court-martial testimony revealed that the airman
slapped his wife only after she beat him in the head
with a shoe. Quinn noted that the wife's testimony
raised a serious doubt about whether the airman should
have been charged in the first place with assault and
battery.
The airman testified at his trial that he loved his
wife very much. She indicated she felt the same about him.

118United States v. Adams, 5 USCMA 563, 18 CMR 187 (1955).
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"To burden (the airman) with a bad-conduct discharge
in these circumstances borders on the unconscionable,"
Quinn wrote,
At the court-martial, the wife said repeatedly that
she did not wish to testify against her husband, but the
prosecutor told her she had to. Quinn held that the
prosecutor was wrong and ordered the conviction set aside.
Quinn wrote:
" . . . the general rule is that, as to offenses against
third persons, one spouse cannot testify against the defendent-spouse . . . as to offenses against the spouse, the
victim-spouse may testify voluntarily, but cannot be com
pelled to testify over her protest."119
The law officer in a general court-martial has gradually
assumed the status comparable to that of a trial judge in the civilian
federal system.

This has had the complete approval of the Court; in

fact the Court has largely contributed to his concept.

120

It has held

that the law officer must always be completely impartial, should never
be placed in a partisan status and must function as a judge at all
times.

121

The Court has reversed numerous cases because it found the

law officer's rulings and instructions prejudicial to the accused.

On

the other hand if it found the error not sufficiently serious, there
would be no reversal.

Such cases have been a major contribution to

improving military judicial proceedings.
vital part of Military Due Process.

Obviously a fair trial is a

122

The law officer's functions are discharged by the president of
a Special court-martial.
119

Since this officer presides by right of

The Air Force Times, July 15, 1964, p. 8.

120Unlted States v. Biesak, 3 USCMA 717, 14 CMR 132 (1954).
121United States v. Renton, 8 USCMA 697, 25 CMR 201 (1958).
See Judge Ferguson's dissent for a discussion of law officer's duties
in United States v. Mortensen, 8 USCMA 233, 24 CMR 43 (1957) .
122

United States v. Jenkins, 1 USCMA 329, 3 CMR. 63 (1952).
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seniority only, he frequently has no legal training.

The Court of

Military Appeals carefully evaluates the president's behavior, in those
limited cases which reach the Court.

The Clay case, referred to several

times above as the basis of the Military Due Process Doctrine, was re
versed because of the omission by the president of a Navy special courtmartial.

He failed to instruct as to the presumption of innocence,

burden of proof and the elements of an offense to which the accused had
pleaded not guilty.

123

Aside from the legal complexities, even conduct comes under
scrutiny.

124
In United States v. Lynch,
a conviction on a guilty plea

was nullified due to the conduct of the president of the Court.

He re

monstrated in open court saying, "you, as a civilian lawyer, may not be
aware that an officer of the United States Army is bound to tell the
truth."
We recall our own anxieties as president of special courtsmartial in numerous serious situations.

The decisions involved, when

punitive discharge and confinement may be adjudged, are not to be taken
lightly.

As president of a general court-martial we welcomed the

secondary role, subordinate to the law officer.

In contrast to those

serious cases the one we recall most vividly was a ludicrous incident.

125

A young lady, who had allegedly been molested by the accused, was called
in by the trial counsel to testify, and to identify the accused.

We

had always wondered about the setting of the courtroom which almost
labels the accused by his position.

The trial counsel had elicited the

123United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951).
124United States v. Lynch, 9 USCMA 523, 26 CMR 303 (1958).
125 Burtonwood, United Kingdom, 1952-1954.
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testimony about the alleged molesting.

He then asked the witness to

look around the courtroom to see if the person who had molested her
was present, and if so to point him out.

She looked all around the

room, at the spectators, the counsel, the accused and finally at the
court.

Then with perfect confidence she pointed to a lieutenant seated

at the table as a member of the court.
the one."

"There he is," she said, "That's

After order was restored-even the accused joined in the

laughter- the witness realized her mistake and properly identified the
accused.

But a reasonable doubt was established and the accused was

found not guilty.

The poor innocent lieutenant who was our squadron

adjutant, with good nature, enjoyed the notoriety for a long time.
t

In considering trial procedure as a part of Military Due Process
we must include the protection against self-incrimination and the right
to remain silent.

The Court of Military Appeals has of course been

particularly alert to enforce these rights and pays special interest to
confessions.

Confessions must be affirmatively shown as voluntary.

Since this is not an interlocutory question, the law officer must in,
,
.
.
. . .
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struct the court that it must decide if voluntariness is in issue.
Since confessions are seldom made during the trial, they are more likely
obtained in the investigation stage of Military Due Process.

Early in

its tenure in reversing a conviction the Court made this exceptionally
strong pronouncement:
At the outset of the investigation, the officer con
ducting it did not fully advise petitioner of his rights
under Article of War 24, supra. This was a clear viola
tion of that Article. Nor did he advise petitioner of
the nature of the investigation, or of the charges against
him. This officer then conducted a searching and in
quisitorial examination utilizing all the devices of an

126United States v. Minnifield, 9 USCMA 373, 26 CMR 153 (1958).
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expert prosecutor cross-examining a hostile witness,
accompanied by shouting, accusations of falsehood,
reprimands, and castigations of character. All these
factors inevitably lead to the conclusion that petitioner
was, in effect, compelled to incriminate himself. This
smacks too much of Star Chamber proceedings. Petitioner
does not have a free choice to admit or deny his guilt or
to refuse to answer the questions asked.
It follows automatically that the testimony given at
this investigation should not have been received in evi
dence at the trial. Article of War 24, supra, and Article
31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 U. S. C.
Sec. 602, so command. Further, it matters not that there
may be other evidence of guilt. The right here violated
flows, through Congressional enactment, from the Con
stitution of the United States. Military due process re
quires that courts-martial be conducted not in violation
of these constitutional safeguards which Congress has seen
fit to accord to members of the Armed Forces, United States
v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, decided November 27, 1951. These
safeguards are for the protection of all who are brought
within the military disciplinary system, and are not to be
disregarded merely in order to inflict punishment on one
who is believed to be guilty.^27
There are innumerable cases, which we cannot discuss here,
where the Court of Military Appeals demonstrated that disregard for sub
stantial rights or activity prejudicial to the accused cannot be tolerated.
The Code states that "a finding or sentence of a court-martial shall not
be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless materially pre1 OO

judiced the substantial rights of the accused."1 °

In this respect, the

Court has frequently disagreed with boards of review in recognizing the
extent of error as harmless or prejudicial.

The totality of harmless

error cannot become prejudicial by mere cumulative effect.

The Court so

held in this case:
Appellate defense counsel, admitting arguendo that,
considered individually, none of the errors listed above
prejudiced the accused, argues that their cumulative
177

lz/United States v. Welch, 1 USCMA 402, 3 CMR 136 (1952).

128

UCMJ, 59a.
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effect was such as to warrant a finding of prejudice.
Counsel refers to several Federal cases in support of
this proposition. Without analyzing those decisions in
detail, we note that the individual errors in each of
them contained some, although slight, possibility of
prejudice. Such is not the case here. The errors dis
cussed above are formal in nature and we fail to see how,
individually or collectively, they could have in any
way materially harmed the accused. Since we find no
substantial prejudice, we are bound by Article 59 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 50 USCMA Sec. 646, to
hold that the errors considered by the board of review 129
do not require disapproval of the findings and sentence.
The Court is certainly more alert than the boards of review and
thereby justifies its existence as a civilian supervising agency.

The

following testimony before the Senate hearing on constitutional rights
should emphasize the value of the Court.
. . . it is impossible to expect the services without
the supervision of the Court of Military Appeals to
stamp out the endemic existence of command influence,
and I have here a list of the horribles. I don't want
to go into them in detail, Mr, Chairman, perhaps if I
either submit the citations to the reporter or submit
them separately. These are shocking cases that weren't
caught by the Board of Review.
There is the Deain case (5 USCMA 44), a Navy case.
They had a permanent general-court. I think the Navy
has now got away from that. The admiral who was presi
dent of the general court was challenged and on challenge
admitted that when "I see him come in there, I know he
is generally guilty otherwise he wouldn't be here," and
then he made out the fitness reports on the members of
the court.
Well, you can imagine how much dissent you were going
to get from the members of the court in that situation.
Passed by a board of review, reversed by the Court of
Military Appeals.
Whitley (5 USCMA 786): The president of a special
court was ruling in favor of the defense. At a recess
he was relieved and another officer was substituted in
his place. Passed by the Board of Review, reversed by
the Court of Military Appeals.
Sears (6 USCMA 661): There was an Air Force special
court-martial in England. The accused hired an English
solicitor who, of course, has the right of audience.

^ ^ United States v. Zimmerman, 1 USCMA 160, 2 CMR 66 (1952).
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The convening authority put two lawyers on the court on
the special court, who advised the president to overrule
every one of the solicitor's objections. Passed by the
Air Force Board of Review, reversed by the Court of
Military Appeals.
Parker (6 USCMA 75): A soldier put on trial for a
capital case, death sentence adjudged, 1 day to prepare
for trial. Passed by the Board of Review, reversed by
the court.
McMahan (6 USCMA 708): A soldier on trial for a cap
ital offense. His counsel, a major, J. A., made no
closing argument although it was a very thin case on
premeditation, said nothing in mitigation when the ques
tion before the court was whether it should be a death
sentence or a life sentence. Death sentence was ad
judged, passed by the Board, reversed by the court.
Kennedy (8 USCMA 251): A cooked-up scheme, I don't
think any other characterization would be accurate, be
tween trial counsel, the law officer and the staff
judge advocate to get a conviction. Passed by the
Board, reversed by the court, and finally Kitchins
(12 USCMA 589), when an Army lieutenant made a spirited
defense his superior, the staff judge advocate, gave
him a low efficiency report. Passed by the Board,
reversed by the court.
So, I am convinced you need a court not only to take
you gentlemen and the Congress out of the court-martial
business so you don't have to go see the Secretary on
behalf of constituents but also to look over the
shoulders of these people who just can't be relied upon
to do a completely decent job by themselves.l^O
The cases, opinions and statements cited in this chapter are
not inclusive enough to be considered as a valid survey.
included all the areas of interest.

Nor have they

We do believe, however, that a

firm conclusion can be drawn that the United States Court of Military
Appeals is indeed a protector of the rights of the service personnel.
We have come a long way since the case described here.
In a rather bizarre case involving a young Army lieu
tenant named Shapiro, a federal district court decided
that the Army conducted its court-martial with more
speed than due process allowed. Shapiro, an Army defense
130

Frederick Bernays Wiener (before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights) Hearings, CRMP, op. cit. p p . 780-81.
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counsel, had substituted one Mexican for another who
was charged with rape, which caused the chief government
witness at the court-martial to identify the pretended
defendant as the guilty party. Shapiro revealed the
hoax only after the party was convicted. The Army,
thrown off stride by this ingenious defense tactic only
momentarily, freed the innocent defendant and charged
the "original", who was then convicted. There is no
need to speculate about the Army's feeling toward Shapiro.
It then charged him with delaying a general court-martial,
a violation of that military catchall, the ninety-sixth
Article of War. Shapiro was arrested at 12:40 P.M., and
the tiral was set for 2:00 P.M., at a place forty miles
away. At that time and place Shapiro's request for con
tinuance was refused. This treatment was held to be a
denial of counsel and of due process in what apparently
was an enjoyable case for the district court, whose
opinion lashed military "justice" thoroughly.■'-31In contrast to that horrible example of military justice,
compare this case, tried under the old Articles of War but reviewed
by the Court of Military Appeals under the Uniform Code.
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In the past year and a half the Court of Military
Appeals has protected the constitutional rights of more
than 2000 servicemen. The DeCarlo case involved a typical
case the court will not tolerate.
Private DeCarlo was moving up to the front with his in
fantry regiment in March 1951 (in Korea) when he asked
Poe Kaiwan, a Korean boy working in the outfit's supply
branch, for a bar of candy. Poe frequently had given
candy to the soldiers but on that occasion said he had
none. All witnesses testified that private deCarlo was
kidding when he told Poe, "If you don't give me some
candy I'll shoot you" - and then his gun went off.
Just before Poe died he said he knew the shooting was
accidental. The law officer (Judge) of the court that
tried private DeCarlo on May 15, 1951, refused to admit
Poe's statement in evidence and private DeCarlo was
found guilty of unpremeditated murder. The law author
izing C. M. A, to review court-martial convictions went
into effect May 31, 1951, The Court of Military Appeals
whose decisions are final, ruled that the supression of
Poe's voluntary statement was a prejudicial error and
ordered another trial. Private DeCarlo was tried with
131
William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts.
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1955), pp. 51-53.
132

United States v. DeCarlo, 1 USCMA 91, 1 CMK 90 (1951) .
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negligent homicide at the retrial and received a sen
tence of six months. He since has returned
to active
I 9 9
duty (original sentence was 25 years).
The balance between the military's concern for discipline and
the Court's concern for the accused is a perplexing problem.

As the

late Judge Brosman put it in the early days of the Court:
We can't solve it simply by giving the accused the
benefit of every possible doubt. There are times when
military considerations of necessity are overriding
factors in a case.
It is essential for the public to
remember that military service takes place in an ab
normal social situation governed by limitations growing
out of the realities and necessities of military oper
ations . . . each case involves considerations peculiar
to itself.
The Court has well deserved the praise heaped upon it.

Let us

turn now to the effects of its case law on the Uniform Code and future
military justice.
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Stanley Frank, "The G I's Day in Court," Nations' Business
January 1953, p. 36.
134 Ibid .

CHAPTER VI

TRENDS IN MILITARY JUSTICE

Progress Under the Uniform Code

We have seen how the Uniform Code of Military Justice was developed
to cure many of the ills of former military codes.

We have also seen that

the Code in action is an extremely effective device, and a protector of
the basic rights of an accused.

We have examined the legislative history,

structure and operation of the United States Court of Military Appeals.
We have also examined some of its decisions and observed how the Court
strives to maintain a balance between the military requirement for
discipline, and the constitutional requirement for the protection of
individual rights.

Let us turn to the effects of the Court on the Code,

by noting some of the provisions of the Code that have undergone modifi
cation as a direct result of judicial review.

The power of judicial

review is usually associated with the United States Supreme Court,^ and
in fact we shall see that the Supreme Court has also had an impact on
the Code.

The judicial review of the Court of Military Appeals has

resulted in the invalidation of certain provisions of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, which is an executive order forcing the executive to
promulgate new orders to be in consonance with military case law, and
causing Congress to amend the law.

■*-Rocco J. Tresolini, American Constitutional Law, (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1959), p. 55.
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The
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The Uniform Code of Military Justice was originally Section 1
of Public Law 506, 81st Congress, Act of May 5, 1950, and was codified
as part of Title 50 U. S. C. (Chapter 22).

The Act of August 10, 19562

revised, codified, and enacted the Uniform Code into law as part of
Title 10 U. S„ C. (Chapter 47).
1957.

This change was effective January 1,

Chapter 47, titled Uniform Code of Military Justice, contains

3
sections 801 - 940, which are synonomous with Articles 1-140, UCMJ.

All

subsequent changes to the Uniform Code are therefore amendments to the
Act of August 10, 1956, and are codified in the appropriate section of
Title 10

4

U. S. C.

Four minor amendments changed some language due to

the status changes of Hawaii and Alaska, and extended the power to ad
minister o a t h s . T h e r e have been only three significant amendments in
fifteen years of operation under the Uniform Code.
The first major change was the insertion of Article 58a
Code.

6

in the

This Article provided statutory authority for automatic reduction

of enlisted persons to the lowest grade.

Upon approval by the convening

authority, any sentence that includes (1) a dishonorable or bad-conduct
discharge; (2) confinement; or (3) hard labor without confinement; will
automatically effect reduction to the lowest grade.

The usual appellate

procedures remain; if the sentence is set aside, or as finally approved

2P.L. 1028, 84th Cong., 70 A Stat. 1 (1956).
3
See appendix for sec. 801, chapter 47 (UCMJ, Art. 1), 10
U. S. C. 801.
4
e.g, 10 U. S. C. 815 (UCMJ, Art. 15) was revised by P.L. 87648 in 1962.
5P.L. 86-70, 73 Stat. 142 (1959); P.L. 86-624, 74 Stat. 411
(1960). P.L. 86-589, 74 Stat. 329 (1960), oaths, UCMJ, 136. There
should be another language change due to transfer of the Coast Guard from
Dept, of Transportation.

6
P.L. 86-633, 74 Stat. 468 (1960).
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does not include any of the punishments listed above, all rights and
privileges will be restored retroactively.
The Article 58a amendment to the law, the first significant
change in the Uniform Code, was a direct result of judicial review by
the United States Court of Military Appeals.
followed a general pattern.^

The Court's reasoning

Certain provisions of the Manual appeared

to be in conflict with the Code, or at least what the Court determined
to be the intent of Congress in adopting the Code.

In the 1953 Wappler

g
decision,

noted above, the Court first held a provision of the Manual

to be invalid, when a long recognized punishment in the Navy was
declared "cruel and unusual."

That decision, by ipvalidating a pro

vision of the Manual, negated part of an executive order.

In 1958 in

Q
the Varnadore

decision, the Court again took issue with the same section

in the Manual, concerning punishment.

UCMJ, Article 56, authorizes the

President to prescribe maximum punishments.

This is implemented in the

Manual by a table relating punishments to specific violations.

In the

same paragraph the Manual^ states that a sentence of confinement for
a period greater than six months results in automatic punitive discharge
as part of the sentence.

In the Varnadore case the Court reasoned that

this was setting a minimum limit in conflict with Article 56.
Apparently the Court applied the same reasoning in invalidating
a long standing practice

that confinement resulted in automatic reduction

^Major General Stanley W. Jones, "What's the Law Today," Army,
X (1960), 52-58.
8United States v. Wappler, 2 USCMA 393, 9 CMR 23 (1953).
^United States v. Varnadore, 9 USCMA 471, 26 CMR 251 (1958).
10MCM, 1951, par. 127.

11 Since 1917.
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to the lowest enlisted grade, and that total forfeiture resulted in
punitive discharge.

The writer can recall specific instructions by

the Staff Judge Advocate on many occasions (not in court), to be sure to
include the reduction or discharge as part of the sentence, if that was
the intent of the court.

If the court failed to include the proper

sentence it would be corrected by the convening authority in his review
of the case.
problems.

12

However the automatic features created administrative
An Executive Order,

13

amending the Manual in 1956, was pro

mulgated to clarify the automatic reduction provision.

The Court, how

ever, invalidated that Executive Order and the automatic feature of the
14
Manual in United States v. Simpson.

The Court recognized that an

accused sentenced to an extended period of confinement is worthless and
perhaps a liability to the services; but it held that reduction, if added
by the convening authority, operates to increase the sentence and is
therefore invalid.

Reduction must be part of the sentence.

By this

ruling a senior non-commissioned officer conceivably could be sentenced
to confinement and discharge and continue to receive full pay and
allowances.

The average time for full appeal in 1959-1960 was 344 days.^~*

These decisions worked a real hardship on the services and were
severely critized by many legal authorities.

16

Relief was granted by

12A case is not final with the pronouncement of the courtmartial's sentence.
^Executive Order 10652, 1956.
1^United States v. Simpson, 10 USCMA 229, 27 CMR 303 (1959).
United States v. Littlepage, 10 USCMA 245, 27 CMR 319 (1959).
-'■-’Jones, loc. cit.
16

william G. Fratcher, "Presidential Power to Regulate Military
Justice: A Critical Study of Decisions of the Court of Military Appeals,"
N.Y.U. Law Review, XXXIV, (1959), 861.
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the Amendment to the Code which, in effect, placed the invalidated
Executive Order within UCMJ, Article 58a.^ This legislation was
sponsored by the Department of Defense as a result of an Army study of
the first seven years operations under the Uniform Code. 18
The second significant change was implemented by inserting
Article 123a,

19

the "bad check" provision.

Before this amendment

became effective, the services had struggles for ten years with the in
adequate provisions of the Uniform Code.

It was especially difficult

to obtain a bad check conviction due to the lack of specific language
in the Code.

Serious violations were prosecuted as larceny under

Article 121, while less serious offenses were charged under Article 134,
the General Article.

The new Article spelled out the offense with

clarity, and of course required a new Executive Order

20

to revise the

table of maximum punishments and other parts of the Manual.

It is

interesting to note here, that USCMA decisions were not the motivating
force in this instance.

In fact, the Court, as part of the Code

Committee^ recommended legislation to correct this inadequacy ten
years earlier.
17

22

The Code Committee recommended legislation similar

Note 6, supra.

18

The Committee on the Uniform Code of Military Justice Good
Order and Discipline in the Army, Report to Honorable Wilber M. Brucker,
Secretary of the Army, 18 Jan. 1960, known as "The Brucker Report."
See Appendix C for extract summary. Note the critical letter to Cong
ressman Kilday, later to become USCMA judge.
19
20

P.L. 87-385, 75 Stat. 814 (1961).
Executive Order 11009, 1962.

21

The Code Committee includes the USCMA, the Judge Advocates
General of the Armed Forces and the General Counsel of the Dept, of the
Treasury.
22
USCMA Annual Report, June 1, 1952— Dec. 31,'1953, p. 9.
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to the District of Columbia bad check law.

The services welcomed the

new law and the \<»ord soon circulated that there was a "crack down" on
bad check offenses.
The third and perhaps the most significant change was the im~
provement of Article 15.,

23

non-judicial punishment.

This amendment to

the Uniform Code resulted in a sharp reduction in summary courtsmartial,

24

and has received popular acceptance by all the services.

The Code Committee expressed approval with this comment:
Although in effect less than one year, the new Article
15 has already reduced the court-martial rates in the
Armed Forces substantially. Most minor offenses are now
appropriately punished non-judicially without imposing
the stigma of criminal convictions. ^
The new Article 15, was a major revision in non-judicial punish
ment.

It has been extensively used by all the services since it went

into effect February 1, 1963.

The attendant reduction in summary

courts-martial is especially noteworthy.

26

The following comments

express typical approval:
There was a sharp reduction in summary courts-martial
trials, from 43,542 last year to 32,316, or approximately
30 percent. This decrease can be attributed primarily to
the amended article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which was in effect during 5 months of the re
porting period, and which provided commanders with more
extensive and effective non-judicial punishment authority. ^

23P.L. 87-648, 76 Stat. 447 (1962).
24See Table 8, Chap. IV.
23USCMA Annual Report, 1963, p. 1.

26

Army - 61 percent, Navy - 65 percent, Marines - 57 percent,
Air Force - 56 percent (estimate).
27USCMA Annual Report, 1963, p. 61.
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Courts-martial of all types--general, special, and sum
mary- -convened within the Navy and Marine Corps totaled
39,033 in fiscal year 1963 as compared to 45,529 in fiscal
year 1962. This represents an overall decrease of 6,496
cases, or 14.2 percent. Since service strengths have re
mained relatively unchanged, a decrease in courts-martial
case-load may be attributable to Public Law 87-648 which
increased the Article 15, UCMJ, non-judicial punishment
authority of commanding officers. The new article 15 has
received universal command approval, with many noting an
improvement in discipline. Despite the relatively short
period of time that the new article 15 has been in effect,
it is apparent that not only are we saving many of our
people from criminal records, but discipline and morale
are being enhanced.28
The first months of experience with the operation of the
new Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice, indicates
that the powers granted by the article are being employed
with discretion and that a beneficial effect on discipline
has resulted. Of more importance is the fact that the
drastic reduction in the number of cases tried by summary
courts-martial is due primarily to the use of the powers
granted by the new article. During the last quarter of
fiscal year 1963, the only period for which I have com
plete statistics, the authority granted by the new article
was used by commanders on 51,683 occasions. No informa
tion is available with respect to the number of times the
powers granted under the former article 15 were employed
in the last quarter of the previous fiscal year. However,
during that quarter, 11,143 cases were tried by summary
courts-martial, while only 4,419 cases were tried by that
forum in the last quarter of fiscal year 1963. The summary
court-martial rate per thousand dropped from 9.96 in the
last quarter of fiscal year 1962 to 4.39 in the last
quarter of fiscal year 1963. There was, however, no signi
ficant change in the special court-martial rate during
the same periods.^9
Courts-martial of all types--general, special, and sum
mary- -convened within the Navy and Marine Corps totaled
25,041 in FY 1964 as compared to 39,033 in FY 1963. This
represents an overall decrease of 13,992 cases or 36 per
cent. The decrease in case load cannot be attributed to
a decrease in service strengths since they have increased
slightly, but may be attributable to PL 87-648 which in
creased the Article 15 UCMJ non-judicial punishment
authority of commanding officers. A comparative analysis
of the first two quarters of FY 1963 (before the new

28Ibid., p. 89.
^ Ibid., pp . 66-67.
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Article 15 became law) with the first two quarters of FY
1964 (during which time the new law was in effect) shows
a 65 percent decrease in Navy and a 57 percent decrease
in Marine summary courts-martial cases, ®
. . . a remarkable reduction in summary court-martial
trials from 32,316 last year to 16,926, or approximately
47 percent. The decreases may be attributed primarily
to the amended Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which was in effect for the entire fiscal year
as compared with only 5 months during Fiscal Year 1963.
There were 61 percent fewer summary court-martial cases
in Fiscal Year 1964 than in a similar period immediately
preceding the amendment of Article 15. ^
The recommendations by the Code Committee had included dispensing
with the summary court-martial, as well as increasing the authority of
Article 15.

Note the following testimony, by Chief Judge Quinn, USCMA,

before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights:
MR. CREECH. Sir, with regard to the Uniform Code, are
there any suggestions which you would care to make in re
gard to amendments to it in areas in which your experience
has indicated that perhaps amendments should be made in
order to safeguard the constitutional rights of the service
personnel?
JUDGE QUINN. I think Mr. Chairman, that perhaps those
rights are adequately safeguarded as far as we are able
to safeguard them. Certainly we will and have, to the
best of our ability, protected the constitutional rights
of every serviceman. We have recommended some 17 rather
minor changes in the code, and those recommendations are
before the Armed Services Committee for consideration.

Now, I have not before me the other 17 changes that we
have recommended, but we are on record in our annual re
port several different times as to what we think ought to
be done to somewhat streamline the Uniform Code.

MR. CREECH. It has been indicated to us that there is
no right to counsel in summary courts-martial, and I
wonder, Sir, what your feeling is with regard to the lack
of counsel in view of the sixth amendment guarantee of the
right of defendants to counsel in criminal cases?

■^USCMA Annual Report, 1964, p. 65.
31

Ibid., p . 57.
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JUDGE QUINN. This is before summary courts? Of course,
we have more or less concurred in recommendations that
article 15 punishment be increased to some extent, and that
the summary court be dispensed with.
So that perhaps would obviate any necessity for counsel.
Of course, I am a firm advocate of the right of counsel,
and I think if any boy, whether it is before a summary or
special or general court, asks for counsel, that he ought
to have it, if it is reasonably available.
MR. CREECH. Sir, with regard to changing article 15,
there have been some proposals made for the increase of
article 15 authority of the commanding officer to impose
non-judicial punishment.
Do you feel, Sir, that this would be desirable?
JUDGE QUINN. Yes, I do.
MR. CREECH. Do you care to elaborate on your state
ment, Sir?
JUDGE QUINN. Well, of course, whatever punishment he
gets under article 15 would leave no record and, after
all, I think that perhaps conviction in a summary court
which leaves a boy with a record is far more dangerous
than maybe even a little more severe punishment in the
matter of fine or 8 or 10 days in jail.
So that I think, at least to some extent, it is a
lesser punishment. And most of the commanding officers
around the world that we have talked to--and Judge
Ferguson and I have been in many parts of the world:
Judge Kilday has just come on the court and has not
had an opportunity to get out into some of the theaters
of war; he undoubtedly will--they have indicated to us
that a little more power in the field of non-judicial
punishment would be very useful to them; that it would
promote discipline, improve the situation in their
commands, and, yet, would leave no record as far as the
boy is concerned.
In other words, there would be no record of any con
viction, and, therefore, no permanent blot upon his
record.
So it seems to me that the increase in powers that we
have recommended to the Armed Services Committee would
actually be in the boy's favor. It would do him little
or no harm, and it would remove any possibility of a
conviction remaining on his record.32
Likewise in his testimony before the same Subcommittee Mr.
Zeigel W. Neff, civilian member of a Navy board of review, noted

U. S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on The
Judiciary Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel, 87th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1962, pp.-181-183.
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the possibility of expanding Article 15 and thereby eliminating the
summary court-martial.

He pointed out;

. . . The punishment limitations of commanding officers
under article 15 of the code should be increased to in
clude punishment reserved for the summary court-martial,
and the summary court should be abolished. This change
has been recommended by the judges on the Court of Mili
tary Appeals, the service Judge Advocate Generals, and
other individuals who have studied the matter. The com
manding officer needs this additional authority so that
he can correct a youngster by taking him out to the wood
shed, so to speak, without being forced to give him a
summary court-martial for a minor infraction. Conviction
by summary court becomes a conviction of record. Two
such convictions will support a punitive discharge in a
special or general court and in any event will follow an
accused for the remainder of his life. Before a summary
court, an accused has no right to qualified counsel as
such, yet he may come out with a relatively serious con
viction of record, involving such derelictions as insub
ordination, assault, petty larceny, et cetera.^
Note this comment from the report, dated 1963, by the Senate
Subcommittee, which conducted the Hearings on Constitutional Rights in
1962.

(The Article 15 legislation was passed before the report was

completed).
Thus, the expansion of non-judicial punishment, taken
together with the continued existence of the summary
court-martial, creates a threat that the serviceman will
be deprived of important rights which Congress intended
him to retain. Indeed, aside from furnishing commanders
with a weapon to use against the rights of service
personnel, the summary court-martial has no role left
to play.
Accordingly, the subcommittee recommends the
elimination of summary courts-martial,-^
It therefore appears that one amendment leads to another.

This

proposal, to abolish the summary court-martial, is one of many which

33Ibid., p. 299.
34
U. S.., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on The
Judiciary, Summary Report of Hearings, Constitutional Rights of Military
Personnel, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 36.
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have been recommended to Congress every year since 1953.

Before examin

ing this and other proposals now under consideration, let us first
review certain United States Supreme Court decisions.

There is now a

proposal to revise the Uniform Code with respect to jurisdiction of
certain civilians, because the Supreme Court has declared UCMJ Article
3(a) and Article 2(11) unconstitutional.
Article 3(a) was discussed briefly in chapter V above.

35

It was

supposed to fill the jurisdictional gap over persons who had committed a
serious offense while in service, but had been discharged without pro36
secution.
The Supreme Court in effect declared it unconstitutional
37
in United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles,
when it held:
Determining the scope of the constitutional power of
Congress to authorize trial by court-martial presents
another instance calling for limitation to "The least
possible power adequate to the end proposed." We hold
that Congress cannot subject civilians like Toth to
trial by court-martial. They like other civilians, are
entitled to have the benefit of safeguards afforded
those tried in the regular courts authorized by Article
III of the constitution,^
The Toth case concerned prosecution in a court-martial of an exserviceman for an offense committed by him while in an active status as

•^Chap. v, p. 92.
36
°UCMJ, Art. 3. "Jurisdiction to try certain personnel.
(a)
Subject to the provisions of article 43 (Statute of Limitations), any
person charged with having committed, while in a status in which he was
subject to this Code, an offense against this Code, punishable by con
finement of five years or more and for which the person cannot be tried
in the courts of the United States or any State or Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia shall not be relieved from amenability to trial
by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status." Original
article.
37

United States ex rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S, 11, 76 Sup.
Ct. 1 (1955).
38t, .,
Ibid.
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expressly authorized by Article 3(a).

The United States Court of Military

39
Appeals in United States v. Gallagher reasoned that Article 3(a) is con
stitutional when applied to service personnel who have been discharged
but re-enlist.

USCMA declared the Toth case applies only to ex-servicemen

and civilians who have severed all connections with the U. S. Armed
Forces.

This ruling has not been tested by habeas corpus.
So it appears that UCMJ, Article 3(a) retains jurisdiction over

those who re-enlist-, but does not extend to those who are discharged and
do not re-enlist.

In this latter group there is a jurisdictional gap

over a serviceman who commits a crime overseas which is not discovered
until after he returns to the United States and is discharged.
correct this situation there have been proposals

40

To

to amend the Code to

allow such violations to be tried by Federal District Courts.

As of

this writing legislation is still pending.
With respect to the Supreme Court decisions regarding Article
41
2(11),
jurisdiction over civilians, there is another jurisdictional
gap.

This came about by the rulings in a series of cases following the

Toth decision.
39

United States v. Gallagher, 7 USCMA 506, 22 CMR 296 (1957).

40

Proposals have been recommended and introduced many times.
Latest proposal is S. 761 introduced by Senator Ervin, January 26, 1965,
Hearings were held in January and March 1966. Parallel bills were in
troduced in the House. Legislation is expected in 90th Congress.
41

UCMJ, Art. 2 "Persons subject to the Code. The following
persons are subject to the Code: . . . (11) all subject to any treaty
or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any
accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by,
or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States and outside
the following: the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."
Revised Article.
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The Supreme Court had considerable difficulty in deciding
whether or not the power granted by Congress in UCMJ, to military courtsmartial to try civilians overseas should be sustained.

Article 2(11)

was first tested with respect to civilian dependents "Accompanying the
Armed Forces without the continental limits of the United States."

The

Supreme Court was required to decide constitutionality in two similar
cases arising from murders committed on American military installations
•in foreign land.

/o

Mrs. Covert killed her husband, a sergeant in the United States
Air Force, at an air-base in England.
with her husband.

Mrs. Covert was residing on base

Mrs. Smith killed her husband, an Army officer on a

post in Japan where she was living with him.
service member.

Neither accused as a

Both were tried and found guilty by general courts-

martial and sentenced.

The sentence in the Smith case was affirmed by

the United States Court of Military Appeals.

The Covert case was re

manded for a rehearing on an issue of insanity, which rehearing was
never held.

Subsequent to the Toth decision, each brought habeas corpus

proceedings in different District Courts where Mrs. Covert was ordered
released and Mrs. Smith was refused the writ.

Their cases came to the

Supreme Court by government appeal in the Covert case and by appeal on
behalf of Mrs. Smith in the other.
The cases

43

were decided together.

The Court held that civilians

accompanying members of the Armed Forces abroad could be tried by courtsmartial.

In each case, however, the decision was five to four.
42
Tresolini, op, cit., pp. 488-489.
43Reid y. Covert, 351 U. S. 487 (1956).
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Frankfurter wrote a separate opinion deciding that he needed more time
to consider the issues.

44

Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black stated

in their dissent:
. . . The questions raised are complex, the remedy drastic,
and the consequences far reaching upon the lives of civilians.
The military is given new powers not hitherto thought con
sistent with our scheme of government. For these reasons
we need more time to write our dissenting views.
In the next term the Court granted a rehearing for both women.
A r

In June 1957, in the second Reid v . Covert case, ° the Court reversed
its previous stand and held that they could not be tried by military
authorities.

Again the justices were far from being in agreement.

The

majority opinion, written by Justice Black, and joined in by the Chief
Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan, concluded that the power of
Congress to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces does not extend to civilians overseas, even though they be
dependents living with servicemen on military bases, and that under our
Constitution, courts of law alone are given power to try civilians for
offenses against the United States.

The Court expressed its agreement

with the well-known military judicial authority, Colonel Winthrop, when
he said "A statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be
made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace."

47

In two

separate concurring opinions Justices Frankfurter and Harlan limited
their approval of the result by concluding that there was no constitutional
44
45
46

Tresolini, op. cit.
Note 43, supra.

Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 77 Sup. Ct., 1222 (1957) .
'>
47
Winthrop, cited extensive ly in this thesis.
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justification for trial of civilian dependents for capital offenses in
time of peace (emphasis supplied).
The following case also involved UCMJ Article 2(11), USCMA and
the Supreme Court.

A Mrs. Dial and her serviceman husband were tried

and convicted by a general court-martial in West Germany of involuntary
manslaughter in the death of their 1 year-old son, a noncapital offense.
An Army board of review affirmed the conviction and the Judge Advocate
General of the Army submitted the jurisdictional question to the United
States Court of Military Appeals for clarification under UCMJ Article
67(b) (2),

The defense urged the same arguments used in Reid v . Covert.

The Court affirmed the decision of the board of review.

The Court

alluded to the fact that certain language of the majority opinion in
Reid v. Covert, was to the effect that Congress could not subject
civilian dependents, accompanying the Armed Forces in peacetime, to
courts-martial jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the offense, and
that certain of the justices had concurred in the result only on the
ground, that the offense was capital.

The Court of Military Appeals

then concluded that with regard to non-capital offenses:
Dependents of military personnel in foreign lands who
are associated with the military in every way but for the
performance of military duties . . . (could) constitution
ally be considered by Congress as part of the Armed Forces
for the purpose of regulating their conduct on the same
basis as those in uniform.
The Court of Military Appeals thus refused to restrict the field
any further than required by Reid v. Covert, which was a capital case.
Immediately after the United States Court of Military Appeals
announced its decision, Mrs. Dial obtained a writ of habeas corpus from

48United States v. Dial, 9 USCMA 541, 26 CMR 321 (1958).
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the United States District Court in West Virginia.

The Government

appealed the judgement directly to the Supreme Court under Title 28,
United States Code, Section 1252, on 8 October 1958.

The habeas corpus

action in this case is entitled Singleton v. Kinsella.

(The action was

brought on her behalf by Mrs. Dial's mother, hence the name Singleton.
The defendant, Miss Nina Kinsella, was the warden at Alderson Federal
Reformatory for Women where Mrs. Dial was confined.)

The Supreme Court

held that military jurisdiction is based on the status of the accused
rather than on the nature of the offense; and accordingly, trial by
court-martial of civilian dependents for non-capital as well as capital
offenses could not be constitutionally justified.

The Supreme Court

thereby ended the distinction previously made in the Covert case between
capital and non-capital offenses.

49

The Supreme Court was again called upon to act in this area, via
the habeas corpus route, in Grisham v. Hagan, McElroy v. Guagliardo,
and Wilson v, Bohlender, all decided on January 18, 1960.^

Grisham,

an Army civilian employee in France, was tried for premeditated murder,
a capital offense, while Guagliardo and Wilson, Armed Forces civilian
employees overseas, were tried for non-capital offenses.

The Court

held in Grisham, that there is no valid distinction between civilian
employees and dependents as concerns court-martial jurisdiction over
them in capital cases; the rule expressed in Covert applies.

In

Guagliardo and Bohlender the Court equated the status of civilian
employees to that of dependents in non-capital cases such as Singleton.
49
Kinsella v. Singleton, 351 U. S. 234, 80 Sup. C t . 297 (1960).
50Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U. S. 278, 80 Sup. Ct. 310 (1960).
McElroy v. Guagliardo. 361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. Ct. 305, (1960). Wilson v.
Bohlender, 361 U. S. 281, 80 Sup. C t . 305 (1960).
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Accordingly, Article 2(11) provising for jurisdiction of courts-martial
over dependents and civilian employees in both capital and non-capital
cases in time of peace cannot be constitutionally applied.

Presumably

in time of war UCMJ, Article 2(11) would be valid.
The jurisdictional loophole created by these Supreme Court
decisions is still open.

No American tribunal, military or civil, can

try American civilians who violate the law overseas.
if at all, in foreign courts under foreign procedures.

They must be tried,
In order to bring

such persons under the protection of constitutional safeguards, and to
have them liable to the UCMJ, there have been proposals to extend juris
diction to the Federal District Courts.

This may also be unconstitutional;

the matter is before Congress for further s t u d y . T h e constitutional
issue concerning the status-of-forces agreements involving military
personnel was sustained by the Supreme Court.

52
In Wilson v. Girard,

the Court in a unanimous opinion held that there are "no constitutional
or statutory barriers" which prohibit surrendering American military
personnel to foreign courts.
We have seen in a few cases, how the United States Court of
Military Appeals and the United States Supreme Court have used the
power of judicial review in military justice.

There have been other

-’■'■William A. Creech, "Serviceman's Rights," American Bar Ass'n,
Journal, XCIX (Nov. 1963), 1074.
~^Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524 (1957). Army Specialist
William S. Girard was charged in 1957 with the death of a woman, who
had been picking up scrap at an Army firing range north of Tokyo. The
soldier's lawyers contended that since he had been carrying out the
duties of a guard he could not be tried by a Japanese court. The
United States, however, said Girard had not been authorized to shoot
the woman. The U. S. waived jurisdiction and turned him over to
Japanese authorities. He was convicted and given a three-year sentence,
which was shortly suspended.
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opinions and rulings of USCMA too numerous to list which have directly
affected the instructions in the Manual for Courts Martial, United States,
1951. At the end of the first ten years under the Uniform Code, the
services published a forty page booklet of annotations to reflect recent
case law.

53

Each paragraph of the Manual was annotated if applicable.

Perhaps most significant was the ruling"^' by the Court of Military
Appeals, which prohibited the use of the Manual by members of the Court.
This had been a well-established custom in the services.

The Court

reasoned that such use was prejudicial to the accused.
Par. 33h. Court members must reach a decision on the
findings and sentence on the basis of the evidence pre
sented and the law officer's instructions, uninfluenced
by any policy directives whether contained in the Manual
or elsewhere. Calling the court's attention (by TC) to
that part of par. 33h which states that retention in the
armed forces of thieves and persons guilty of moral turpitude
reflects upon the good name of the military service and its
self-respecting personnel, has been held p r e j u d i c i a l . 55
With the exception of a few executive orders, the writer has
discussed all changes so far implemented in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Manual.

Before turning to proposed legislation, note

the following Executive Order, the most recent revision in military
justice.
On December 3, 1966, President Johnson signed Executive Order
11317, which increased from one year to ten years the maximum period of
confinement which may be adjudged by a court-martial for the offense
of misbehavior of a sentinel.

5 6

The new maximum applies only when the

53
Military Justice: Annotations to 1951 MCM, (Air University, 1962) .
^United States v. Rinehart, 8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).
55Mil itary Justice Annotations, supra, p. 3.
56
UCMJ, 113.
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offense is committed in any of the areas authorizing entitlement to
special pay for duty subject to hostile fire,^

These are the areas in

which critical sentinel duty takes on even greater importance.

While

Vietnam is the area of principal concern at this time, the Executive
Order would have future application in any geographical area designated
as a hostile fire area.

This is the only change in the Table of Maximum

Punishments which the commanders concerned have generally recommended
or feel to be warranted as a result of the conflict in Vietnam.

Suspension

of the limitations on all offenses as to which the Table of Maximum
Punishments was suspended during the Korean conflict was considered and
- j 58
rej•ected.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has worked well in the last
fifteen years.
today.

It worked well in Korea and it is working well in Vietnam

But some changes are in order; even the Judiciary Act adopted by

the first Congress in 1789 is still being amended.

Proposed legislation

to modify the military justice system will be discussed next.

Proposed Legislation

The three major amendments,

59

were passed by Congress only after

being sponsored by the Department of Defense, The Code Committee, or
other interested agency or individual.

While the three measures re

ferred to above have been enacted into law, a greater number of pro-1
posals have not fared so well.

Congress in enacting the Code clearly

■*^As designated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to 10 U. S.
C. 310,
"^USCMA Annual Report, 1966, p. 3.
59UCMJ, 58a (1960); UCMJ, 123a (1962); UCMJ, 15 (1963).
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recognized that amendments to the Code would be required from time to
time.

It specifically provided for recommendations in UCMJ, Article

67(g) .
The Court of Military Appeals and the Judge Advocates
General of the armed forces shall meet annually to make
a comprehensive survey of the operation of this code and
report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives and to the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretaries of the Departments the
number and status of pending cases and any recommendations
relating to uniformity of sentence policies, amendments
to this code, and any other matters deemed appropriate.
Each year many proposals have been advanced, most have obtained
bill status, but we have seen that only a few have been enacted into
law.

The Code Committee made several valuable recommendations to

6o
Congress in its second annual report0 for the period ending December
31, 1953.
Code,

This report contained seventeen proposed amendments to the

Subsequent annual reports, reflected continuing study and refine

ments of the changes originally recommended.
The seventeen proposals were incorporated in a Defense Depart,
,
61
ment sponsored bill and introduced in the 84th Congress.

This omnibus

bill went further than the proposals advanced by the Code Committee.
In fact if enacted, the power of the Court of Military Appeals would
have been considerably reduced.

This Pentagon action reflected some

animosity then felt by high ranking military officials against the
62
Court.
The American Legion opposed the proposed legislation and
made some recommendations of its own.

63

No legislation was enacted.

60USCMA Annual Report, June 1, 1952 - Dec. 31, 1953.
^H.R. 6583, 84th Congress., 2nd Sess.
62
•
...
American Legion Report on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 1956, p. 11.
^ Ibid, p. 53.
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The omnibus bill underwent various changes from time to time.
By January 1959, all proposals, after complete screening, were incorporated
into one revised omnibus bill.

This bill was processed through IJSCMA,

The Departments of Defense and Justice, the Bureau of the Budget, and
introduced by the Chairman of the House and Services Committee,
Representative Carl Vinson as H.R. 3387.^
this time drawn up its own proposals0
sentative Overton Brooks, Louisiana.

The American Legion had by

which were introduced by Repre
No legislation was enacted.

In October 1959 the Special Committee on Military Justice, of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, undertook to study
the bills pending in Congress, and to consider independently what
changes in the Uniform Code were necessary.

In its study, the Committee

was extremely conscious of the necessity of striking a balance between
the interest of the military in performing its mission on the one hand,
and the importance of providing fundamental judicial guarantees to
military persons accused of crime on the other.

66

This Special Committee

found that the Vinson Bill contained many worthwhile provisions, which
were designed to do away with costly and unnecessary administrative
duplication, ineffeciency, and ambiguity.
in enlarging substantive rights.

But it did not go far enough

The Committee found that a number of

the American Legion's proposals (H.R. 3455) merited enactment, but con
cluded that they went too far in circumscribing the military judicial

^H.R. 3387, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
^H.R. 3455, 86th Cong,, 1st Sess.
^Arnold I. Burns and Donald J. Rapson, "Sounding the Death
Knell of Drumhead Justice," American Bar Ass'n. Journal. XLVIII
(Sept. 1962) 843-847.
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system.

In short the Committee found provisions of merit in each of

the bills, and also found each to be seriously lacking.
The Special Committee presented an alternate proposal, which
was adopted by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.

In

April 1961, that proposal *
7 was introduced in the Senate by Jacob
Javitts and in the House by John V. Lindsay.

Both sponsors were members

of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
In January 1961, the Defense Department omnibus amendments were
again transmitted to Congress as part of the new Kennedy administration's
legislative program.

The amendments were not introduced.

Since the

proposed legislation appeared to be bogged down, the Defense Department
abandoned the omnibus technique and established priorities in individual
proposals.

68

Thus Article 123(a) and Article 15 amendments became law

in the 87th Congress.

69

The 87th Congress showed an exceptionally avid interest in
military justice.

In addition to enacting the two major amendments,

The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights conducted extensive
hearings on the constitutional rights of military personnel.
hearings

70

The

were prompted in part by the Supreme Court's decisions in

Burns v. Wilson, Wilson v. Girard, Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Singleton
and McElroy v. Guargliardo; all were concerned with constitutional rights,
the Uniform Code and court actions.

The subcommittee noted also that

67S. 1553, H.R. 6255, 87th Cong,, 1st Sess.
6ft

°This was recommended informally by the House Armed Services
Committee.
69
Notes 19 and 23, supra.
70
_„
Note 32, supra.

162
71
in Harmon v. Brucker,
the Supreme Court ruled that the character of
an administrative discharge issued by the Army could be judicially re
viewed.

This decision paved the way for successful collateral attacks

against administrative discharges by means of suits for back pay in the
U. S. Court of Claims.
Despite these recent safeguards for the serviceman,
provided by the courts, the subcommittee members and
individual Senators continued to receive complaints
concerning military justice and the issuance of admin
istrative discharges by the armed services. In view of
a decade's having passed since the Uniform Code of
Military Justice was enacted, the subcommittee was dis
turbed by claims that abuses persisted which the code
was designed to eliminate. Furthermore, there were re
ports that the safeguards of the Uniform Code, vigorously
implemented in the decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals, had induced the military to resort to adminis
trative action, which was not subject to these safe
guards .73

After the subcommittee decided to conduct hearings on
the constitutional rights of military personnel, ex
tensive research was undertaken and detailed questionaires were submitted to the Department of Defense for
answer by each armed service. Moreover, copies of
service regulations pertinent to military justice and
administrative discharges were examined in detail. The
hearings occupied 7 days, and testimony was received
from spokesmen for the Defense Department and each armed
service, from the judges of the Court of Military Appeals,
from representatives of bar associations and veterans'
organizations, and from various individuals with special
experience relevant to the subcommittee's inquiry.74
The subcommittee also studied the responses to 7000 questionaires
and members of the staff made a seventeen-day field study of military*
7

71Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U. S. 579, 1958.
7^Clackum v. United States, Ct. Cl. 237-257.
73

Senate Report, note 34, supra., p. IV.
p. V.
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justice in Europe.
1962.^

The hearings were published in a 966 page volume in

The major part of that publication is concerned with adminis

trative discharge procedures, although considerable testimony and factual
information relates directly to the Uniform Code.

The hearings have

been referred to many times in this paper.
Unquestionably the hearings and the study by the Senate sub
committee are most thorough and far reaching.

Since the subcommittee

weighed the recommendations of the sponsors of previous legislative
proposals, one would expect a resolution of most of the major differences.
Generally this is so.
subcommittee,

76

Based on the findings and recommendations of the

eighteen legislative proposals were introduced by

Senator Sam J. Ervin on August 6, 1963.

The stated purpose was to

protect and enhance the constitutional rights of military personnel.

77

On September 25, 1963, Representative Victor Wickersham introduced
identical bills in the House of Representatives.

78

Each bill was re

ferred to appropriate committees but no hearings were held.

The House,

however, did pass a bill granting life tenure to the judges of the
Court of Military Appeals.

79

In the next session, 1964, the Defense Department recommended
separate legislative proposals which it preferred over the Ervin81
Wickersham bills.

No hearings were held on any of these bills.

^Note 32, supra.
7^The Report, note 34, supra., contained twenty-four conclusions
and twenty-two recommendations. S. 2002-S. 2019 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
^Co-sponsors with Senator Ervin were Senators:
Fong, Humphrey, Hruska, Long, and Williams.

Bayh, Cooper,

78H.R. 3179, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
79

H.R. 3179, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. The bill also granted Federal
judiciary retirement privilege (full pay after ten ye'ars) . There was no
action in the Senate.
80H.R. 10048 and H.R. 10050, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess.
O1
Air Force Times, March 11, 1964, p. 22.
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Early in the 89th Congress, on January 25, 1965, Senator Ervin
,
82
again introduced eighteen bills in the Senate;
in addressing the Senate
he made the following remarks:
Mr. President, I send to the desk, for appropriate
reference, a legislative program designed to further
safeguard the constitutional rights of our Nation's
servicemen and women who for so long have sacrificed
so much to protect our American way of life. Senator
Hruska has joined me in sponsoring some of these
measures as will be indicated on the bills when they
are printed.
President Johnson recently stated that we must make
every effort to improve the status of our military per
sonnel and to make them "first class citizens in every
respect." Improved pay and retirement policies, better
housing and equitable promotion systems are indeed im
portant steps for improving working and living con
ditions for our Armed Forces. However, basic to the
goal of making military personnel "first class citizens
in every respect," is to insure that they are accorded
the rights, privileges and protections guaranteed to
every American citizen under the Constitution.

Complaints received by the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, and the results of its ex
tensive 4-year study, have revealed numerous inade
quacies both in the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
administrative discharge proceedings, and other im
portant phases of military justice.

Almost without exception, the subcommittee work has
pointed up a very serious need for legislation to mod
ify our system of military justice so that it adequately
protects the constitutional rights of our military per
sonnel .
Protecting the rights of the individual by providing
procedures in which disputes about rights and duties
can be fairly and equitably decided is basic to our
Nation's system of constitutional due process. This
system has long been a part of the rights of every
citizen. Certainly, Mr. President, it is time that the
men and women of the armed services, whose sacrifices
almost defy enumeration, should also be provided the
protections of our Constitution which are consisten
with the duty of the military to protect our Nation.
82

S. 745 - S. 762, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.

83
U.S., Congressional Record, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965,
CXI, 17-1.
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On January 4, 1965, Representative Charles E, Bennett again
introduced the Defense Department sponsored bills in the House of
Representatives,^4

His remarks are included in the appendix.

The

objectives of Mr, Bennett's bills are essentially the same as Senator
Ervin's; "To insure every serviceman the same rights as a person
accused of committing a crime in a federal criminal proceeding,"

85

No hearings were conducted on any of the twenty proposals, in the 1965
session,
Hearings on all twenty bills were held in January and March,
1966, before joint sessions of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
and a Special Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

All

three judges of the Court of Military Appeals, and the Judge Advocates
General testified at the hearings.

No legislation was reported out of

committees following the hearings.

In the House of Representatives,

86

Mr. Bennett introduced another bill0
Defense,
S, 745.

Summaries of these bills

87

sponsored by the Department of
follow,

A bill to further insure to military personnel certain due
process protection by providing for military judges to be
detailed to all general courts-martial, and for other purposes.-This essentially makes the "law officer" a "military judge,"
and creates a field judiciary program for all services.

88

84H.R. 273, H.R. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
85Appendix.
^H.R. 16115, 89th Cong,, 2nd Sess,
87

Extracted from copies furnished by Senator Ervin and Representa
tive Bennett.

88

The Army initiated the Field Judiciary Program.
but the Air Force is opposed.

The Navy followed
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S. 746.

A bill to further insure due process in the administration of
military justice in the Department of the Navy by establishing
a Judge Advocate General's Corps in such Department.--

This

is not opposed but will create a personnel recruiting problem
for the Navy.
S. 747.

A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military
personnel by providing an independent forum to review and correct
the military records of members and former members of the Armed
Forces, and for other purposes.--

This has no direct relation

to UCMJ except to clarify correction of conviction errors.
S. 748.

89

A bill to provide additional constitutional protections for
members of the armed forces by establishing Courts of Military
Review, and for other purposes.--

This would change the title

from Boards of Review, set minimum tours for military and
require one civilian member, who is not a military retiree.
S. 749.

90

A bill to insure to military personnel certain basic constitu
tional rights by prohibiting command influence in courts-martial
cases and in certain non-judicial proceedings, and for other
purposes,--

This is the old bugaboo in military justice.

The

Code prohibits command influence but there have been cases
reversed by USCMA for this violation.
secutions against offenders.

There have been no pro

This bill puts more teeth in the

89 There is general disagreement amongst the services for the
correct authority to correct courts-martial convictions.
90

The Navy has had civilian membership on boards of review.
Continuity would be improved by this proposal.
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measure and extends to non-judicial proceedings hitherto not
covered in the Code.
S. 750.

91

A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military
personnel by insuring their right to be represented by
qualified counsel in certain cases, and for other purposes.-This would add a new Article 141, to govern procedure and
right to counsel in discharge board actions.

It would also

require qualified legal counsel for defense in special courtsmartial, if a bad-conduct discharge can be adjudged.
S. 751.

92

A bill to protect the constitutional rights of military personnel
by increasing the period within which such personnel may petition
for a new trial by court-martial and for other purposes.--

This

would extend the period for petition for a new trial from one
year to two years, and grant the right in any court-martial.
S. 752.

93

A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice)
of title 10, United States Code, so as to provide additional
constitutional protection in trials by courts-martial.-is a major change.

This

It would provide a law officer (trial

judge if so phrased) in special as well as general court91 Undoubtedly there have been many cases of command influence which
have not reached USCMA. The purposes of the bill are commendable. Chief
Judge Quinn says this article should be grouped with the punitive articles.
USCMA Annual Report, 1966,
92
Like S. 746 this will require more lawyers for the Navy. The
Army sends bad-conduct cases to a general court-martial. The Air Force
provides defense counsel in special courts-martial if the charge warrants
a bad-conduct discharge. The Navy special courts-martial adjudge such
discharge without benefit of counsel. The right to counsel in board pro
ceedings is new to all.
9

3
7“This
has been supported by the Code Committee and the Department of Defense for many years. The old article limits applicability to
serious sentences only. The new proposal is similar to Federal Rules for
Criminal Procedure. Rule 33.
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martial.

The accused in either court could waive trial by

the court members and agree to trial by the law officer (trial
judge).

The requirement for law officer in the special court-

martial would not apply in time of war.
S. 753.

94

A bill to implement the constitutional rights of military
personnel by providing appellate review of certain administrative
board decisions, and for other purposes.--

This would extend

the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Military Appeals
to review decisions of board for correction of military records. 95
S. 754.

A bill to insure due process in the case of certain administra
tive actions involving military personnel.--

This would reorganize

administrative discharge boards, and revise procedure.

It would

require a law officer to preside, and would grant the respondent
i
96
legali counsel.
i

S. 755.

A bill to further insure the fair and independent review of
court-martial cases by prohibiting any members of a board of
review from rating the effectivenss of another member of a

9^The rationale is based on the fact that special courts-martial
can now adjudge a bad-conduct discharge. In some cases a defense counsel
is provided, but there is now no provision for a law officer. This bill
will also increase Navy personnel requirements. USCMA approved, but
objects to relief in war clause.
95
A unique proposal; USCMA considers this action worthwhile.
Review would be limited to matters of law as in courts-martial. This
proposal is a major gain for a board respondent.
96
Discharge boards have been conducted as "show cause" pro
ceedings, The respondent is at a disadvantage. In most cases, however,
he is anxious to get out of the service and prefers this action to trial
by court-martial. He does not realize, or chooses to ignore, the harm
ful effects of a less than honorable discharge. Fair hearing and right
to counsel would be major protections.
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board of review, and for other purposes.--

This would revise

a long standing procedure of military supervisor relationships,
but there has been a trend to correct this in such situations.
S. 756.

97

A bill to broaden constitutional protection against double
jeopardy in the case of military personne.--

This is to cir

cumvent administrative discharge of military personnel who have
been acquitted by a court-martial for the same offense. 98
S. 757.

A bill to more effectively protect certain constitutional rights
accorded military personnel.--

This would allow pretrial

hearings to resolve certain issues, motions, plea, etc.
rights referred to are speedy and fair trials.
S. 758.

The

99

A bill to provide additional constitutional protection in certain
cases to members of the armed forces, and for other purposes.-This would require an additional article in the Code or another
section of section 10 U . S. C.

The purpose is to extend due

process, confrontation, compulsory process and assistance of
counsel to a respondent in administrative discharge proceedings.
97

There used to be semi-permanent courts-martial with the senior
member having general supervisory responsibility and authority over the
members. That procedure was abandones many years ago. In some cases
this has carried over in the boards of review. The Army corrected the
practice after the hearings in 1962. The Air Force still uses the old
procedures. The Navy usually has a civilian as the permanent member.
98

Protection against double jeopardy is provided in UCMJ,
Article 44. This relates to criminal proceedings only. The services
use administrative boards to discharge undesirables who "beat the rap."
99

The proposal would bring military procedure still closer to
that of Federal district courts. The Department of Defense has made
similar proposals in the past.
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He would have the right to demand trial by court-martial.'*'®®
S. 759.

A bill to afford military personnel due process in courtmartial cases involving minor offenses, to insure the right of
counsel in such cases, and for other purposes.--

This would

eliminate the summary court-martial and require the use of
special courts if the service desires to prosecute.

It would

also allow an accused who elects court-martial by refusing non
judicial punishment (an existing right) to have the benefit of
higher court procedure.

,

,.

.

_,

.

This proposal was mentioned above in

the discussion of Article 15.
S. 760.

101

A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice)
so as to assure constitutional rights of confrontation and com
pulsory process by providing for the mandatory appearance of
witnesses and the production of evidence before certain boards
and officers, and for other purposes.--

This bill would grant

subpena power to discharge boards and incidentally to UCMJ,
Article 32 investigating officer.
S. 761.

102

A bill to provide for compliance with constitutional requirements
in the trials of persons who are charged with having committed

^®®The proposal is applicable to those who deny the alleged mis
conduct, which is the basis for the administrative action.
'*’^'*"This proposal has been advanced by the services since 1953.
With the new Article 15, summary courts-martial are even less justified.

102

Like S. 754, note 98, supra., S. 760 would make board pro
ceedings closer to trial proceedings. There would have to be a reason
able distance limit for subpena of civilian witnesses. The Article 32
subpena power would be a major improvement in the Code.
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• certain offenses while subject to trial by court-martial, who
have not been tried for such offenses, and who are no longer
subject to trial by court-martial.--

This is to close the

jurisdictional gap created by the Supreme Court Toth decision
invalidating Article 3(a).

The remedy, granting jurisdiction

to a Federal District Court, must be staffed by the Committee
103
on the Judiciary.
S. 762.

A Bill to provide for compliance with constitutional require
ments in the trials of persons who, while accompanying the
armed forces outside the United States commit certain offenses
against the United Stated.--

This is to plug the jurisdictional

loophole created by the Supreme Court decisions in several cases
involving civilians tried under UCMJ, Article 2(11) .

The remedy,

granting jurisdiction to a Federal District Court, must be
staffed by the Committee on the Judiciary.
H.R. 273.

104

A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice)

of title 10, United States Code, by creating single-officer
general and special courts-martial, provising for law officers
on special courts-martial, affording accused persons an
opportunity to be represented in certain special court-martial

Corrective action has been advocated ever since the Supreme
Court decisions. The jurisdiction would apply to the court in whose
area the offense took place; if overseas, to the area where the accused
was first apprehended or taken. The accused should be protected against
doublt jeopardy if tried in a foreign or State court.
^^The Department of Defense is anxious to close the jurisdictional
gap. This bill would clarify that jurisdiction extends to military tri
bunals in time of war. There is also a provision against double jeopardy
in the event of trial by a foreign court.
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proceedings by counsel having the qualifications of defense
counsel detailed for general courts-martial, providing for
certain pretrial proceedings and other procedural changes, and
for other purposes.--

This bill "provides for pretrial pro

ceedings, authorizes the law officer to conduct court-martial
proceedings alone under certain circumstances, guarantees legal
counsel in special court-martial cases, and establishes post
conviction proceedings."^^
bills 750, 752, 757.

This is a combination of Senate

It would establish a law officer for a

special court-martial and allow the law officer to be a single
officer court if the accused waives trial by the full court.
It would retain however, the special court without a law officer
as an alternative and the summary court.
H.R. 277.

106

A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military Justice)

of title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Judge Advocate
General to grant relief in certain court-martial cases, to extend
the time within which an accused may petition for a new trial,
and for other purposes.--

This bill "will extend the period

within which a new trial may be requested from the present one
year to two years, and it authorizes the Judge Advocate General
of each service to set aside those convictions where fraud,
illegality, lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or newly

^ ' ’Appendix.

Statement by Hon. Charles E. Bennett.

106The major difference regarding the requirement for a law
officer in all or certain special courts-martial should be resolved in
committee. The summary court-martial will surely be eliminated. This
bill was formerly H.R. 10048 (88), and was first proposed by the Code
Committee in 1959.
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discovered evidence is found."

This bill has certain

108
features of Senate bills 747 and 751. x
H.R. 16115.

A bill to amend chapter 47 (Uniform Code of Military

Justice) of title 10, United States Code, by permitting timely
execution of certain court-martial sentences.--

This bill

would insure that a death sentence should include a dishonorable
discharge or dismissal, total forfeitures, and life imprisonment.
This would allow all of the lesser sentence to take effect upon
approval without waiting for the President's review of the death
109
sentence.

Conclusions

Even a cursory examination of the bills advanced by Senator Ervin
reveals a dedicated concern for constitutional rights.
derivative of it appears in each bill.

The term or a

The language in Representative

Bennett's bills was developed from that of the Code Committee and is
less dedicated; but Bennett's introduction expressed the same concern.
This concern for constitutional rights for military personnel
is a great advance over the military justice system before the Code.
We attribute this advance to the United States Court of Military Appeals.

110

Even considering early interpretations of the Code when the Court con
sidered that rights stem from Congress, not the Constitution, there has

■*^Note

107,

supra.

108

According to Mr. Bennett, the differences should be resolved
in committee. This bill was first proposed by the Code Committee in 1963
and was formerly H.R. 10050 (88).
1959.

The Code Committee has made a similar proposal each year since
This is the first introduction as a bill to either House of Congress.
110United States v. Clay, 1 USCMA 74, 1 CMR 74 (1951) .
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been a significant change of view.

Now there can be no doubt.

Mili

tary personnel have every right except thos particularly excluded by
the Constitution.
Senator Ervin and his committee's concerns have had major effect
even without legislation.
policy;

HI

The Army changed its board of review manning

the Navy adopted the field judiciary system;

112

and the Air

113
Force revitalized administrative discharge procedures.

All without

legislation.
So too have Supreme Court decisions influenced military justice
procedures.

After the Miranda v. Arizona r u l i n g , w h i c h extended pro

tections to accused persons in state jurisdictions, the military justice
authorities corrected their own directives.

Even before this decision

many legal experts agreed that the military system afforded maximum pro
tection to the accused.

Commissioners of USCMA participated in con

ferences on the impact of that decision and the Escobedo v. Illinois
. . .
U6
decision.
The improved quality of military justice can be attested by
Supreme Court rulings last year.

In Gallagher v. Quinn et al,

the

complainant alleged a denial of due process and equal protection of the

^ ^ Congressional Record, CXI, no. 17-3.
112Ibid.
113

no. 17-11.

Air Force Times, Sept. 21, 1966; Air Force Manual 39-12.

^ ^ Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602
(1966) .
^~*Air Force Times, July 13, 1966, p. 3.
•'•'^Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct.
1758 (1964) .
117

Gallagher v, Quinn et al, 363 F. 2nd 301 (C.A.D.C.) (1966).
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laws, in the requirement that an enlisted accused show good cause in
order to obtain review by USCMA; whereas a general or flag officer's
case is automatically reviewed.

118

The U. S. Court of Appeals rejected
119

the contention; the Supreme Court denied certiorari,
the litigation.

thereby terminating

In like manner, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in

Crawford v. United States

120

in which private Crs.wford attacked USCMA's

decision that he had not been denied his right to enlisted membership
on his court-martial, because of a policy of selecting members from noncommissioned officers of the first three grades.

121

Constitutional rights and the United States Court of Military
Appeals have been the subjects of this thesis.

It should be apparent

that the rights exist for military personnel, and that the Court is
dedicated to protect them.
The Uniform Code of Military Justice has been in effect over
sixteen years.

Military justice has improved, numbers of cases are

down, discipline is high; the case load of the Court of Appeals has
diminished, all in spite of an increase in overall strength and greater
demands on the armed forces.

There is not only a decrease in courts-

martial rates, but there is also a rising sophistication in the admin
istration of military justice at all levels.

It is fitting to conclude

with these remarks by the United States Court of Military Appeals:
. . . It is gratifying to note the increased attention
being paid at the trial level--particularly among the pro
fessional law officers of the services--to procedural and

118UCMJ, 67 (b) (1).
11 9

Gallagher v. Quinn et al, 385 U. S. 881, 87 Sup. Ct. 167 (1966).

120

Crawford v. United States, 380 U. S. 970, 85 Sup. Ct. 1349

(1965).
121
United States v. Crawford, 15 USCMA 31, 35 CMR 3 (1965).
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substantive matters in order that the number of errors may
be reduced and appellate reversals brought to an all-time
low. Nevertheless, no system of justice is ever perfect,
nor can it hope, by maintaining a static position, wholly
to eliminate its faults. Hence, it is to be hoped that
the Armed Services, guided by this Court, will continue to
strive in every instance for the fairness and impartiality
which should be the hallmark of every American judicial
proceeding.

122

^

USCMA Annual Report, 1966, pp. 5-6.
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, June 8, 1949.

Hon. MILLARD E. TYDINGS,
United States Senate.

DEAR SENATOR TYDINGS: As you know, I requested Prof. Edmund
M. Morgan to inform your committee of my support of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice when he appeared before you on my be
half.
I would appreciate it if this letter is incorporated in the
record of your hearings and the committee report, because I am
anxious to reiterate my strong support of the Uniform Code.
The Code was drafted and transmitted to the Congress before
I assumed office. I have taken the time, however, to familiarize
myself with its principal provisions and I concur in Mr. Forrestal's
opinion that the Code represents an outstanding example of unifi
cation in the armed services. In my opinion, the Code provides
a number of very desirable protections for the accused without in
terfering with necessary military functions. In addition it re
presents a great advance in military justice in that it provides
the same law and the same rights, privileges, and obligations
will apply to Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Coast Guard. I
cannot emphasize too much the importance of this equality and
the fact that I believe it will be an item which will enhance
the teamwork and cooperative spirit of the services.
I am aware of the concientious and objective work of your
committee and the House committee. I know that the bill has
been improved by these constructive efforts and I wish to express
to you and the members of your committee my deep appreciation.
In order that the benefits of the Code may be available at the
earliest possible time, I strongly urge its passage at the present
session of the Congress.
With kindest personal regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,

LOUIS JOHNSON.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
Washington 25, D. C.
September 25, 1961
Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Ervin:
I have your letter of September 15 requesting a "preliminary
statement" of my views on the constitutional rights of persons
in the armed forces and I am glad to comply therewith.
Without attempting to analyze the basis of my conviction
which includes a study of the opinions, old and recent of the
United States Supreme Court, I firmly believe that accused
persons in the military services "are entitled to the rights
and privileges secured to all under the Constitution of the
United States, unless excluded directly or by necessary im
plication, by the provisions of the Constitution itself." I
set out that view as a controlling principle of my judicial
conduct in my dissent, in United States v. Sutton, 3 USCMA 220,
228, 11 CMR 220. More recently, writing not as a judge but
merely as a member of the great confraternity of the legal
profession, I said: "it is anomalous to say that aliens re
siding in the United States are entitled to constitutional
guarantees, but that citizens of the United States in the ser
vice of their country are deprived of those rights simply be
cause they wear the uniform of one of its military departments."
The United States Court of Military Appeals and Individual
Rights in the Military Service, 35 Notre Dame Lawyer 491, 493
(August 1960) . To that I might add the question:
"If sentences
felons are not deprived of constitutional rights and protection
(see Fulwood v. Clemmer, Court of Appeals, D. C. Circuit,
August 1, 1961) surely the men and women wearing the uniform in
defense of the United States are not deprived of those rights
and protections?"
Should you decide to conduct hearings on the matters raised
in your letter, I shall be glad to submit to your subcommittee
a compilation of pertinent United States Court of Military
Appeals opinions and other of my public statements on those
matters.
With every good wish for continued physical and spiritual
strength in the discharge of your monumental responsibilities
in these difficult times, I am

(s)

Very sincerely yours,
Robert E. Quinn
ROBERT E. QUINN
Chief Judge
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
Washington 25, D. C.
January 25, 1962
Honorable Sam J. Ervin, Jr.
Chairman Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights
United States Senate
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Senator Ervin:
Referring to your notification of January 23rd of the
hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
on February 6th, please be advised I shall be present at the
time and place indicated.
In accordance with my letter of January 9, 1962, I am en
closing a list of cases decided by the United States Court
of Military Appeals, which the Subcommittee might find help
ful. The essence of my personal views on some of the matters
under inquiry by the Subcommittee is set out in my letter of
September 24, 1961. I shall be pleased to enlarge upon them
in direct testimony before the Subcommittee.
In anticipation of our early meeting, I am

(s)

Enclosure

Sincerely yours,
Robert E. Quinn
ROBERT E. QUINN
Chief Judge
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U. S. Court of Military Appeals,
Washington, D. C., Dec, 15, 1965.

Hon. Sam J. Ervin, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
Old Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR ERVIN: Thank you very much for your invitation
to testify in connection with proposed legislation on constitu
tional rights of service personnel at the joint hearings in
January 1966, before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and a special sub
committee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. My
brother judges and I welcome the opportunity.
At earlier congressional hearings, I pointed out that
the U. S. Court of Military Appeals, which was established
by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C.
801, et seq., has attempted to expunge the dictum in the mili
tary establishment that courts-martial are mere instrumentalities
of the executive branch and, therefore, are not bound to accord
to military accused the protections and privileges granted by
the U. S. Constitution. By decision and discussion, the judges
of the Court of Military Appeals have endeavored to demonstrate
that military discipline is wholly compatible with, and en
couraged by, equal justice under law. The war crimes trials
after World War II established that, even in the field in time
of hostilities, the military commander cannot disregard the
rule of law.
Millions of Americans are committed to serve in our armed
services in defense of our country and the free world. The
preservation of their constitutional rights and privileges is
imperative, I commend you, and the other committee members,
for the intense interest you have shown, and the work you have
done, in this important field of law.
As requested, Judges Ferguson, Kilday and I will separately
send you a written statement of our respective views on the
pending bills.
With warmest regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
ROBERT E. QUINN,
Chief Judge
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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY
COLORADO

TO:

L t . Colonel Thomas H. McGuigan
Professor of Air Science
AFROTC Detachment 615
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota
Dear Colonel McGuigan
1. The Department of Law teaches a one-year prescribed
course in elementary law to all cadets in their secondclass (junior) year, and three one-semester elective
courses: Constitutional Law, International Law and Gov
ernment Contracting. The first semester of the prescribed
law course is a survey of the major fields of civil law
(e.g., contracts, torts, property), and the second semester
is a survey of criminal law, evidence, jurisdiction and
personal estate planning.
2. Military justice is not part of any of our academic
courses, and the only instruction furnished cadets re
lating to this topic is in the military training program,
under the auspices of the Commandant of Cadets, In that
program, members of the Law Faculty present a two-hour
lecture on the military justice system. There are no pre
pared course materials for these lectures.
3. The general area of civil rights protection in the
military justice system is taken up in a small part of our
Constitutional Law course. The text used for that course
is the commersially available Mason and Beaney, American
Constitutional Law (2nd ed.).
4. I regret that we have no course materials which pertain
to your thesis topic. I believe your best source for in
formation would be The Military Law Review (DA Pamphlet 27100-1), which is published quarterly by the Army Judge Ad
vocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. That
school also has on file the thesis of its graduates, many
of which pertain to your topic.
Sincerely

(s) Christopher H. Munch
CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH
Colonel, USAF
Professor of Law
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THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S SCHOOL, U. S. ARMY
CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA
24 May 1963

JAG/AJ

Lt. Colonel Thomas H. McGuigan, USAF
Professor of Air Science
Air Force ROTC Detachment 615
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota
Dear Sir:
Although the students at The Judge Advocate General's School
receive extensive instruction on the procedural and substantive
aspects of military justice, including the rights of a military
accused, we have no available material particularly devoted to
discussion of civil rights protection of military personnel.
A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee last
year conducted extensive hearings on the question of the con
stitutional rights of military personnel. You might find the
record of the hearings and the report of the Subcommittee
helpful. Both documents are for sale by the Superintendent of
Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.
The hearings volume costs $2.45 and is entitled, "Constitutional
Rights of Military Personnel, Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of the Committee On The Judiciary,
United States Senate pursuant to S. Res. 260, Eighty-Seventh
Congress, Second Session." The Committee Report is Senate
Report No. 1455, 87th Congress, 2nd Session.
I hope you will find this information of value in your
project.
Sincerely yours,
(s)

Peter H. Cook
Peter H. Cook
Major, JAGC
School Secretary
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20442

July 26, 1965

Lt. Col. Thomas H. McGuigan
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive
Merced, California 95340
Dear Colonel McGuigan:
Pursuant to your request of July 21st, there is enclosed a
copy of the 1964 Annual Report of the Court and the Judge Advocates
General, submitted to the Congress.

As there is no charge for

this copy, I am returning your check in the amount of $2.50.
An inquiry was made in Judge Ferguson's office regarding
the speech he made before the Federal Bar Association in April.
Judge Ferguson spoke from notes and did not have a prepared
speech.

Therefore, of course, no copies are available.
Very truly yours,

(s)

Frederick R. Hanlon
Frederick R. Hanlon
Acting Clerk of the Court

Ends.
1 - 1964 Annual Report.
2 - Check for $2.50.

186
UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20442

March 7, 1966

Mr, Thomas H. McGuigan
161 E, N. Bear Creek Drive
Merced, California 95340
Dear Mr. McGuigan:
In response to your request of February 28th, I regret that the
Annual Report covering the period from January 1 to December 31, 1965
is still in the hands of the printer and will not be available before
next month.

A copy will be sent to you upon release.

I also regret that Judge Ferguson's remarks at the Federal Bar
Association meeting at Bolling Air Force Base on Nov. 10, 1964 were
not made from a prepared text and, accordingly, a copy is not available.
You may be interested in knowing that the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights recently conducted additional hearings on the
constitutional rights of military personnel.

Further information may

be obtained by addressing the subcommittee directly.
Enclosed is a copy of a pamphlet on the Court recently released.
Very truly yours,

(s)

Alfred C. Proulx
Alfred C. Proulx

Enel.
1 - Pamphlet on Court.
ACP:vb s
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UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
WASHINGTON, D. C 0 20442

June 2, 1966

Mr. Thomas H. McGuigan
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive
Merced, California 95340
Dear Mr. McGuigan:
This is in response to your letter of May 24th regarding the
availability of the 1965 Annual Report of the Court.
This report has just recently been received from the printer
and a copy thereof is enclosed for your use.
Very truly yours,
(s)

Frederick R. Hanlon
Frederick R. Hanlon
Acting Clerk of the Court

Enel.
1 - 1965 Annual Report.

FRHrvbs
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Charles E. Bennett
Member, 2nd District, Florida
Committee: Armed Services

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.
February 25, 1966

Mr. Thomas H. McGuigan
161 E. N. Bear Creek Drive
Merced, California

Dear Mr. McGuigan:
Thank you for your February 15 letter. Attached are
copies of my bills H.R. 273 and H.R. 277, and a recent
statement I made to the Senate subcommittee on constitutional
rights which sets forth my feelings on this legislation. The
Department of Defense is actively supporting my bills and
I am hopeful that a hearing will be granted on them by the
House Armed Services Committee sometime this spring. I hope
this information will be helpful to you, and if I can be of
any further assistance, please let me know.
With kindest regards, I am
Sincerely,
(s)Charles E. Bennett
Charles E. Bennett
CEB/ijf
Enclosures(3)
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MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

ROBERT EMMETT QUINN, CHIEF JUDGE; born in Phenix, Rhode Island,
April 2, 1894; son of Charles and Mary Ann (McCabe) Quinn; A.B., Brown
University, 1915; LL.B., Harvard, 1918; married Mary Carter, August 3,
1923; children, Norma Marie, Robert Carter, Pauline Fulton, Cameron
Peter, and Penelope Dorr; admitted to Rhode Island bar and practicing
attorney at Providence, Rhode Island, since 1917; member, United States
Diplomatic Intelligence Service in England and France, 1917-19; member,
Rhode Island Senate, 1923-25 and 1929-33; Lieutenant Governor, State of
Rhode Island, 1933-36; Governor, State of Rhode Island, 1937-39; judge,
Rhode Island Superior Court commencing May 1, 1941; legal officer, First
Naval District, 1942-45; captain, United States Naval Reserve Volunteer
legal Unit of Rhode Island, 1947-50; president, Kent County Bar Association; member, American and Rhode Island Bar Associations; member, Phi
Kappa; member, Brown, Harvard, Wannamoisett, Turks Head, West Warwick
Country, and Army and Navy Clubs; nominated by President Truman to chief
judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals May 22, 1951, for the
term expiring May 1, 1966, confirmed by Senate, June 19, 1951, and took
oath of office June 20, 1951, under commission of President Truman dated
June 20, 1951; Democrat; Roman Catholic.
HOMER FERGUSON, JUDGE:

born in Harrison City, Pennsylvania, son

of Samuel and Margaret Ferguson; married Myrtle Jones, June 20, 1913, one
daughter, married, Mrs. Charles R. Beltz.

Attended University of Pitts

burgh; LL.B. degree University of Michigan, 1931.
Michigan,

1913; practiced law, Detroit, 1913-29.

Admitted to bar of
Circuit Judge of the

Circuit Court of Wayne County, Michigan, 1929, elected 1930, and re-elected
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1935 and 1941; United States Senator from Michigan, 1943-55; Chairman,
Republican policy committee, 83rd Congress; member, Foreign Relations
Committee and Appropriation Committee, 83rd Congress.

Honorary degrees

conferred by Detroit College of Law, Kalamazoo College, Michigan State
College, Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania; L L .D ., University
of Michigan, 1951.

Member of the second Hoover Commission; Ambassador

from the United States to the Philippines, March 22, 1955, to April 8,
1956, at which time resigned to accept Presidential appointment;
nominated by President Eisenhower as judge of the United States Court of
Military Appeals, January 30, 1956, for terms expiring May 1, 1956, and
May 1, 1971, unanimously confirmed by Senate, February 17, 1956, and took
oath of office April 9, 1956, administered by Chief Justice Warren.
Member of American and Michigan Bar Associations.
PAUL J. KILDAY, JUDGE; born in Sabinal, Uvalde County, Texas,
March 29, 1900, son of Pat and Mary (Tallant) Kilday; moved with his
family to San Antonio, Texas, in 1904; attended the San Antonio public
schools, St. Mary's Parochial School, and old St. Mary's College of San
Antonio, Texas; graduated from Main Avenue High School and from George
town University, Washington, D. C., in 1922, with LL.B. degree; LL.D.
degree, St. Mary's University of San Antonio, Texas, 1963; admitted to
bar of Texas in 1922; engaged in private practice at San Antonio from
1922 to 1935; First Assistant Criminal District Attorney of Bexar County
(San Antonio), 1935-38; member of bars of Texas, District of Columbia,
and Supreme Court of United States; member, Texas State, San Antonio,
and American Bar Associations; married Miss Cecile Newton, of San
Antonio, 1932, and they have two daughters- Mary Catherine and Betty Ann
(Mrs. Fred W. Drogula); elected in the 76th Congress in 1938 and reelected
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to the eleven succeeding Congresses, serving from January 3, 1939 to
September 24, 1961; member, Committee on Military Affairs, House of
Representatives, 1939-46, and Committee on Armed Services, 1946-61;
for ten years, member joint Committee on Atomic Energy; awarded
"Citation of Honor" by the Air Force Association "for tireless efforts
in building national armed strength and active participation in success
ful legislation to enhance the military service as a career" (1955) ;
awarded "Army Times 1957 Accomplishment Award in recognition of his out
standing leadership in military personnel legislation and his unceasing
concern for the welfare of the men and women of the Armed Forces";
awarded honorary membership by the Fleet Reserve Association (1958);
awarded "Honor Bell" by the Military Order of the Association of the
United States in Recognition of Outstanding Contribution to the Associa
tion's Programs" (1961); awarded Veterans of Foreign Wars Gold Medal of
Merit "in recognition of his many outstanding historic contributions to
national security" (1961); resigned from House of Representatives
September 24, 1961, to accept Presidential appointment; nominated by
President Kennedy as Judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals,
June 28, 1961, for the term expiring May 1, 1976, unanimously confirmed
by Senate, July 17, 1961, and took the oath of office September 25, 1961,
under commission of President Kennedy dated September 25, 1961; Democrat.
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EXECUTIVE ORDER 10214

PRESCRIBING THE MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the act of Congress
entitled "An act to unify, consolidate, revise, and codify the Articles
of War, the Articles for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary
laws of the Coast Guard, and to enact and establish a Uniform Code of
Military Justice," approved May 5, 1950 (64 Stat. 107), and as President
of the United States, I hereby prescribe the following Manual for CourtsMartial to be designated as "Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951."
This manual shall be in force and effect in the armed forces of
the United States on and after May 31, 1951, with respect to all courtmartial processes taken on and after May 31, 1951:

Provided, That

nothing contained in this manual shall be construed to invalidate any
investigation, trial in which arraignment has been had, or other action
begun prior to May 31, 1951; and any investigation, trial, or action
so begun may be completed in accordance with the provisions of the
applicable laws, Executive orders, and regulations pertaining to the
various armed forces in the same manner and with the same effect as if
this manual had not been prescribed:

Provided further, That nothing

contained in this manual shall be construed to make punishable any act
done or omitted prior to the effective date of this manual which was
not punishable when done or omitted:

Provided further, That the maximum

punishment for an offense committed prior to May 31, 1951, shall not
exceed the applicable limit in effect at the time of the commission of
such offense:

And provided further, That, any act done or omitted prior
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to the effective date of this manual which constitutes an offense in
violation of the Articles of War, the Articles for the Government of the
Navy, or the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard shall be charged as
such and not as a violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice;
but, except as otherwise provided in the first proviso, the trial and
review procedure shall be that prescribed in this manual.

(s)
THE WHITE HOUSE, February 8, 1951

HARRY S. TRUMAN
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TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES
CHAPTER 47.-- UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

Sec. 801. Art. 1. Definitions
In this chapter:
(1) "Judge Advocate General" means, severally, the
Judge Advocates General of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force and, except when the Coast Guard is operating as
a service in the Navy, the General Counsel of the De
partment of the Treasury.
(2) The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard
when it is operating as a service in the Navy, shall be
considered as one armed force.
(3) "Commanding officer" includes only commissioned
officers.
(4) "Officer in charge" means a member of the Navy,
the Marine Corps, or the Coast Guard designated as such
by appropriate authority.
(5) "Superior commissioned officer" means a commis
sioned officer superior in rank or command.
(6) "Cadet" means a cadet of the United States Mili
tary Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, or
the United States Coast Guard Academy.
(7) "Midshipman" means a midshipman of the United
States Naval Academy and any other midshipman on active
duty in the naval service.
(8) "Military" refers to any or all of the armed
forces.
(9) "Accuser" means a person who signs and swears to
charges, any person who directs that charges nominally
be signed and sworn to by another, and any other person
who has an interest other than an official interest in
the prosecution of the accused.
(10) "Law Officer" means an official of a general
court-martial detailed in accordance with section 826
of this title (article 26).
(11) "Law specialist" means a commissioned officer
of the Navy or Coast Guard designated for special duty
(law).
(12) "Legal officer" means any commissioned officer
of the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard designated
to perform legal duties for a command.
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A Statement by Brigadier General Alan B. Todd, U. S. Army, Assistant
Judge Advocate General for Military Justice, to the Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel February 20, 1962.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A person subject to military law does not divorce himself
from his responsibilities under the civil law. On the contrary,
the former is superimposed upon the latter with the result that
a serviceman's misconduct frequently violates both the Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the State or local laws wherein
the offense occurred. The rule of law is well settled that
trial by one system of laws does not impose a bar to subsequent
trial for the same misconduct by a court deriving its authority
from a separate sovereign. In this respect, the serviceman
stands in no better and no worse position than do all the
citizens of the United States, for in every State there is the
possibility that an act in violation of State law, may also be
a violation of a Federal law prohibiting the same activity.
Nevertheless, the Department of the Army's pertinent policy
provision, as set out in regulations, is that a member of the
Army normally will not be prosecuted by a court-martial for
misconduct which violates both the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the State or local laws if the individual has
already been convicted by a civil court.
There are circumstances, however, under which it believed
a military offender should be prosecuted by court-martial
even though he has already been tried in a State court. Let
us assume that a military policeman, who is on duty dressed
in his identifying uniform, observes that a soldier is
engaged in a fist fight with another individual on a public
street in a civilian community, when the military policeman
attempted to apprehend the soldier, the latter struck him
with a beer bottle. Subsequently, the soldier was convicted
of assault and battery in the local civilian court and was
fined $20. The military commander of the soldier may have
decided that the soldier, by assaulting a military policeman
who was then in execution of his duties may have committed
a serious military offense, and that the sentence of the
civilian court was inadequate under the circumstances. The
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over
the individual may, therefore, authorize disposition of the
matter under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, notwith
standing the previous trial. This would be based upon his
personal determination that authorized administrative action
alone is inadequate and that punitive action is essential to
maintain discipline in his command.
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Extract from a statement by Major General Charles L. Decker, The Judge
Advocate General of the Army, in his annual report, 1963, pursuant to
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

In the past, much time has been spent on discussions of
improvement of substantive and procedural law. There has
been substantial improvement--the greatest single improvement
has been the enactment of article 15, which has provided for
the correction of young soldiers by their commanders. No
permanent stain left on the soldier's record. Long since,
the officers of the Army have dropped the concept of the
pseudo-exemplary sentence, the unfairly heavy punishment
designed to scare potential offenders. With a few scattered
exceptions, military men realize that, except for those who
must be kept away from society indefinitely, punishment
should be directed toward correction and rehabilitation.
Article 15 provides small corrective dosages for expeditious
administration. Normally, the soldier is not removed from
his fellows and his training, thereby eliminating problems
of restoration to the community after confinement. This
simple provision for expeditious correction draws us closer to
basic and universal concepts of good justice, because it creates
a neighborhood consciousness of good order and discipline. The
principle of neighborhood responsibility and keeping the admin
istration of justice close to the community is admirably demon
strated in the use of this article. This underlying principle
should be put to use in the civilian community.
In the last two decades, there has been a tendency to
make the administration of justice mechanistic--to remove from
the citizen an awareness of his own responsibility for law and
order. This tendency can have a particularly unfortunate
effect on the military community. Give to a young commander,
commissioned or noncommissioned, the feeling that he can turn
his disciplinary problems over to someone else and, on occasion,
he will try to do so. Regarding himself basically as a budding
strategist and logistician, he will turn over this "administra
tive aspect" of the command function to "the lawyers." Ex
perience has proved, time and again, that morale and discipline
are responsibilities of the commander. There should always be
some training in the judicial process for commanders at all
levels, as well as some participation. Article 15 supplies
some of the requisite responsibility. I am of the opinion
that participation by the younger line officers in all parts
of special court-martial work is salutary. Proper supervision
by judge advocates can insure substantial compliance with law.
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REPORT TO HONORABLE WILBUR M. BRUCKER,
SECRETARY OF' THE ARMY - 18 Jan. 1960.
by
The Committee on the Uniform Code of Military
Justice Good Order and Discipline in the Army.
Summary.
The committee was appointed by Major General R. V. Lee, by order
of the Secretary of the Army, October 7, 1959.

The purpose was to study

and submit a confidential report on the Uniform Code and good order and
discipline in the Army.

The scope of the study included the date on

courts-martial, discharges, pertinent USCMA decisions and analysis of
the Court's function; disciplinary interest was primarily concerned with

UCMJ.
Extracts,
During the period FY 52 - FY 59, 915, 369 persons were tried by
courts-martial; highest rate FY 1953 113.3/1000, lowest rate FY 1959
66.2/1000.

Rate is persons tried per 1000 assigned strength; definite

improvement in state of discipline.
Comments on the effects of USCMA.
contrary to, but paramount to Manual.
Manual during trials,

Developed (p. 27) case law

Cited prohibition of use of

Cited effects of USCMA decisions on Article 31,

self-incrimination, e.g. body fluids, "statement" extended to include
handing over a pass on demand,

"All these interpretations have had

the effect of making it extremely difficult to investigage suspected
offenses in the military.
good order and discipline."

They have had an (p. 87), adverse effect on
Criticized rulings of USCMA on search and

seizure.

"It is not clear what the COMA considers to be a permissable

search."

The committee recommended change in the Code to give commanding
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officer broad power of search.

(p. 89)

Recommended USCMA be a five

man court, with members who have had recent military-legal experience.
Extracts from letter to Hon. Paul J. Kilday, Chairman, Special
Subcommittee on Amendments to UCMJ, committee on Armed Services, H.R.
from Major General Stanley W. Jones Asst. Judge Advocate General.
800 Ct. 1959, (p. 181) ..
. . . Certain refinements have been introduced by judicial
interpretation that tend to dilute its (the UCMJ) efficiency
to support military operations.
At the outset it is fair to say that a number of decisions
of the (U.S. COMA) have made it unduly difficult to collect
evidence and prosecute military offenders. The stated
objective of the Court is "to place military justice on the
same plane as civilian justice." U.S. v. Clay 1 USCMA
74, 1 CMR 74. In order to achieve this objective there has
been a pronounced tendency, on the part of the Court, to
import civilian rules.
(cites U.S, v. Brown, the search and seizure hereoin case)
(cites Article 31 "statements" - "body fluids," etc.)
In recent years there has been a pronounced tendency in
Court of Military Appeals decisions to downgrade the standing
of the Manual for Courts-Martial which is a Presidential re
gulation and, in effect, to declare that many provisions of
the Manual are invalid exercises of the President's authority
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.
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STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. BENNETT
TO THE JOINT HEARING OF THE
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
AND THE SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
JANUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Chairman, it is a distinct pleasure for me to appear before
this joint meeting of these two subcommittees, and I want to take this
opportunity to personally congratulate the distinguished senior Senator
from North Carolina for his leadership in the field of military justice.
It can safely be said that no one person has contributed more than you
have to the protection of the American serviceman's individual rights.
As you may know, I have been a member of the House Armed Services
Committee for over a decade and a half now, having been assigned to that
committee from another about the time the Uniform Code of Military Justice
was adopted.

Various matters before the committee over the past 15 years

have shown that the Code needs further work.
In November of 1964 the Department of Defense advised it had
two draft bills to overcome certain problems in modern military justice,
concerning which I had contacted them.

Those two proposals I introduced

and they presently bear the numbers of H.R. 273 and H.R. 277 and in many
respects resemble five of the Senate bills now before this committee for
consideration.

They in no way diminish the objects sought by the Senate

bills, but if anything strengthen them.
Essentially, my bill H.R. 273 provides for pre-trial proceedings,
authorizes the Law Officer to conduct court-martial cases, and establishes
post conviction proceedings.

H.R. 277 will extend the period within

which a new trial may be requested from the present one year to two years,
and it authorizes the Judge Advocate General of each service to set
aside those convictions where fraud, illegality, lack of jurisdiction,
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improper venue, or newly discovered evidence is found.
At this point X think I should make my position clear that I
am not wedded to the language of my two proposals, because we have not
had hearings on these bills in our committee yet, and perhaps your
committee will report a bill better than these two I have proposed, in
which case I would of course prefer to back your bill.

A hearing was

scheduled by the House Armed Services Committee on these two House bills
for early in October of the last session, but when we learned you ex
pected to conduct hearings' ours were postponed until you had a chance
to meet and report something.

By way of urging action, I certainly

hope this committee will report a bill to the Senate, and get it passed
early in this session, because I would like the House to have a Senate
bill to consider when hearings are held later this year.
Without exploring the technicalities of my bills, since I know
the Department of Defense will go into this in great detail later in
these hearings, I would like to say that what I am trying to do with
these two bills is to streamline the military court-martial proceeding
so as to insure every serviceman the same rights as a person accused of
committing a crime in a federal criminal proceeding.
I want to again thank the members of these two committees for
your efforts to insure a standard of military justice that all Americans
can be proud of, and I greatly hope you will report and pass a bill that
the House can consider promptly in this session.
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